Prince v. Barnhart, 1:04 CV 508.
| Decision Date | 09 September 2005 |
| Docket Number | No. 1:04 CV 508.,1:04 CV 508. |
| Citation | 418 F.Supp.2d 863 |
| Parties | Robert D. PRINCE v. Jo Anne B. BARNHART, Commissioner of Social Security Administration |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Texas |
Steven S. Packard, for Plaintiff.
James Alfred Garrett, for Defendant.
The Court heretofore ordered that this matter be referred to the Honorable Earl S. Hines, United States Magistrate Judge, for consideration pursuant to applicable law and orders of this Court. The Court has received and considered the Report of the United States Magistrate Judge pursuant to such order, along with the record, pleadings and all available evidence. No objections to the Report of the United States Magistrate Judge were filed by the partied.
Accordingly, the findings of fact and conclusions of law of the United States Magistrate Judge are correct, and the Report of the United States Magistrate Judge is ADOPTED. A Final Judgment will be entered separately, affirming the decision of the Commissioner and dismissing this action.
This case is referred to the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge for review, hearing if necessary, and submission of a report with recommended findings of fact and conclusions of law.1
Plaintiff seeks judicial review of the Commissioner of Social Security Administration's (SSA) decision denying his application for Social Security disability benefits. United States district courts may review such decisions. 42 U.S.C. § 405 (2003). However, Congress limits the scope of judicial review to determinations as to whether (a) the Commissioner applied proper legal standards and (b) the decision is supported by substantial evidence. See Leggett v. Chater, 67 F.3d 558, 564 (5th Cir.1995); Anthony v. Sullivan, 954 F.2d 289, 292 (5th Cir.1992). Moreover, if proper principles of law were applied, and the Commissioner's decision is supported by substantial evidence, the Commissioner's findings are conclusive and must be affirmed. Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401, 91 S.Ct. 1420, 1427, 28 L.Ed.2d 842 (1971) (quoting Consolidated Edison Co. v. N.L.R.B., 305 U.S. 197, 230, 59 S.Ct. 206, 217, 83 L.Ed. 126 (1938)); see also, 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).
Plaintiff applied on February 26, 2001 (Tr. 61), claiming disability due to (1) coronary bypass surgery, (2) carpal tunnel syndrome, and (3) bone spur on left heel (Tr. 70). Plaintiff requested and received an evidentiary hearing before an administrative law judge ("ALP) (Tr. 36). ALJ John Jarrett determined that plaintiff has a combination of impairments consisting of (1) coronary artery bypass grafting times six, (2) non-insulin diabetes mellitus, (3) peripheral neuropathy, (4) hypertension, and (5) carpal tunnel syndrome. (Tr. 20, Finding 3)
ALJ Jarrett further concluded that these impairments are severe so as to prevent plaintiff from engaging in his past occupation. However, ALJ Jarrett determined that plaintiff nevertheless retains capacity to do light work, subject to certain specified limitations. In ALJ Jarrett's view, this capacity permits plaintiff to perform alternative work. Relying on expert vocational testimony, ALJ Jarrett specifically concluded that plaintiff can still work as a work order detailer, counter sales clerk, and sales person in hardware, jobs that are available in substantial numbers. Tr. 20.
Since plaintiff can still perform substantial gainful employment, ALJ Jarrett decided that plaintiff is not disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act. He therefore denied plaintiff's claim for disability benefits.
Although plaintiff's brief asserts three alleged errors, plaintiff's arguments conceptually raise two points. Plaintiff argues first that ALJ Jarrett erred in ignoring and failing to consider the combined effect and cumulative impact of one of plaintiff's alleged impairments, viz., heel pain resulting from bone spurs, as required by governing case law and 20 C.F.R. § 404.1523 (2004). Second, plaintiff argues that ALJ Jarrett failed to follow applicable law when evaluating plaintiff's subjective testimony regarding pain and effects of all his symptoms in two respects. Specifically, plaintiff contends that ALJ Jarrett failed initially to evaluate his subjective testimony by measuring it against seven objective factors, as required by Regulation 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(3) (2004). Further, ALJ Jarrett allegedly erred when ultimately failing to make specific credibility findings with respect to those portions of plaintiffs testimony that ALJ Jarrett rejected, as required by governing circuit case law and Social Security Ruling (SSR) 96-7p.2
Plaintiff argues that these proffered errors warrant reversal because his testimony regarding intensity, persistence and functionally limiting effects of his symptoms was inconsistent with a finding of residual functional capacity for light work. Plaintiff argues that had ALJ Jarrett followed the prescribed course for evaluating subjective testimony, the result of the proceedings might have been different, i.e., favorable to plaintiff.
