Prince v. State
Decision Date | 15 January 2013 |
Docket Number | No. WD 74478.,WD 74478. |
Citation | 390 S.W.3d 225 |
Parties | Kristopher M. PRINCE, Appellant, v. STATE of Missouri, Respondent. |
Court | Missouri Court of Appeals |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
M. Ruth O'Neill, Columbia, MO, for appellant.
Chris Koster, Attorney General, Evan J. Buchheim, Assistant Attorney General, Jefferson City, MO, for respondent.
Before Division Two: LISA WHITE HARDWICK, Presiding Judge, and JAMES M. SMART, JR., and KAREN KING MITCHELL, Judges.
Kristopher M. Prince appeals, after an evidentiary hearing, the denial of his post-conviction Rule 29.15 motion.1 Prince argues that the motion court clearly erred in denying his claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel based on trial counsel's alleged failure to: (1) investigate evidence related to Prince's mental health and functioning; (2) request a change of judge at trial based upon the trial judge's acquaintance with Prince's grandfather; and (3) request a no-adverse-inference instruction following Prince's decision not to testify in his penalty phase. Prince also argues motion court error in: (1) denying his change of judge motion; and (2) adopting the State's proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law. Finding no error of law, we affirm.
On April 12, 2007, Prince and his cousin, Lorenzo Ladiner, bought an assault rifle for the purpose of robbing a local drug dealer, Larry McBride. They stored the rifle at Ladiner's home. Later that same day, Ladiner was pulled over and arrested on an outstanding warrant. The next day, when Prince went to post bail for Ladiner, Prince was arrested on an outstanding warrant. From April 13[th through the] 18[th], 2007, Prince remained in custody at the Boone County jail. During his confinement, Prince made several phone calls to Ladiner in which they discussed their plans to assault and rob McBride.
While Prince was in custody, Ladiner fired shots at McBride's vehicle. When Prince was released, he went to Ladiner's house. McBride [later] pulled up to the house with Tedarrian Robinson and Carlos Dudley [in the vehicle]. McBride accused Ladiner of shooting at his house[, and this accusation] led to a heated verbal exchange. Prince attempted to open McBride's door, [but] McBride drove off.
Prince and Ladiner ran inside Ladiner's house. Prince grabbed the assault rifle[,] and Ladiner grabbed the car keys to chase after McBride. When they caught up with McBride, Prince leaned out the passenger window and fired at least five shots at McBride's vehicle. One bullet pierced the trunk of McBride's vehicle, traveled through the rear seat to the front passenger headrest, and struck Robinson in the neck. Prince and Ladiner returned to Ladiner's house and hid the rifle in the attic. McBride drove toward the hospital. Dudley called the police and reported that Prince was the shooter. The police pulled McBride over and took Robinson to the hospital where he was pronounced dead.
Police responded to Ladiner's house and arrested both Ladiner and Prince. Prince was charged with murder in the second degree, section 565.021 (felony murder), unlawful use of a weapon by shooting a firearm from a motor vehicle, section 571.030.1(9), and armed criminal action, section 571.015.... A jury found Prince guilty on all three counts. Prince was sentenced to consecutive sentences of thirty years for felony murder, fifteen years for unlawful use of weapon, and five years for armed criminal action.
State v. Prince, 311 S.W.3d 327, 330 (Mo.App. W.D.2010). This Court affirmed Prince's convictions and sentences on direct appeal. Id. at 340.
Prince subsequently filed a pro seRule 29.15 motion. Appointed counsel filed an amended motion, alleging the following relevant claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel: (1) counsel failed to investigate Prince's mental disability; (2) counsel unreasonably failed to request a no-adverse-inference instruction based upon Prince's decision not to testify in either the guilt or penalty phases of his trial; and (3) counsel failed to request a change of judge based upon the court's familiarity with Prince's grandfather. Prince also filed a motion for change of judge for the evidentiary hearing based upon both the motion court's familiarity with Prince's grandfather and Prince's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel related to the failure to request a change of judge at trial for the same reason; that motion was denied.
