Prindle v. Campbell

Decision Date01 January 1864
Citation9 Minn. 197
PartiesWILLIAM W. PRINDLE vs. S. L. CAMPBELL.
CourtMinnesota Supreme Court

1. The tax deeds set up in the complaint are prima facie evidence of the validity of the taxes under which the same were executed, and of the facts recited in such deeds, as far as they affect the force or validity of the title conveyed by said deeds. Charter of the City of Wabasha, ch. 5, §§ 19 and 20; 18 Ohio, 400.

2. It is not alleged in the answer that the errors and informalities complained of do, in any way, affect the substantial justice of the taxes, or that the respondent was damaged by the same.

3. Courts will not ordinarily set aside a tax deed on account of irregularities in the proceedings not affecting the merits, even where no special provision is made. Weller v. City of St. Paul, 5 Minn. [105], [106].

Points and authorities for respondent: —

1. The tax deeds set up in the complaint of the plaintiff, vest no title to the land in dispute in the said plaintiffs, on account of the following admitted errors occurring in the levy and collection of the taxes for the City of Wabasha for the years 1858-59: The city charter provides that the common council shall annually appoint assessors, on or before the first Monday of March of each year. For the year 1858, assessors were appointed July 3d of said year. For the year 1859, they were appointed May 7. As this charter did not become a law until March 20, 1858, it is evident no tax could be levied for that year. § 2, ch. 5, p. 17.

2. It is admitted that the assessors, in listing the property to be assessed, did not call on the tax payers for the purpose of examining the property to be assessed, or to ascertain the value thereof, as required by the general laws then in force. See old Statutes, 77, § 5. Neither did the common council define the duties of the assessors, nor make rules and regulations for their government, as required by the charter. Charter, 18, ch. 5, § 3. When the charter of a municipal corporation does not define the manner of assessing and collecting taxes, the general laws then in force govern. See Blackwell on Tax Titles, 556.

3. The common council extended the time for the collecting the tax each of said years. See Stipulations, No. 13. It may be laid down as a general rule, that a valuation being essential in taxing property, the statutes must be strictly pursued, or the proceedings based upon it will be illegal and void. 3 Mass. 429.

4. But one assessor signed the assessment roll for the tax of 1858. Two assessors were appointed, and but one acted — a fatal defect. If it is not necessary for two to act, it is not necessary to appoint but one, or if two are appointed, each may make a separate roll, and the council can adopt the one that pleases them best.

5. For the year 1859 the city council levied a general and a specific tax. The general tax was levied June 13, 1859. No authority is given by the charter to levy a special tax to pay for buildings purchased by the city, and if they have that authority, no sufficient notice for the collection of said tax could be given. Still we find the land claimed in the complaint sold for both the general and special tax at one and the same time, and a deed given on said sale. This, the defendant submits is a fatal defect. Blackwell on Tax Titles, 190, 191, 192. The plaintiffs rely on sec. 20, p. 22 of Charter, to sustain their deeds. It is beyond the power of the legislature to excuse in advance the non-performance of a required act by a ministerial officer, for it would strike down the rights of citizens, and make statutes meaningless. In each of the taxes mentioned herein, the ministerial officers have wholly ignored the provisions of the charter and of the general law in the assessing and collecting of the taxes. If this can be done, an agent of the law can set up his dictum in place of the law, and there is no necessity of legislative provisions. It is the established doctrine of the courts, that to make a tax valid, the strictest compliance with the provisions of the law authorizing the assessment, levy, and sale, are essential, pre-requisite and imperative, and the special power granted by the statutes must be strictly pursued. Blackwell on Tax Titles, 45, 46, 47, 55, and 57; also, 2 Ill. 323; 2 N. Y. 70; 4 Cranch, 267.

John N. Murdock, for appellant.

S. L. Campbell, for respondent.

McMILLAN, J.

This is an action of ejectment brought by the plaintiff against the defendant to recover the possession of block No. 152 in the City of Wabasha, according to the recorded plat thereof. The case was submitted to the court below, upon a statement of facts agreed upon and settled by stipulation between the parties — the finding of the court was for the defendant, and judgment for the defendant was thereupon entered. The plaintiff appealed from the judgment. The case involves the validity of the tax sales in the City of Wabasha for the years 1858 and 1859 respectively. The facts as agreed upon by the parties, show a great many informalities and errors in the proceedings of the officers in reference to the taxes and sales of both years, some of which are fatal and others are not so. We will not consider all the objections urged to the validity of these taxes, but only a portion of those we deem fatal to each of the tax deeds under which the plaintiff claims title to the land.

First, as to the taxes for 1858. It appears, that the tax list for the year 1858 was delivered to the city marshal on the 27th of July, 1858; "that notices were posted on the 29th of July, 1858, by the city marshal, requiring taxes on personal property to be paid within thirty days from the date of said notice, and on real estate before the 1st of December, 1858, and that on such real estate taxes as were not paid by the 1st day of August, 1858, interest would be charged at three per cent. per month." The act of incorporation of the City of Wabasha, approved March 20, 1858, ch. 5, § 10, provides that the city marshal, on receipt of the tax list, "shall give one week's notice thereof in the official paper, or shall give ten days' notice thereof by posting up notices in three of the most public places in the city. Such notices shall specify, that taxes on personal property shall be paid within thirty days from the first publication of said notice, or from the first day of posting the same, and taxes and assessments on real estate before the first day of August following, or the first day of December following; that if such taxes are not paid until after the first day of August, interest will be charged at the rate of three per cent. per month after said first day of August on all unpaid taxes, and that if paid before said first day of August, no interest will be charged, and that all taxes or assessments specified in the tax list upon which said taxes or assessments shall not be paid on or...

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6 cases
  • Geer v. Redman
    • United States
    • Missouri Supreme Court
    • June 20, 1887
  • McCord v. Sullivan
    • United States
    • Minnesota Supreme Court
    • January 31, 1902
    ... ...          As we ... understand it, this has always been the rule in this state ... It was so held in Prindle v. Campbell, 9 Minn. 197 ... (212), where the court used the following language: ...          "The ... notice of sale required by the ... ...
  • Musser v. Adler
    • United States
    • Missouri Supreme Court
    • April 30, 1885
  • Kipp v. Dawson
    • United States
    • Minnesota Supreme Court
    • January 11, 1884
    ...statute is therefore mandatory, and not directory. Com'rs of Stearns Co. v. Smith, 25 Minn. 131; Eastman v. Linn, 26 Minn. 215; Prindle v. Campbell, 9 Minn. 197, (212;) v. Edwards, 13 Wall. 506; Blackwell on Tax Titles, 239, 263; Sharp v. Johnson, 4 Hill, 92; Clark v. Crane, 5 Mich. 151; Pe......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

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