Primes v. Tyler

• Decision Date: 23 July 1975
• Docket Number: No. 75-61,75-61
• Citation: 331 N.E.2d 723,43 Ohio St.2d 195,72 O.O.2d 112
• Parties: , 72 O.O.2d 112 PRIMES, Appellee, v. TYLER, Appellant.
• Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Page 195

43 Ohio St.2d 195

331 N.E.2d 723, 72 O.O.2d 112

PRIMES, Appellee, v. TYLER, Appellant.

No. 75-61.

Supreme Court of Ohio.

July 23, 1975.

Syllabus by the Court

R.C. 4515.02, the Ohio guest statute, is unconstitutional.

Plaintiff George Primes III, appellee herein, and defendant Donald G. Tyler, appellant herein, are part of a group of weekend golfers who travel to various golf courses by way of an informal car pooling arrangement, where the golfer who arranges the tee times with the golf course also arranges who should drive as he contacts the other riders. That determination (who drives) depends on the proximity of the selected golf course to the homes of the riders.

No payment has ever been made nor has any gasoline ever been purchased by anyone for the driver. No set arrangements regarding transportation have ever been worked out on a regular or definite basis.

On the day of the collision, May 29, 1972, Tyler picked up Primes at his home, and, en route to the golf course, failed to complete a turn at an intersection, and collided with a telephone pole, causing injury to Primes.

Primes filed a complaint in the Court of Common Pleas, which alleged that he was a 'paying passenger' and that Tyler was guilty of ordinary negligence. Tyler's answer denied both allegations.

At the conclusion of the plaintiff's case, the court sustained defendant's motion for a directed verdict, and entered judgment for defendant.

Upon appeal, that judgment was reversed by the Court of Appeals for Summit County (Judges Victor, Mahoney and Doyle), which found that the evidence would not support a finding that plaintiff was a 'paying passenger' and thus the Ohio guest statute, R.C. 4515.02, would apply to preclude liability, but that such statute is unconstitutional as violative of the equal protection guarantees of the Ohio and United States Constitutions. The Court of Appeals certified its judgment to this court.

Cherpas, Manos & Syracopoulos, Christopher T. Cherpas, Akron, Spangenberg, Shibley, Traci, Lancione & Markus and Richard M. Markus, Cleveland, for appellee.

Knowlton, Sanderson, Ragan, Cady, Corbett & Drexler and William J. Cady, Akron, for appellant.

WILLIAM B. BROWN, Justice.

R.C. 4515.02, the Ohio guest statute, reads:

'The owner, operator, or person responsible for the operation of a motor vehicle shall not be liable for loss or damage arising from injuries to or death of a guest, resulting from the operation of said motor vehicle, while such guest is being transported without payment therefor in or upon said motor vehicle, unless such injuries or death are caused by the willful or wanton misconduct of such operator, owner, or person responsible for the operation of said motor vehicle.'

Upon this record, we agree with the determination of the Court of Appeals that plaintiff was a guest transported without payment, and not a 'passenger.' Plaintiff's allegation of negligence, rather than willful and wanton misconduct, on the part of defendant, squarely places defendant within the class of persons which the guest statute absolves of liability. Plaintiff may not recover for his injuries unless that statute contravenes the organic law of this state or nation. If the guest statute is unconstitutional, it '* * * is not a law; it confers no rights; it imposes no duties; it affords no protection; it creates no office; it is, in legal contemplation, as inoperative as though it had never been passed.' Norton v. Shelby County (1886), 118 U.S. 425, 442, 6 S.Ct. 1121, 1125, 30 L.Ed. 178. Therefore, the question presented is whether the guest statute contravenes the constitutions of Ohio or of the United States. ¹

The guest statute finds its provenance in Connecticut where it was introduced in 1927, upheld by that state's Supreme Court in Silver v. Silver (1928), 108 Conn. 371, 143 A. 240, affirmed, 280 U.S. 117, 50 S.Ct. 57, 74 L.Ed. 221 and promulgated in Ohio as G.C. 6308-6 (115 Ohio Laws 57) on June 15, 1933. The statute's twofold objective has been described as to preserve the hospitality of the host-driver ² and to prevent the possibility of fraudulent, collusive lawsuits against insurance companies. ³

Although this court '* * * need not in equal protection cases accept at face value assertions of legislative purposes, when an examination of the legislative scheme and its history demonstrates that the asserted purpose could not have been a goal of the legislation' (Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld (1975), -- U.S. --, 95 S.Ct. 1225, 1233, 43 L.Ed.2d 514, 525, at fn. 16), we consider only the foregoing dual legislative purposes and proceed to '* * * the determination (of) whether there is some ground of difference having a fair and substantial relation to at least one of the stated purposes justifying the different treatment accorded * * *' (Johnson v. Robison (1974), 415 U.S. 361, 376, 94 S.Ct. 1160, 1170, 39 L.Ed.2d 389) automobile passengers who pay the driver, and those passengers who do not.

