Pringle v. Valdez, 06SC92.
| Decision Date | 26 November 2007 |
| Docket Number | No. 06SC92.,06SC92. |
| Parties | Debbie Jo PRINGLE, Petitioner v. Mark VALDEZ, Respondent. |
| Court | Colorado Supreme Court |
Snell & Willmer L.L.P., Lee A. Mickus, Cedar R. Holmgren, Denver, Colorado, Attorneys for Amicus Curiae Colorado Civil Justice League.
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED IN PART AND REVERSED IN PART
We granted certiorari in Valdez v. Pringle, 143 P.3d 1069 (Colo.App.2005), to determine whether the court of appeals correctly affirmed a jury's damages award in this automobile accident case.1 The jury found that Petitioner Debbie Jo Pringle, the defendant in the trial court, was at fault in causing the accident, and awarded Respondent Mark Valdez, the plaintiff in the trial court, $400,000 for physical impairment and disfigurement damages and $100,000 for noneconomic damages.
Because Valdez admitted he was not wearing a seatbelt, Pringle requested a jury instruction based on section 42-4-237(7), C.R.S. (2007) (), which permits a jury to consider violation of the mandatory seatbelt law to mitigate damages for pain and suffering.2 The mandatory seatbelt law requires most drivers and front-seat passengers to wear a seatbelt. Valdez did not claim damages for pain and suffering but only for inconvenience, emotional stress, and impairment of the quality of life. The trial court refused to instruct according to the seatbelt defense provision, ruling that this statute provided for the plaintiff to mitigate damages only for a claim of pain and suffering damages, but not other noneconomic damages as claimed by Valdez. Because evidence of Valdez's failure to wear a seatbelt was introduced at trial, the trial court gave a specific instruction that the jury was not to consider his failure to wear a seatbelt in calculating damages.
On appeal, the court of appeals affirmed the trial court's refusal to instruct on the seatbelt defense provision and affirmed the damages award to Valdez of $100,000 for noneconomic loss consisting of inconvenience, emotional stress, and impairment of the quality of life. That court held that the phrase "pain and suffering" as it is used in the seatbelt defense provision refers only to a limited subset of noneconomic damages bearing that label.
Our review of the statutory language, our case law in slightly different contexts, and various treatises discussing damages leads us to conclude that the court of appeals erred by its statutory construction. We hold that the General Assembly intended "pain and suffering" as used in this statute to encompass all noneconomic damages, which includes damages for inconvenience, emotional stress, and impairment of the quality of life. In addition, contrary to Pringle's claims, we hold that "pain and suffering" as used in the seatbelt defense provision does not include damages for physical impairment and disfigurement. Rather, such damages are a category separate and distinct from other noneconomic damages and thus are not subject to mitigation under the seatbelt defense provision.
Thus, we reverse the court of appeals' decision as to the $100,000 award for noneconomic damages and affirm the $400,000 award for physical impairment and disfigurement damages. We remand the case to the court of appeals to be returned to the trial court for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Mark Valdez was riding in the front passenger's seat of a vehicle driven by Debbie Jo Pringle. Pringle was driving Valdez home after leaving a bar with a group of friends. Shortly after leaving the bar, Pringle drove the car into a concrete barrier. Valdez, who was not wearing a seatbelt, was thrown into the windshield. His head penetrated the windshield and he sustained injuries to his face, including multiple lacerations, abrasions, and nerve damage. The lacerations required surgical repair after the accident, and he had a further surgery for scar revision six months later.
Valdez now has permanent scars on his face, including across the hairline, over the bridge of his nose, on his ear, on his forehead, and from his lip across his cheek toward his ear. He also has permanent nerve damage causing pain in his face, and loss of sensation in the areas of the scars.
Valdez brought this action against Pringle alleging negligence. At trial, he requested damages for impairment and disfigurement, and noneconomic losses including inconvenience, emotional stress, and impairment of quality of life. He initially requested damages for pain and suffering, but dropped this element of his damages claim because section 42-4-237(7), the seatbelt defense provision, provides for mitigation of pain and suffering damages for a plaintiff who was not wearing a seatbelt at the time of an auto accident, in violation of the mandatory seatbelt law.
