Principe v. Great Atlantic & Pac. Tea Co.

• Decision Date: 16 June 1981
• Docket Number: No. WD,WD
• Citation: 618 S.W.2d 284
• Parties: Steve PRINCIPE, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. The GREAT ATLANTIC & PACIFIC TEA COMPANY, Defendant-Respondent. 31869.
• Court: Missouri Court of Appeals

Page 284

618 S.W.2d 284

Steve PRINCIPE, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. The GREAT ATLANTIC & PACIFIC TEA COMPANY, Defendant-Respondent.

No. WD 31869.

Missouri Court of Appeals, Western District.

June 16, 1981.

Robert L. Shirkey, Kansas City, for plaintiff-appellant.

Fred Bellemere, Jr., Kansas City, for defendant-respondent.

Before KENNEDY, P. J., WASSERSTROM, C. J., and SHANGLER, J.

WASSERSTROM, Chief Judge.

A claim by Steve Principe for workmen's compensation was denied by the Administrative Law Judge. That denial was affirmed in turn by the Industrial Relations Commission and by the Circuit Court. Principe now appeals here. The sole issue is whether he suffered an "accident" within the meaning of Section 287.020(2), RSMo 1978.

On July 26, 1976, plaintiff was on duty as a meat cutter along with one fellow meat cutter at the employer's store in Gladstone, Missouri. A delivery truck brought in a load of meat. The other meat cutter was busy, and Principe proceeded to unload the truck by himself. When he got about half-way through the unloading process, he lifted a box of beef chuck which weighed approximately 100 pounds off the skid and as he was turning to place it on a rack, he felt a severe pain in his back.

Principe admits that there was no slip, fall, twist or similar special occurrence on that occasion. He nevertheless contends that this constitutes an unusual and abnormal strain which amounts to an accident within the ruling of Crow v. Missouri Implement Tractor Company, 307 S.W.2d 401 (Mo. banc 1957).

The law is well-settled that the Crow doctrine is inapplicable if the strain in question was normal to the job and the action by the employee was performed in a customary fashion. Gold v. Sharp, Kidde, Webb, 564 S.W.2d 612 (Mo.App.1978); Langendoerfer v. Hazel, 576 S.W.2d 553 (Mo.App.1978); Herring v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 499 S.W.2d 538 (Mo.App.1973). The facts as to what the general practice was with respect to unloading meat trucks rested wholly on testimony of Principe, who was the only witness in that respect. His testimony showed that the procedure for unloading a truck depended on the number of people available in the meat department at the moment. It was usual and customary for two persons to unload the truck if sufficient help was available, but when only two meat cutters were working and one was occupied with grinding meat and filling the counter for customers, it was a part of the other person's duty to unload the truck without assistance.

Principe's testimony on cross-examination made it explicitly clear that unloading by just one meat cutter was a customary thing:

"Q What I'm asking you, Mr. Principe, if it is not the usual and customary thing for a butcher who carries his own weight

A Uh-huh.

Q to singly pick up a case of chuck as you were doing that day?

A Yes, sir.

Q There is nothing unusual about that, is there?

A No, nothing unusual.

Q And that's part of your duties if you're a meat cutter?

A That's correct."

Although Principe retreated somewhat from that testimony on redirect, he proceeded to generally reiterate on re-cross examination what he had said above on...