Pringle v. State

• Decision Date: 11 January 1915
• Docket Number: 17621
• Citation: 67 So. 455,108 Miss. 802
• Court: Mississippi Supreme Court
• Parties: PRINGLE v. STATE

67 So. 455

108 Miss. 802

PRINGLE v. STATE

No. 17621

Supreme Court of Mississippi

January 11, 1915

APPEAL from the circuit court of Lauderdale county. HON. J. L BUCKLEY, Judge.

W. B Pringle was convicted of murder and appeals.

The evidence upon which appellant was convicted is entirely circumstantial. It was the theory of the state that robbery was the motive of the crime, as the evidence showed that the deceased was robbed of some money.

The sixth assignment of error, referred to in the opinion of the court, is based upon the overruling of the defendant's motion to exclude the testimony of witness Culpepper, with reference to certain statements made by the defendant at the time the note signed "W. B. P." was taken off defendant's person by Culpepper, who was an officer, and who testified that he had learned that the defendant had given two or three other parties money, and that he had told defendant that he knew of this, and that defendant admitted that he only had a small sum of money prior to the time of the killing, considerably less than the amount he had given away subsequent to the killing; that he had admitted that he had had some other money, and attempted to account for it in two or three different ways.

Affirmed. Suggestion of error overruled.

W. L Scott and C. B. Cameron, for appellant.

Ross A. Collins, Attorney-General, for the state.

OPINION

COOK, J.

Appellant was indicted, tried, and convicted for the murder of Caroline Watts.

Appellant contends that he was convicted entirely upon circumstantial evidence, and that many errors were committed by the trial court during the progress of his trial. The record establishes the contention that the case of the state rests upon circumstantial evidence alone.

The case made by the evidence is a strong one against the defendant, and, if no errors were committed, the verdict of the jury must stand.

We will take up and consider the assignment of errors in the order presented by the briefs of appellant:

"The first assignment of error is based upon the refusal of the trial court to permit the appellant, through his attorneys, to show on cross-examination of the witness Sam Culpepper, a witness for the state, that said witness was drunk or under the influence of intoxicating drink, at the time he testified in this case in the court below."

It appears that this assignment is based on the action of the court in sustaining an objection to questions propounded to the witness while he was on the stand. He was asked if he had not been drinking a good deal during the day, and he answered that he had not. He was then asked if he was not "pretty nearly drunk right now." This question was resented by the witness, but not answered. The question was repeated, and answered in the negative. The district attorney then objected to the questions, and his objection was sustained by the court.

The judge and jury had the witness under observation, and the questions directed the attention of the jury to the witness. If the witness was drunk, it must have been apparent to the jury, and the jurors gave due consideration to that fact in weighing his testimony. The judge saw the witness and knew whether or not he was drunk, and he no doubt, thought the questions were impertinent. There is nothing in the record to justify a belief that the witness was drunk, and therefore we cannot assume that he was. It seems to us that this was a poor way to prove that the witness was drunk. If the witness was able to testify upon his condition, his opinion was worth very little, because, if he was sober enough to realize that he was drunk, he was sober enough to testify intelligently. If he was in fact drunk, his opinion of his condition was worthless.

The second assignment of error is based upon the court admitting evidence relative to a certain razor found at the home of appellant's sister.

We think this evidence was of slight probative value, but we do not think it could have had any weight with the jury, and certainly its admission did not prejudice appellant.

The third assignment of error refers to the testimony of one Sam Lackey, who arrested appellant.

This assignment is without merit. It is perfectly apparent that the witness related all that was said or done, and it is also clear that what the defendant said to the witness, in response to his inquiries, was entirely free and voluntary.

It is safer for the trial judge to ascertain that confessions obtained from prisoners were made without hope of reward, or fear of punishment, as a condition precedent to the admission of the testimony; but where it is manifest that the witness has told all that was said and all that occurred, and his testimony shows that the statements of the accused were free and voluntary, there is no reason to reject the evidence, because the precise formula was not observed in advance of the admission of the evidence.

