Primal Vantage Co. v. O'Bryan
| Docket Number | 2020-SC-0247-DG,2021-SC-0064-DG,2021-SC-0065-DG |
| Decision Date | 18 August 2022 |
| Parties | PRIMAL VANTAGE COMPANY, INC. APPELLANT/CROSS-APPELLEE v. KEVIN O'BRYAN APPELLEE/CROSS-APPELLANT AND SANTÉ O'BRYAN APPELLEE/CROSS-APPELLANT AND DENNIS MARTIN AND MARGARET MARTIN APPELLEES/CROSS-APPELLEES |
| Court | United States State Supreme Court — District of Kentucky |
ON APPEAL FROM COURT OF APPEALS NOS. 2018-CA-0045-MR 2018-CA-0063-MR & 2018-CA-0106-MR JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT NO. 12-CI-006326
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT/CROSS-APPELLEE, PRIMAL VANTAGE COMPANY:
Milton S. Karfis
Clark Hill PLC
Griffin Terry Sumner
Casey Wood Hensley
Frost Brown Todd LLC
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE/CROSS-APPELLANT, KEVIN O'BRYAN:
Ann B. Oldfather
R. Sean Deskins
Oldfather Law Firm
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE/CROSS-APPELLANT SANTÉ O'BRYAN:
Paul A. Casi
Jeff W. Adamson
Paul A. Casi, II, P.S.C.
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEES/CROSS-APPELLEES, DENNIS I. AND MARGARET M. MARTIN:
Diane M. Laughlin
Emily C. Lamb
Bryce Lee Cotton
Blackburn Domene & Burchett, PLLC
This is a products-liability case in which Primal Vantage Company, Inc. appeals from a decision of the Court of Appeals affirming the trial court's judgment that awarded substantial damages to Kevin O'Bryan and Santé O'Bryan. The product at issue is a ladderstand manufactured by Primal Vantage that must be affixed to a tree to be used for hunting. While Kevin O'Bryan was using the ladderstand, the polypropylene straps securing the stand to the tree broke, the stand fell, and Kevin sustained serious injuries.
A jury found Primal Vantage liable for failure to warn and to instruct of the dangers associated with use of the straps. The jury awarded Kevin[1]damages for past and future medical and personal expenses, pain and suffering, and lost wages. The jury also awarded damages for loss of consortium to Kevin's ex-wife, Santé O'Bryan. The O'Bryans' claims against Dick Sporting Goods, Inc., the retailer of the stand, and Dennis and Margaret Martin, the owners of the property where the accident occurred, were dismissed by the trial court.
We granted discretionary review to examine further the role of the trial court as evidentiary gatekeeper and clarify the law regarding failure-to-warn claims. Upon review, we conclude that the trial court abandoned its role as evidentiary gatekeeper and abused its discretion by allowing the jury to hear a wealth of other-incidents evidence before ultimately ruling that evidence inadmissible near the end of trial. As a result, we affirm the Court of Appeals' opinion in part, reverse in part, and remand the matter to the trial court for further proceedings.
In 2007, Dennis Martin purchased a ladderstand at Dick's Sporting Goods and attached it to a tree on his property. The stand was manufactured by Primal Vantage and consisted of a two-person platform and an attached ladder. The ladderstand was not designed to be freestanding. Five polypropylene straps were required to secure the stand to a tree. The stand was sold with instructions and warnings.
In 2012, Kevin O'Bryan, his son, and a friend were given permission to hunt on the Martins' property. Kevin, his son, and the friend climbed the ladder to the platform. Shortly after the three reached the platform, the straps broke, and the stand fell to the ground. Kevin suffered serious injuries.
Kevin and his then-wife Santé O'Bryan sued the Martins, the owners of the property and the stand; Dick's Sporting Goods, the retailer of the stand; and Primal Vantage, the manufacturer of the stand. The claims against the Martins were dismissed before trial based on Kentucky Revised Statute (KRS) 150.645, which grants immunity to landowners who give permission to another person to hunt on their property. All claims against Dick's Sporting Goods were dismissed by directed verdict following the close of evidence at trial.
