Prioleau v. Ryder's on Main, LLC

• Decision Date: 30 June 2016
• Docket Number: 106015468S
• Court: Connecticut Superior Court
• Parties: Yolanda Prioleau v. Ryder's on Main, LLC

Yolanda Prioleau v. Ryder's on Main, LLC

No. 106015468S

Superior Court of Connecticut, Judicial District of New Haven, New Haven

June 30, 2016

UNPUBLISHED OPINION

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION

Thomas J. Corradino, Judge Trial Referee.

The plaintiff brought a cause of action against the defendant Ryder's on Main. The complaint was filed on October 26 2010 and alleges the defendant violated § 46a-60(a) as a result of (1) racial discrimination and (2) color discrimination.

The first count based on racial discrimination in violation of § 46a-60(a)(1) states in paragraph 34 that (1) the defendant interfered with the plaintiff's privilege of employment on the basis of her race (2) the defendant limited and classified the plaintiff by her race in such a way that resulted in depriving her of opportunities and recognition given to other similarly situated coworkers (3) the defendant racially discriminated against the plaintiff as to adversely affect her status as an employee (4) the defendant " treated the plaintiff adversely different from similarly situated Caucasian employees (5) the " defendant terminated the plaintiff from employment on account of her race." In the second count the plaintiff makes the same allegations of discrimination based on her color.

As a result of the alleged violation of § 46a-60(a)(1) the plaintiff she claims suffered damages which included loss of employment with resulting loss of income and wages and various job benefits. She also claims as a result of the discrimination she " suffered severe humiliation embarrassment, and emotional distress."

The plaintiff in a final paragraph to both counts of the complaint states that her " termination and unequal treatment was arbitrary, unreasonably discriminatory and retaliatory all in violation of the Connecticut Fair Employment Practices Act C.G.S. § 46a-60a et seq. The defendant exhibited ill will, malice, improper motive, and indifference to the plaintiff's civil rights by discriminating against her and terminating her on the basis of her race (first count) and on the basis of her color (second) count.

Prefacing the legal claims in the first and second counts the plaintiff makes 33 factual allegations which are incorporated in each of the counts. It alleges the defendant Ryder on Main, LLC is a limited liability company located on West Main Street in Meriden and it is a bar and grill establishment. The defendant admits these allegations. There are other allegations of an introductory nature which the court finds were established at trial but as to which the defendant left the plaintiff to her proof. The court finds that the plaintiff is African-American and that her color is black. Prior to the defendant purchasing the bar and grill Tom and Fred Mauri owned the establishment which was known as Mauri's Café and the plaintiff was employed by these prior owners as the head bartender. This business was purchased by the defendant Ryder's On Main in February or March 2008. After the defendant purchased the business the plaintiff was employed by the defendant Ryder's On Main.

Paragraph 12 through thirty-three then lists a series of discriminatory and racist statements or actions which form the basis of the discriminatory actions on which the First and Second Counts are based. As noted the plaintiff has brought this action against a business entity, Ryder's On Main and bases its suit on the Connecticut Fair Employment Practices Act (CFEPA) which provides that it is a violation of the act:

For an employer, by the employer or the employer's agent except in the case of bona fide occupational qualification or need, to refuse to hire or employ or to bar or to discharge from employment any individual or to discriminate against such individual in terms of compensation or in terms, conditions or privileges of employment because of the individual's race, color . . .

The following acts of discrimination are then alleged:

12. In or about March 2008, Jay Ryder, an employee and/or member of the defendant, told the plaintiff that he was told to get rid of the black girl if he did not want a problem crowd.

13. In or about March 2008, Jay Ryder told the plaintiff that " there is a difference between blacks and niggers, just like there's a difference between whites and white trash."

14. Plaintiff objected to Jay Ryder's use of the racial epithet " nigger."

15. Jay Ryder told the plaintiff that he did not want the DJ playing hip hop and rhythm and blues music because he was afraid that he would lose his day crowd.

16. The day crowd was Caucasian.

17. In or about May 2008, Jay Ryder told the plaintiff that all employee's shift hours were going to be changed to see who worked best on what nights. He did not tell the plaintiff that any employee would lose hours.

18. Defendant hired a cousin of Lynn Ryder who is Caucasian to work as a bartender.

19. Jay Ryder told the plaintiff that the defendant hired the cousin because the defendant wanted to keep the Wallingford crowd.