Since '(t)he guest statute (is) intended to shield from liability' a certain 'category of persons' (Thomas v. Herron (1969), 20 Ohio St.2d 62, 64, 253 N.E.2d 772, 774), we look first at the category thus established and its compatibility with equal protection guarantees.

'* * * We do not inquire whether this statute is wise or desirable * * *. Misguided laws may nonetheless be constitutional.' James v. Strange (1972), 407 U.S. 128, 133, 92 S.Ct. 2027, 2031, 32 .l.Ed.2d 600. However, '* * * the mere recitation of a benign * * * (statutory) purpose is not an automatic shield which protects against any inquiry into the actual purposes underlying a statutory scheme.' (Emphasis added.) Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, supra at page _ _, 95 S.Ct. at page 1233, 43 L.Ed.2d 514, at page 525.

Under 'traditional' equal protection analysis, it was required that a statutory classification be 'shown to be necessary to promote a compelling governmental interest' (Shapiro v. Thompson (1969), 394 U.S. 618, 634, 89 S.Ct. 1322, 1331, 22 L.Ed.2d 600) when it violated a 'fundamental' interest (Belle Terre v. Boraas (1974), 416 U.S. 1, 7, 94 S.Ct. 1536, 39 L.Ed.2d 797), or was based upon a trait which rendered it 'suspect' (San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez (1973), 411 U.S. 1, 61, 93 S.Ct. 1278, 36 L.Ed.2d 16. Justice Stewart, concurring). Otherwise, the classification would be upheld if there existed any conceivable set of facts under which the classification rationally furthered a legitimate legislative objective. McGowan v. Maryland (1961), 366 U.S. 420, 425, 81 S.Ct. 1101, 6 L.Ed.2d 393.

However, '(i)n all equal protection cases * * * the crucial question is whether there is an appropriate governmental interest suitably furthered by the differential treatment.' Police Dept. of Chicago v. Mosley (1972), 408 U.S. 92, 95, 92 S.Ct. 2286, 2290, 33 L.Ed.2d 212.

Recognizing that the arbitrary imposition of disabilities "* * * is contrary to the basic concept of our system that legal burdens should bear some relationship to individual responsibility or wrongdoing" (Jimenez v. Weinberg (1974), 417 U.S. 628, 632, 94 S.Ct. 2496, 2499, 41 L.Ed.2d 363), Chief Justice Burger states that "* * * the Equal Protection Clause does enable us to strike down discriminatory law * * * where . . . the classification is justified by no legitimate state interest, compelling or otherwise.' (Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. (1972),) 406 U.S. (164), at 175-176, 92 S.Ct. 1400, 31 L.Ed.2d 768.' Ibid.

Jimenez involved a statutory disparity in eligibility for social security benefits between two classes of illegimate children. The government argued that to grant 'eligibility for such benefits to * * * (the statutorily excluded class of) illegimates would open the door to spurious claims,' i. e., fraudulent or collusive claims. (Emphasis added.) Ibid, at page 634, 94 S.Ct. at page 2500. The government urged that an 'absolute bar to disability benefits is necessary to prevent spurious claims because '(t)o the unscrupulous person, all that prevents him from realizing . . . gain is the mere formality of a spurious acknowledgment of paternity or a collusive paternity suit with the mother of an illegitimate child who is herself desirous or in need of the additional cash. '' Ibid, at page 635, 94 S.Ct. at page 2501.

The Chief Justice answered that contention as follows:

'We recognize that the prevention of spurious claims is a legitimate governmental interest * * *. It does not follow, however, that the blanket and conclusive exclusion of appellants' subclass of illegitimates is reasonably related to the prevention of spurious claims. * * * (T)he potential for spurious claims is exactly the same as to both subclasses. * * * Thus, for all that is shown in this record, the two subclasses of illegitimates stand on equal footing, and the potential for spurious claims is the same as to both; hence to conclusively deny one subclass benefits presumptively available to the other denies the former the equal protection of the laws * * *.' Ibid, at pages 636-637, 94 S.Ct. at page 2507.

The concepts of Jimenez are transferable to the present matter. Prior to the enactment of the guest statute, paying passengers and nonpaying guests could recover for injuries negligently inflicted by their driver. ⁴ Under the statute, however, a paying passenger may still recover against a driver for ordinary negligence, but a nonpaying guest is wholly precluded from such recovery. The guest is denied all opportunity to disprove that any suit filed by him would be fraudulent, collusive or destructive of hospitality. On the other hand, the statute does nothing to prevent, but perhaps encourages, a guest to present a fraudulent claim that he paid for the ride or that the driver was guilty of willful and wanton misconduct, and prove such claim with perjury and the collusive assistance of the driver.

The North Dakota Supreme Court, in Johnson v. Hassett (N.D.1974), 217 N.W.2d...