The Commissioner's response—not necessarily ad rem to the specific points of error—is that the ALJ properly considered plaintiff's subjective complaints because ALJ Jarrett "included limitations in his hypothetical questions to the vocational expert [affecting] abilities such as walking, climbing, and postural abilities." Deft.'s Br. at p. 6. The Commissioner further argues that subjective complaints must be corroborated by objective evidence, and that plaintiff's complaint of pain due to heel spur is not corroborated by medical evidence. Id. The Commissioner also argues that the ALJ properly found plaintiff's subjective complaints "creditable but not to the degree alleged," because medical evidence does not support alleged severity of subjective complaints. Id. at p. 7.
For analytical convenience, this section addresses plaintiff's points of error in a logical, but different sequence than they were proffered in plaintiff's brief.
Plaintiff asserts error as follows:
"The ALI failed to consider all of Plaintiff's impairments and their cumulative effect."
Through this error, plaintiff complains that ALJ Jarrett did not discuss an alleged impairment of "bone spurs" in his decision, and did not include it in a hypothetical question addressed to the vocational expert who testified. Plaintiff argues that these omissions "deprived the Plaintiff of having his eligibility for benefits accurately determined." Pl.'s Br. at p. 20. In that respect, plaintiff argues that governing case law and the Commissioner's regulation required ALJ Jarrett to consider the cumulative impact of all impairments, regardless of their severity. Moreover, plaintiff argues that a discussion of bone spurs (and presumably inclusion of bone spurs in the hypothetical question to the vocational expert) "would normally impact the ALJ's decision of whether the Plaintiff can remain on his feet essentially all day long as required by the light exertional level." Id.
Social Security benefits based on disability are awarded only for "impairments" that render a person unable to engage in any substantial gainful activity for a continuous period of not less than 12 months. 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(A). For Social Security disability purposes, an "impairment" is an abnormality that can be shown by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques, and, in fact, must be established by medical evidence, as opposed to the claimant's subjective statement or symptoms. 20 C.F.R. § 416.908 (2004). Mere notations of subjective complaints fall short of "medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques" required to establish an impairment. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1508 (2004).
Frequently—as here—disability claimants exhibit multiple impairments of varying severity. In such circumstances, administrative law judges consider the combined effects of all impairments without regard to whether any such impairment, if considered separately, would be of sufficient severity to be a basis for disability. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1523 (2004); Loza v. Apfel, 219 F.3d 378, 393 (5th Cir.2000), citing Crowley v. Apfel, 197 F.3d 194, 197 (5th Cir.1999); Anthony v. Sullivan, 954 F.2d 289, 293 (5th Cir.1992); Sewell v. Heckler, 764 F.2d 291, 294 (5th Cir.1985); Davis v. Heckler, 748 F.2d 293, 296 (5th Cir.1984); Estran v. Heckler, 745 F.2d 340, 341 (5th Cir.1984). Failure to consider combined impact of multiple impairments constitutes a failure to apply correct principles of law. Loza, 219 F.3d at 393, 399; Owens v. Heckler, 770 F.2d 1276, 1282 (5th Cir.1985).
The Commissioner utilizes a five-step sequential analysis when evaluating disability claims.3 This court previously observed that a befitting approach at Step 2 is for an administrative law judge to address three distinct questions: (1) Does an allegedly disabling condition constitute an "impairment"? (2) If so, is that impairment "severe"? (3) If not severe standing alone, does it combine with other impairments so that the cumulative effect is "severe"? Zeno v. Barnhart, No. 1:03cv649 2005 WL 588223, at *4 (E.D.Tex. Feb.4, 2005).
ALJ Jarrett clearly was aware of plaintiffs alleged bone spurs. He recited "left heel spur" as a claimed impairment in the first paragraph of his evaluation of the evidence. Tr. 15. He also acknowledged that he had a duty to consider all symptoms, including pain. Tr. 16. Given these recitations, ALJ Jarrett's subsequent omission of bone spurs from his listing of combined, medically-determinable, severe impairments must be...
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