20. The Wallingford crowd is predominately white.

21. Defendant replaced the plaintiff from working as a second bartender on Thursday night.

22. Plaintiff was replaced by a Caucasian employee.

23. Plaintiff asked the defendant why she was replaced as the second bartender on Thursday nights, the defendant, by and through Jay Ryder, stated I have no good reason.

24. Defendant accused the plaintiff of stealing when the defendant knew that plaintiff had not.

25. After accusing the plaintiff of stealing, the defendant told the plaintiff that it wanted to fire her but that it did not have a good reason to do so.

26. On or about September 25, 2008, defendant informed the plaintiff that it believed that she was unhappy at work and that certain customers had complained about her.

27. Defendant failed to provide the names of any of the alleged customers that complained and failed to provide any description of the nature and/or substance of the alleged customer complaints.

28. Other similarly situated, non-African-American employees of the defendant did engage in misconduct in the workplace but were not terminated.

29. On or about September 25, 2008, defendant terminated plaintiff's employment.

30. Any and all excuse that may be offered by the defendant for the plaintiff's discrimination would be a pretext to mask a true motivating factor of unlawful race and/or color discrimination.

31. Defendant did not want an African-American crowd at its establishment and believed that having an African-American employee as a bartender would attract such a crowd.

The defendant denies all of these allegations in its brief except as to paragraphs 18 and 20 where it leaves the plaintiff to her proof.

Apart from these denials the defendant also argues that any comments or actions by Jay Ryder cannot be attributed to the business entity, Ryder's On Main. The defense takes the position that Jay Ryder's wife set up and financed the business and ran it. The court will discuss this position and the actual factual allegations of discrimination later in the decision.

The defendant also filed special defenses in its answer to the plaintiff's complaint (1) a general statement that the action is barred by " the applicable statute of limitations"; (2) the action is barred by § 46a-100 of the General Statutes; (3) the action is barred by § 46a-98; (4) the action is barred by § 46a-101; (5) the action is barred by § 46a-102.

I

The court will first examine the test to be applied to determine whether there has been a violation of Section 46a-60(a)(1), a section of CFEPA. In this part of the court's decision it will reference federal case law. In Levy v. Commission on Human Rights, 236 Conn. 96, 103, 671 A.2d 349 (1996) the court said that " Although this case is based solely on Connecticut law, we review federal precedent concerning employment discrimination for guidance in enforcing our own anti-discrimination statutes" citing Miko v Commission on Human Rights, 220 Conn. 192, 202, 596 A.2d 396 (1991), also see Ezikovich v. Commission on Human Rights, 57 Conn.App. 767, 774, 750 A.2d 494 (2000), also see Jackson v. Water Pollution Control Authority, 278 Conn. 692, 900 A.2d 498 at footnote 11 (2006). In analyzing a CFEPA claim in the Connecticut Federal District Court, the same principle applies. Referring to Title VII, the federal employment anti-discrimination statute, the court in Johnson v. C. White & Son, Inc., 772 F.Supp.2d 408, 413 (D.Conn., 2011) said " Both Title VII and the CFEPA make it unlawful to discriminate against an employee because of the employee's race or color, see 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (Title VII); Connecticut General Statutes § 46a-60(a)(1) (CFEPA). Claims of racial discrimination under Title VII and CFEPA are analyzed using the same standard, " citing Feingold v. New York, 366 F.3d 138, 157 (CA2, 2004) and Levy v. CHRO, supra, also see Williams v. Quebecor, 456 F.Supp.2d 372, 382-83 (2006). In a race discrimination case brought in District Court under federal and state statutes, the court said that as a result of the foregoing law " . . . the court will analyze Lyte's Title VII and CFEPA race discrimination claims together, " Lyte v. South Central Regional Water Authority, 482 F.Supp.2d 252, 262 (D.Conn., 2007).

As noted in Levy v. Commission on Human Rights, 35 Conn.App. 474, 480, 646 A.2d 893 (1994), the Federal Supreme Court has advanced two theories of employment discrimination (1) the disparate treatment theory, McDonnell Douglas Corp v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973), and (2) the direct evidence theory Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 246, 109 S.Ct. 1775, 104 L.Ed.2d 268 (1989). As pointed out by the Connecticut Supreme Court on the appeal of this case " ...