Pringle argued that the jury should have been instructed on the seatbelt defense, because the term "pain and suffering" in that section of the statute encompasses all forms of noneconomic damages. However, because Valdez did not request pain and suffering damages, the trial court rejected Pringle's tendered instruction on the seatbelt defense. The court concluded that if the General Assembly had intended the seatbelt defense to apply to noneconomic damages other than pain and suffering, it would have clearly stated so. Because there was evidence that Valdez was not wearing his seatbelt at the time of the accident, the trial court instructed the jury not to consider Valdez's failure to wear his seatbelt when determining his damages for physical impairment and disfigurement, inconvenience, emotional stress, and impairment of the quality of life.
The jury returned a verdict in Valdez's favor awarding him $400,000 for physical impairment and disfigurement and $100,000 for his noneconomic losses.
Pringle appealed to the court of appeals, claiming, among other things, that the trial court improperly failed to give the seatbelt defense instruction, which would have permitted Valdez's noneconomic damages to be subject to mitigation.
The court of appeals held that the phrase "pain and suffering" in the seatbelt defense provision does not encompass all forms of noneconomic damages; rather, it denotes a subcategory of noneconomic damages. Because the seatbelt defense provision does not define "pain and suffering," the court looked to other statutes for a definition and reasoned that section 13-21-102.5(2)(b), C.R.S. (2005), which defines noneconomic loss in the general damages cap statute applicable to civil actions, should apply. That section does not define "pain and suffering," but includes it in a list of types of noneconomic loss:
"Noneconomic loss or injury" means nonpecuniary harm for which damages are recoverable by the person suffering the direct or primary loss or injury, including pain and suffering, inconvenience, emotional stress, and impairment of the quality of life.
§ 13-21-102.5(2)(b). The court reasoned that the word "including" in the general damages cap statute meant that the items in the list were secondary or subordinate to noneconomic loss, not synonymous with noneconomic loss. Thus, the court concluded that the General Assembly intended to categorize pain and suffering as a subcategory of noneconomic loss, not as a synonym for it. The court also concluded that because both the general damages cap statute and the seatbelt defense provision apply to the same lawsuit, the General Assembly would not have intended "pain and suffering" to mean different things in the two statutes. Thus, the court determined that the meaning of "pain and suffering" in the general damages cap statute controls the meaning in the seatbelt defense statute.
Lastly, the court of appeals stated that the language of the general damages cap statute indicates that the General Assembly was aware of the distinction between pain and suffering and noneconomic damages. Because the seatbelt defense provision, which was enacted later than the general damages cap statute, specifies pain and suffering alone as the type of damages to which it applies, the court concluded that it must be read to exclude all other types of damages not specified.
Hence, the court of appeals held that the seatbelt defense provision applies only to pain and suffering, and not to other kinds of noneconomic damages such as those claimed by Valdez. Thus, the court of appeals affirmed the trial court when it instructed the jury not to consider Valdez's failure to wear a seatbelt in relation to his claims for noneconomic damages other than pain and suffering.
Pringle petitioned this court for certiorari review. She argues that the phrase "pain and suffering" in section 42-4-237(7) encompasses all forms of noneconomic damages, including those sought by Valdez. She also argues that the jury should have been instructed that it could mitigate Valdez's claimed damages not only for his noneconomic damages, but also for his physical impairment and disfigurement damages, based on his failure to wear a seatbelt.
This case requires that we construe the phrase "pain and suffering" in Colorado's mandatory seatbelt law, section 42-4-237, which provides for mitigation of damages when a plaintiff in a automobile accident fails to use a seatbelt in violation of the statute.
Before considering the substantive issues raised in this case, we summarize briefly the principles that guide our analysis. We review the proper construction of sta...
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...at 286. [35]Id. at 286, n.1. [36]Id. [37]B.G.’s, Inc. v. Gross, 23 P.3d 691, 694 (Colo. 2001); CRS § 13-21-203. [38]Pringle v. Valdez, 171 P.3d 624, 629 (Colo. 2007). [39]CRS § 13-21-102.5(1)(b). [40]James v. Coors Brewing, 73 F.Supp.2d 1250, 1253 (D.Colo. 1999). [41]Calvaresi v. Nat’l Dev.......