The motion court held an evidentiary hearing wherein it received testimony from Prince, Prince's mother, Prince's grandmother, Prince's grandfather, both trial attorneys, the Deputy Director of the Public Defender System, and a licensed clinical social worker that treated Prince when he was eleven or twelve years old. The motion court also received the following evidence: three documents related to the caseload of the Public Defender's Office, two documents related to Prince's juvenile matter in Minnesota, a letter from one of Prince's past treatment providers, and a progress report from the licensed clinical social worker that treated Prince when he was a child. Thereafter, the motion court solicited proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law from both parties. The court then adopted the State's proposed findings and conclusions, over Prince's objection, and overruled Prince's Rule 29.15 motion. Prince appeals.
“ ‘Appellate review of a motion court's denial of a Rule 29.15 motion for post-conviction relief is limited to a determination of whether its findings of fact and conclusions of law are clearly erroneous.’ ” Hendrix v. State, 369 S.W.3d 93, 96 (Mo.App. W.D.2012) (quoting Williams v. State, 205 S.W.3d 300, 304 (Mo.App. W.D.2006)); see alsoRule 29.15(k). “Findings of facts and conclusions of law are ‘clearly erroneous only if, after review of the entire record, we are left with a definite and firm impression that a mistake has been made.’ ” Id. (quoting Williams, 205 S.W.3d at 305).
Prince asserts error not only in the overruling of his post-conviction motion but also in the denial of his motion for change of judge in his post-conviction case. “A denial of an application for change of judge is reviewed for abuse of discretion.” Burgess v. State, 342 S.W.3d 325, 328 (Mo. banc 2011). “ ‘A trial court abuses its discretion when its ruling is clearly against the logic of the circumstances before the court and is so arbitrary and unreasonable as to shock the sense of justice and indicate a lack of careful consideration.’ ” State v. Ferdinand, 371 S.W.3d 844, 850 (Mo.App. W.D.2012) (quoting State v. Scott, 348 S.W.3d 788, 794 (Mo.App. S.D.2011)).
Prince raises three claims of ineffective assistance of counsel and two claims of independent motion court error. Prince argues that trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance in the following ways: (1) failing to investigate and present evidence related to Prince's mental health and mental functioning for the purpose of mitigation during the penalty phase; (2) failing to request a change of judge based upon the trial court's familiarity with Prince's grandfather; and (3) failing to request a no-adverse-inference instruction during the penalty phase of Prince's trial after Prince decided not to testify. Prince argues that the motion court erred not only in overruling his claims of ineffective assistance of counsel but also in denying his post-conviction motion for change of judge and in adopting the State's proposed findings and conclusions verbatim.
“The benchmark for judging any claim of ineffectiveness must be whether counsel's conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied on as having produced a just result.” Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). “A convicted defendant's claim that counsel's assistance was so defective as to require reversal of a conviction ... has two components.” Id. at 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052. The defendant must demonstrate both deficient performance and resulting prejudice to the defense. Id. “Unless a defendant makes both showings, it cannot be said that the conviction ... resulted from a breakdown in the adversary process that renders the result unreliable.” Id. “Failure to make the required showing of either deficient performance or sufficient prejudice defeats the ineffectiveness claim.” Id. at 700, 104 S.Ct. 2052.
Prince's first claim of ineffective assistance charged trial counsel with deficient performance for failing to investigate evidence demonstrating that Prince had been “plagued” with mental health issues since he was a child and for then failing to present such evidence at the penalty phase of Prince's trial.2 Prince alleged that, had this evidence been discovered and presented, it would have mitigated the punishment ultimately assessed by the jury.
The motion court rejected this claim for several reasons. The court first found that Prince failed to prove that he had the various mental health issues he alleged. Second, the court found that counsel had no reason to believe that Prince suffered from any mental conditions that warranted further investigation; thus, counsel did not act unreasonably in not further investigating Prince's mental health. Third, the court found that even if the mental health evidence identified at the evidentiary hearing was placed before the jury, there was no reasonable likelihood that Prince would have received a lower sentencing recommendation. In fact, the motion court found that this evidence may have had the effect of aggravating the jury's recommendation. These findings are not clearly erroneous.
“[C]ounsel has a duty to make reasonable investigations or to make a reasonable decision that makes particular investigations unnecessary.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691, 104 S.Ct. 2052. “In any...
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