Pringle v. Gibson

• Decision Date: 13 December 1937
• Citation: 195 A. 695
• Parties: PRINGLE v. GIBSON (two cases).
• Court: Maine Supreme Court

195 A. 695

PRINGLE

v. GIBSON (two cases).

Supreme Judicial Court of Maine.

Dec. 13, 1937.

Report from Superior Court, Washington County.

Actions by Mary Pringle and Peter K. Pringle against William E. Gibson. On report.

Judgments for defendant.

Argued before DUNN, C. J., and STURGIS, BARNES, THAXTER, HUDSON, and MANSER, JJ.

Stern & Stern, of Bangor, for plaintiffs. James E. Mitchell, of Bangor, for defendant.

MANSER, Justice.

On report. Actions for personal injurier sustained by the plaintiffs as a result of an automobile accident while plaintiffs were riding as gratuitous passengers in the automobile of the defendant. The accident occurred September 26, 1935, in the Province of New Brunswick. The plaintiffs are residents of that province. The defendant is a citizen of Maine. The defense pleaded and proved the act of the legislature of New Brunswick passed in 1934:

"The owner or driver of a motor vehicle other than a vehicle operated in the business of carrying passengers for hire or gain, shall not be liable for any loss or damage resulting from bodily injury to or death of any person being carried in or upon, or entering or getting on or alighting from such motor vehicle."

The position of the defense is that the plaintiffs as citizens of a foreign state are seeking the aid of the courts of Maine to enforce a liability against a citizen of Maine which is. denied them by the law of their own jurisdiction.

The general rule, long established, has been recently reaffirmed in Winslow v. Tibbetts, 131 Me. 318, 162 A. 785, 786:

"It is elementary law that the rights of the plaintiffs to recover are controlled by the law of the place where the injuries were received, and the law of the jurisdiction where relief is sought determines the remedy and its incidents, such as pleading, practice, and evidence."

Counsel for plaintiffs assent to the existence of this rule, but assert that the law of New Brunswick does not govern for one or more of the following reasons: It merely affects the remedy; the acts of the defendant were wrongful under the motor vehicle laws of New Brunswick, and constituted a violation of its criminal code; the statute is unconstitutional both in New Brunswick and Maine; it is against public policy of this state and will not be enforced by our courts. Further, that if any of the foregoing contentions are sustained and the New Brunswick statute does not apply, then the plaintiffs maintain that the case is to be decided by the common law of New Brunswick, and, in the absence of proof to the contrary, the legal presumption is that the common law of both jurisdictions is the same.

The arguments and briefs of counsel show great research and ingenious reasoning. So urgently are emphasized close refinements as almost to be confusing. The court finds relief in the reflection of Chief Justice Peaslee in Gray v. Gray, 87 N.H. 82, 174 A. 508, 512, 94 A.L.R. 1404, that:

"No rule or set of rules has yet been devised which will make the conflict of laws a logical whole. There are places where logic has to give way to evident facts. In these places horse sense has prevailed over the deductions of the schoolmen. It should continue to do so."

As to the first claim that the New Brunswick statute merely affects the remedy: It is true that distinctions between matters pertaining to the remedy and those going to the basis of the action are sometimes difficult to determine, yet common sense demonstrates that a law which destroys a cause of action entirely clearly comes within the lex loci rule. If the right is absolutely abrogated, then the law of the forum does not give it new life to determine "its incidents such as pleading, practice, and evidence."

"Whether an act is the legal cause of another's injury is determined by the law of the place of wrong."

"If no cause of action is created at the place of wrong, no recovery in tort can be had in any other state."

"A liability to pay damages for a tort can be discharged or modified by the law of the state which created it." Restatement, Conflict of Laws, pars, 383, 384 and 389.

While it is a general and well-settled rule that remedies are regulated and governed by the lex fori, Owen v. Roberts, 81 Me. 439, 17 A. 403, 4 L.R.A. 229, Miller v. Spaulding, 107 Me. 264, 78 A. 358, and that included in the procedural policy of the state are statutes of limitations, Restatement, Conflict of Laws, pars. 604 and 605, yet the distinction is pointed out in Connecticut Valley Lumber Co. v. Maine Cent. R. R., 78 N.H. 553, 103 A. 263, that it is when the statute relates to the remedy and does not obliterate the right of action that such right continues to exist.

The next point relied upon is that the defendant violated the criminal code of New Brunswick with regard to the speed of his car, inadequate brakes, reckless and negligent operation, operating in a manner to endanger life and limb, and by wanton or furious driving or other willful misconduct or willful recklessness causing bodily harm.

The plaintiffs rely upon Machado v. Fontes, 2 Q.B. 231, as establishing the principle that an action for damages would lie in England for a crime committed in a foreign country, even though the law of that country gave no private action for damages.

The doctrine of this case finds little, if any, support in the courts in this country. Goodrich, Conflict of Laws, § 92, says: "There is no American authority for the modification." It is not necessary to discuss whether it should have force or applicability here because the record lacks proof that any of the acts of the defendant constituted a criminal offense. A necessary element to constitute a violation of the criminal code in New Brunswick is criminal intent or mens rea. Such is the testimony of the expert, admitted in accordance with our rule, as that of a competent witness learned in the law of that jurisdiction. Owen v. Boyle, 15 Me. 147, 32 Am.Dec. 143. The facts here disclose nothing more than civil negligence.

The third point raised is that the statute is null and void, both in New Brunswick and in Maine, being in contravention of guarantees under the constitution and at common law.

Under the British-North America Act, which defined the subjects of legislation assigned to the provinces, there are included "property and civil rights in the province." That the act in question was within the category of legislation delegated to the province cannot be gainsaid. From the testimony of the expert, it appears that...