The only remaining claims for the jury to consider were the failure-to-warn claims asserted against Primal Vantage. The jury found Primal Vantage liable for failure to provide reasonable warning and instruction regarding the risk attendant to the use of polypropylene straps to secure the ladderstand to a tree. The jury awarded damages to Kevin for past medical expenses, past personal-care expenses, future medical and personal-care expenses, pain and suffering and loss of enjoyment of life, and lost wages. The jury also awarded Santé O'Bryan damages for loss of consortium. But the jury assigned fifty percent of the fault to Primal Vantage and fifty percent of the fault to Kevin O'Bryan. As such, the trial court reduced Kevin's and Santé's damage-award amounts by fifty percent and issued judgment accordingly.
Primal Vantage and the O'Bryans both filed cross-appeals. The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment. Primal Vantage and the O'Bryans then filed cross-motions for discretionary review in this Court, which we granted.
Primal Vantage asserts several errors: (1) the trial court improperly admitted evidence of other incidents of accidents and injuries involving ladderstands; (2) the trial court gave jury instructions that deviate from Kentucky law and violate the bare-bones doctrine; (3) statutory immunity under KRS 150.645(1) does not proscribe apportionment of fault to the landowners where the accident occurred; (4) an ex-spouse cannot recover for loss of spousal consortium damages and, if they can, damages must be limited to the time of marriage; and (5) Plaintiffs' counsel made repeated prejudicial references to China and Chinese locations to inflame the jury.
On cross-appeal, Kevin O'Bryan contends that the trial court made several errors: (1) the trial court erroneously granted Primal Vantage's motion for directed verdict on the design-defect claims; (2) the trial court erroneously excluded evidence of other incidents involving ladderstand accidents; (3) Primal Vantage failed to comply with discovery orders regarding other-incidents evidence; and (4) if a new trial is granted based on the apportionment instruction, the trial court's decision to grant summary judgment to the landowners based on statutory immunity in KRS 150.645(1) should be reversed.
Finally, on cross-appeal, Santé O'Bryan argues that the trial court erred by reducing her loss-of-consortium award by applying Kevin's fifty percent apportionment of fault.
A. The trial court abused its discretion by failing to screen other-incidents evidence, allowing several other instances to be introduced, then declaring the evidence inadmissible, and failing to admonish the jury expressly not to consider the inadmissible other-incidents evidence.
The trial court abandoned its evidentiary gatekeeper role and allowed introduction of a wealth of evidence of other injuries or accidents occurring during the use of ladderstands without determining the admissibility of the other-incidents evidence until near the end of trial. This error was magnified by several assurances offered by the trial court that introduction of dissimilar other-acts evidence would likely result in a mistrial and by the trial court's failure to admonish the jury clearly that the jury must not consider this inadmissible other-incidents evidence during deliberations.
Generally, "evidence of the occurrence or nonoccurrence of other accidents or injuries under substantially similar circumstances is admissible when relevant to . . . the existence or causative role of a dangerous condition, or a party's notice of such a condition."[2] "A requirement of substantial similarity between the earlier accidents and the one at issue is a matter of relevance to be decided in the discretion of the trial judge and will not be reversed unless there has been an abuse of discretion."[3] Abuse of discretion will be found where the trial court's decision "was arbitrary, unreasonable, unfair, or unsupported by sound legal principles."[4]
In this case, counsel for Primal Vantage objected to introduction of other-incidents evidence through motions in limine. In response, the trial court applied a good-faith standard, generally denied all Primal Vantage's motions in limine, allowed discussion in the presence of the jury of 78 other instances of accidents or injuries involving ladderstands, and withheld ruling on admissibility of the other instances evidence until near the end of trial.
The trial court serves an important evidentiary-screening function to ensure that, to the extent possible, only relevant evidence is admitted.[5] Moreover, even in the context of relevant evidence, the trial court has a duty to balance the potential for undue prejudice against the probative worth of proffered evidence.[6] Here, the trial court abdicated its gatekeeping role by allowing the jury to hear presentation of a wide range of other-incidents evidence without making any determination until near the end of the trial on whether the other instances were substantially similar to the accident underlying this suit. Failure properly to screen the challenged other-incidents evidence was error because the jury heard about 78 other accidents and injuries involving ladderstands that the trial court ultimately ruled inadmissible.
The trial court amplified its error by cautioning that the admission of dissimilar other-incidents evidence would likely result in a mistrial but then failing to grant the mistrial when it ultimately ruled the evidence inadmissible. The trial court cautioned that evidence of unrelated incidents was "incredibly prejudicial evidence" and signaled at least four times that admission of dissimilar other-incidents evidence would likely result in a mistrial. Even so, after ruling that all other-incidents evidence presented at trial was...
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