Prince v. Chehalis Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 25997.
| Decision Date | 02 June 1936 |
| Docket Number | 25997. |
| Citation | 186 Wash. 372,58 P.2d 290 |
| Court | Washington Supreme Court |
| Parties | PRINCE et ux. v. CHEHALIS SAVINGS & LOAN ASS'N. |
Department 2.
Appeal from Superior Court, Lewis County; Wm. E. Campbell, Judge.
Action by C. E. Prince and wife against the Chehalis Savings & Loan Association. Judgment for plaintiffs, and defendant appeals.
Affirmed.
W Grant Armstrong, of Chehalis, and Clarke & Clarke, of Seattle, for appellant.
Don G Abel, of Chehalis, and C. D. Cunningham, of Centralia, for respondents.
This action was brought to recover damages for the loss of a dwelling house, a garage, and certain items of personal property destroyed by fire which arose, as claimed, from the negligence of the defendant. The cause was tried to the court without a jury, and resulted in findings of fact from which it was concluded that the plaintiffs were entitled to recover, fixing the amount of the damages. Judgment was entered against the defendant in the sum of $3,000, from which it appeals.
The facts are these: The respondents are husband and wife, and own lots 11 and 12 in a certain block in the city of Centralia. The appellant is the owner of three lots in the same block. Between the property owned by the respective parties there is a lot owned by another party. Upon the respondents' property there had been erected a dwelling house and a garage. Upon the property between that of respondents and the appellant there had been erected a rooming or apartment house. Adjacent to this, on the property of the appellant, there was a garage.
At about 5:30 p. m. on June 16, 1934, a fire started in the garage, spread rapidly, and destroyed the rooming house adjacent to it, and also the house and garage owned by the respondents, together with certain personal property. The theory of the respondents' action was that the appellant had permitted the garage to get into such a state of disrepair that it created a fire hazard, and that the condition of the building was such that, if a fire did occur in it, it was reasonably probable that it would spread to the adjacent property.
Prior to October 1, 1933, the garage had been used as a place for wrecking used automobiles, but subsequent to that date, and up to the time of the fire, it had been vacant and unoccupied. The building was in a pronounced state of disrepair. There were doors at either end which were open, a considerable number of windows on either side were broken out, and in a number of places on the roof the shingles had disappeared. The floor was wood, and had on it grease and oil, as the result of the use to which it had been put.
As to the general condition of the building, there is not much dispute in the testimony, but as to what was in the interior there was a dispute. According to the evidence offered by the respondents, there was left in the building an accumulation of combustible material, the children of the neighborhood played in it at times during the daytime, and at night it was used as a sleeping place by itinerants that were passing through the city and not able to provide themselvesbetter quarters. About the floor there were cigarette stubs. As stated, the evidence is in dispute as to the condition of the interior of the building, but, after considering the evidence, the trial court found that:
'The Court further finds that defendant had permitted and allowed its building to become and remain in disrepair in that the windows in said building were broken out, the building had been allowed to become in a decayed condition and there were large vents and holes in said roof and that the doors in said building had become broken and were open and the floors and walls of said building had become saturated with grease and oil and defendant permitted and allowed debris and waste material, combustible and inflammable material and permitted and allowed children to play in and around and upon said premises and permitted and allowed itinerants and vagabonds to use, sleep in and smoke in and around said building, and that defendant well knew of all this and by reason thereof, a fire hazard and danger was created, and defendant permitted to allow such condition to exist when it could,...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Arnhold v. United States
...1929, section 1) declaring the same to be a "fire hazard." 4 Pro: R.C.W. 76.04.350, 76.04.370, 76.04.380; Prince v. Chehalis Savings & Loan Ass'n, 1936, 186 Wash. 372, 373, 58 P.2d 290, 61 P.2d 1374; Swan v. O'Leary, 1950, 37 Wash.2d 533, 225 P. 2d 199; State v. Canyon Lumber Corp., 1955, 4......
-
Capra v. Phillips Inv. Co.
...130 S.E. 735[5, 6]; Silver Falls Timber Co. v. Eastern & W. Lumber Co., 149 Or. 126, 40 P.2d 703, 710, 733; Prince v. Chehalis Savings & L. Ass'n, 186 Wash. 372, 58 P.2d 290, 61 P.2d 1374; 22 Am.Jur. 603, n. 21, citing Rudder v. Koopman, 116 Ala. 332, 22 So. 601, 37 L.R.A. 489. The essentia......
-
Menth v. Breeze Corp.
...may constitute a danger which such owner or occupant reasonably should have contemplated and guarded against. Prince v. Chehalis Savings & Loan Ass'n, 186 Wash. 372, 58 P.2d 290, 61 P.2d 1374 (Wash.Sup.Ct.1936); Quaker Oats Co. v. Grice, 195 F. 441 (C.C.A.2d Cir.1912); Arneil v. Schnitzer, ......
-
Robert R. Walker, Inc. v. Burgdorf
...S.W. 66; Swan v. Attaway, 211 Ark. 510, 201 S.W.2d 27; Standard Oil Co. v. Evans, 154 Miss. 475, 122 So. 735; Prince v. Chehalis Savings and Loan Ass'n, 186 Wash. 372, 58 P.2d 290, 61 P.2d 1374; Fjellman v. Weller, 213 Minn. 457, 7 N.W.2d 521; Standard Oil Co. of New York v. R. L. Pitcher C......