Pritchard v. Williams

• Decision Date: 09 March 1921
• Docket Number: 16.
• Parties: PRITCHARD ET AL. v. WILLIAMS.
• Court: North Carolina Supreme Court

106 S.E. 144

181 N.C. 46

PRITCHARD ET AL. v. WILLIAMS.

No. 16.

Supreme Court of North Carolina

March 9, 1921

Appeal from Superior Court, Camden County; Calvert, Judge.

Action by J. A. Pritchard and others against D. E. Williams. From the judgment, both parties appeal. In plaintiff's appeal no error, and, in defendant's appeal, error.

Walker and Allen, JJ., dissenting.

A life tenant, who made permanent improvements under a bona fide belief that he was the owner in fee simple, is entitled to recover for betterments.

This was an action in ejectment in which the plaintiff recovered. 175 N.C. 319, 95 S.E. 510. A petition was filed for betterments and in the same case (176 N.C. 108, 96 S.E. 733) the court held (by Brown, J., for a unanimous court) that the petitioner (the defendant) was entitled to recover the same. Upon rehearing (178 N.C. 444, 101 S.E. 85) this judgment was reaffirmed. This is an appeal from the verdict and judgment upon the issues submitted, the only points presented being exceptions to the charge on the third issue as to the value of the betterments. Both parties assigned error and appealed.

Meekins & McMullan, of Elizabeth City, and D. H. Tillitt, of Camden for plaintiffs.

R. C Dozier and W. I. Halstead, both of South Mills, and Aydlett & Simpson and Ehringhaus & Small, all of Elizabeth City, for defendant.

Plaintiff's Appeal.

CLARK C.J.

The court charged that the term "permanent improvements" includes "all improvements of a permanent nature, and which substantially enhanced the value of the property in controversy." The court charged further (the property being a farm) that:

"Putting up dwelling house, or tenant houses, barns and stables and other outbuildings, and any substantial improvements which might be made to those buildings, the necessary ditching and necessary or proper fencing, the digging of a well or planting of orchards, and cutting the timber in the course of clearing for cultivation, the grubbing of stumps, bushes, and reed patches necessary to clear and break the land for planting and cultivation, were permanent improvements on such property within the meaning of the statute"

--adding, however:

"That it was for the jury to determine whether or not such improvements, if the jury should find that any were made, enhanced the value of the property, and, if so, how much; and, while the jury should consider substantial additions or improvements to the buildings if made, they should not consider repairs to such buildings which should be made by the owner in the ordinary use of such property."

He further charged that ditching (embraced in the plaintiff's first exception), wire fencing (second exception), lightning rods (third exception), dwelling house, tenant houses, barns and stables, the digging of a well, and the planting of orchards and the like were permanent improvements only if they substantially enhanced the value of the property. In these instructions we find no error.

The plaintiff's fourth and fifth exceptions were to the refusal of prayers to instruct the jury, which were based upon the idea that, since under the terms of the trust established in the main cause (175 N.C. 319, 95 S.E. 570), the plaintiff was decreed to be the owner of the life estate, he occupied the position of a life tenant with respect to the improvements made by him. But he was not an ordinary life tenant within the meaning of the principle that life tenants cannot recover for betterments which were placed thereon with the knowledge of that fact. The defendant made the improvements, as the jury find, under a bona fide belief that he was the owner in fee simple, and the court decided that the plaintiff was entitled to have the issue thereon submitted (176 N.C. 108, 96 S.E. 733) by a unanimous court, and this was reaffirmed on rehearing (178 N.C. 444, 101 S.E. 85). The plaintiff's prayers were therefore properly refused.

Exceptions 6 and 7 to the refusal of prayers cannot be sustained. The defendant's right to recover for betterments does not depend upon the wish of plaintiff for them or the sufficiency of the buildings already upon the land. Railroad v. McCaskill, 98 N.C. 526, 4 S.E. 468. The sole question, the defendant having placed these improvements upon the land under a bona fide belief that he owned the premises in fee simple, is whether or not the things which were put thereon as permanent improvements "substantially enhanced the value of the premises." If so, the defendant was entitled to recover to the extent of such enhancement in value of the property caused thereby not exceeding the cost. In the plaintiff's appeal there is no error.

Defendant's Appeal.

The exceptions on the defendant's appeal present but a single question, and that is whether the evidence therein offered, tending to show a large outlay and labor in preparing the soil to put it in condition for cultivation and improving the fertility permanently by the use of a judicious system of tillage and high-grade fertilization over and above the ordinary fertilization of the property from year to year, should be submitted to the jury.

The defendant offered to show as follows:

"That the defendant had also adopted and used a system of tillage with an idea of improving permanently the character of the soil and increasing its fertility, and that he had judiciously applied this system to the cultivation of this land; that he had burned and placed upon the land 8,000 bushels of oyster shells burned into lime; that he had placed 20 loads of manure upon the lands the first year besides that which came from the place; that he had placed upon these reclaimed acres 200 loads of manure a year in addition to the ordinary accumulation on the farm; that he had purchased and placed on it in addition to this an entire barge load of manure; that he had also placed upon the land 1,000 bushels of hard wood ashes each year, for nine years, same having been taken from his mill, which was located in the neighborhood; that he had sowed the land with peas and clover and plowed them in for the purpose of increasing its fertility; that he had in his system of tillage adopted a judicious system in the rotation of crops and deep plowing peculiarly adapted to this soil, for the purpose of increasing its fertility; that in addition to the 8,000 bushels of oyster shells burned into lime the defendant had placed on the land two carloads of agricultural lime of about 100 tons; that this was all in addition to the fertilizers used each year for the tillage of the crops and for which no claim is made; that in following this line of effort to improve the soil the defendant had made a cash outlay in excess of $4,230.18, and that in his opinion such efforts had enhanced the value of the property to this amount."

Whether the above were applied, and whether they substantially enhanced the value of the farm, was fit for the jury to consider, and we think it was error to exclude the testimony offered.

This evidence tends to show an unusual and successful effort by which a run-down farm of about 143 acres, which had lain idle for almost a generation, had been brought into a high state of cultivation and made, as the defendant contends upon the evidence, to "blossom like a rose." The mere cultivation of the soil in the ordinary use of the land and fertilization thereof for the purpose of raising crops in the ordinary course of tillage certainly would not constitute betterments. Only those things which substantially enhance the value of the premises permanently should be estimated by the jury and allowed to the defendant as compensation.

The statute does not permit a recovery except for improvements that are permanent and valuable. The word "permanent" is defined in the Century Dictionary as "lasting or intended to last indefinitely," "fixed or enduring," "abiding," and the like, and it was held in Simpson v. Robinson, 37 Ark. 132, that an improvement does not mean a general enhancement in value from the occupant's operations.

It is elemental justice, as well as public policy, when a man occupies premises "having reason to believe" (C. S. 701) that he is owner thereof in fee simple, that to whatever extent he has increased the value of the property by permanent improvements thereon he should receive compensation from the party who recovers the premises.

The cultivation of the soil in a good and proper manner and the keeping of the buildings in repair and the land in good condition does not entitle the defendant to recover compensation, but permanent improvements by...