The fourth assignment of error is without merit, because it is based upon an erroneous assumption.

The fifth assignment of error is the assignment upon which appellant especially relies.

The evidence shows that a constable searched the clothing of appellant while he was confined in jail awaiting his trial, and found in one of his pockets a letter written by appellant, which was afterwards introduced in evidence. It does not appear that appellant objected to the search of his clothing, but in our opinion it is immaterial whether he objected or not. The letter in question was in the following words:

"Say, listen Maggie, don't you never say I gave you any money when I was at your house, Clemmie and Boy give you what money you have got, state to the court I come to you at 6:30 and stay all night do this.

"[Signed]

W. B. P."

The pertinency and damaging effect of this letter is clear. One of the circumstances which connected appellant with the crime was the possession of an unusual amount of money, and the fact, which was afterwards developed, that he had given "Maggie" money. It was evident that he appreciated the seriousness of his gift to Maggie, and yet he was, by this letter, attempting to suborn the witness.

The murdered woman was robbed by her assassin. It was the theory of the state that robbery was the motive for the murder, and the gift of the money to Maggie doubtless had a strong influence on the minds of the jury, and the attempt to induce her to deny the facts was prejudicial in the extreme. It cannot be doubted that the letter was one of the strongest links of the chain of circumstances which was forged by the state to the undoing of appellant.

The leading case, State v. Turner, reported in 82 Kan. 787, 109 P. 654, 32 L. R. A. (N. S.) 772, 136 Am. St. Rep. 129, and the notes thereto, go fully into a discussion of the principles involved in this assignment of error. Briefly stated, the rule is: Evidence against one accused of crime is not inadmissible because it has been wrongly obtained.

It may have been wrong for the constable to have searched the prisoner; his conduct may have been reprehensible; but this will not affect the admissibility of the letter thus wrongfully obtained.

There is no question of a confession of guilt in this case. The defendant, from the beginning to the end, steadfastly and stoutly protested against any form of guilt, and insisted that he knew nothing about the homicide. It is hardly possible to say that defendant made any admissions of fact--the fact is, it was his policy to deny every criminating circumstance proven by the state.

A "confession" is a voluntary statement of the accused acknowledging that he is guilty of the crime charged. It is a voluntary declaration of his agency or participation in the crime. When a person charged with crime only admits certain facts from which guilt may be inferred, this will not amount to a confession. This distinction between confessions and admission of facts is recognized by this court in Richberger v. State, 90 Miss. 806, 44 So. 772.

As stated above, the complaint here is that the defendant denied the existence of certain incriminating circumstances, and the state was permitted, over his objections, to prove the facts, and also prove that defendant denied their existence.

The vice of appellant's argument is the assumption that confession of guilt and admission of facts from which guilt may be inferred are one and the same thing.

It is also argued that the stripping and search of defendant's person was tantamount to forcing him to testify against himself. If the defendant had been served with a subpoena duces tecum requiring him to produce the letter in his possession, and in obedience to this writ he had produced it, the state could not use same as evidence against him.

"The compulsion must be directed to the accused person in the capacity of a witness. In other words, the compulsion must be strictly testimonial." Turner v. State, supra.

The statement of the rule is distinctly approved in Wilkinson v. State, 77 Miss. 705, 27 So. 639. In that case defendant produced a knife which was used in evidence against her. She was told that it would be better for her to produce the knife, and, if she did so, nothing would be done with her. The inducement for producing the evidence against her was the promise that she would not be punished for the crime. She did not confess the crime; she simply produced evidence from which the jury may have inferred guilt.

Numerous cases might be cited wherein the evidence was improperly or unlawfully obtained, but was nevertheless admitted as competent against the accused. In the earlier decisions a contrary doctrine was announced, but we think the rule as announced above is now almost universally approved by the courts.

The sixth...