Prindle v. Iowa Soldiers' Orphans' Home

• Decision Date: 17 November 1911
• Citation: 153 Iowa 234,133 N.W. 106
• Parties: PRINDLE v. IOWA SOLDIERS' ORPHANS' HOME ET AL. (WILSON, INTERVENER).
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

153 Iowa 234

133 N.W. 106

PRINDLE

v.IOWA SOLDIERS' ORPHANS' HOME ET AL. (WILSON, INTERVENER).^d1

Supreme Court of Iowa.

Nov. 17, 1911.

Appeal from District Court, Hardin County; R. M. Wright, Judge.

Affirmed.

Ward & Williams, for appellant intervener.

Geo. W. Cosson, Atty. Gen., and C. L. Hays, for other appellants.

Lundy & Wood, for appellee.

WEAVER, J.

On June 15, 1901, Helen Atkins, widow, and Eliza J. Leigh, widow, being the owners of certain lots in the town of Steamboat Rock, Iowa, executed and delivered a conveyance thereof to Theron W. Prindle, plaintiff herein, who is the son of the last-named grantor. The granting clause of this deed runs “to Theron W. Prindle, his heirs and assigns,” and the instrument contains the usual covenants of warranty. Following the description of the property are the words: “For the term of his natural life, subject, however, to a life estate therein expressly reserved to the grantors herein and to the survivors of said grantors, so long as either may live. In case of the death of said T. W. Prindle, his wife, Margaret Prindle, shall have the right to continue to occupy and use said premises, so long as she shall live and remain his widow, after grantors' death. Upon the death of grantors herein and of grantees herein, or of a termination of their interests in said premises, the remainder of the title shall vest in the heirs of their body, the fruit of their marriage, if any shall be living. In case of the termination of the estates above granted by the death of the grantors and of T. W. Prindle and of Margaret Prindle, his wife, or of their dying childless, or its termination otherwise, then the remainder of the title to said premises shall vest in the Orphans' Home and Home for Destitute Children, located at Davenport, Iowa, to be used and appropriated by the trustees in charge thereof for its support. The holders of any intermediate estate shall keep the taxes thereon paid during the time of their tenancy.”

The grantor, Eliza Jane Leigh, died intestate November 22, 1905, leaving the said Theron W. Prindle, Amanda Wilson, and three other children, her only surviving heirs. On September 17, 1907, Helen Atkins the other grantor in the conveyance above mentioned, quitclaimed the same property to the plaintiff, subject to her own life use, and declaring therein her intention to pass to the grantee “present interest” in the property. On February 18, 1908, the plaintiff, claiming under the conveyance to which we have referred, instituted this action in equity, asking that the title to said property be quieted in him as the absolute and unqualified owner thereof in fee.

Of the defendants named therein, none appear to contest the claim thus asserted, except the state, which is represented by counsel, who contend that the first-named deed creates a contingent or executory interest in the state, for the benefit of the orphans' home, which it maintains at the city of Davenport. Amanda Wilson, sister of plaintiff, intervenes, claiming that the said deed made by her mother, Eliza Jane Leigh, was testamentary in character; and therefore did not convey to or create in the plaintiff any present estate or interest, and not being witnessed as a will it is ineffective for any purpose.

The trial court found against the claims of the state, and dismissed the intervention of Mrs. Wilson and entered a decree, granting the relief asked by the plaintiff. The state and the intervener appeal.

[1] The nature of the estate conveyed by the first-mentioned deed is of course the vital question presented by this appeal. That the grant to the plaintiff is not merely an imperfect or incomplete testamentary instrument we think is very clear. The grantors do not attempt or profess to create an estate or interest which shall vest only upon their death. On the contrary, the deed in apt terms conveys the property itself to the grantee, and the interest so created, whether it be a fee or merely a life estate contingent upon the death of the grantors during his lifetime, begins with and dates from the making and delivery of that instrument, and not from the death of the grantors, though his right to the possession is postponed until that event. It follows that, in our judgment, the petition of intervention was properly dismissed. See 9 Am. & Eng. Ency. (2d Ed.) p. 92, note 5.

[2] As between the other parties to the controversy, we have next to inquire whether the deed conveys the fee or a life estate only, with a contingent or executory interest over to the state for the use of the orphans' home. It will be observed from our statement of the case that the portion of the deed which is technically termed the “premises,” and includes the granting clause and the description of the property, is in form and substance an ordinary conveyance of the fee, in that it expressly grants the property described to the plaintiff and his heirs and assigns, while the habendum which follows seems to limit the estate so created to a life use contingent upon the death of both grantors during the lifetime of the grantee. That these provisions are essentially repugnant is apparent. If the premises are to be given full effect as a grant to plaintiff, his heirs and assigns, it must be held to convey a fee, and not a mere life estate, dependent upon another intervening life estate. On the other hand, if the habendum be given effect to limit the interest conveyed to an estate for life, after the expiration of a similar estate, reserved in the grantors, then nothing is conveyed to the plaintiff “and his heirs.” When premises and habendum are irreconcilably repugnant, it is the universal rule that the former must prevail. The one purports in express words to grant an estate of inheritance, while the other is limited to the life of the grantee. It is true that the tendency of modern decisions is to restrict the application of this rule to cases where the deed is susceptible to no reasonable construction which will give the apparent intended effect to both clauses; but if the repugnancy be so radical that one...