Pritchett v. Brevard Naval Stores Co.

• Decision Date: 26 October 1938
• Citation: 134 Fla. 649,185 So. 134
• Parties: PRITCHETT et al. v. BREVARD NAVAL STORES CO. et al.
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

185 So. 134

134 Fla. 649

PRITCHETT et al. v. BREVARD NAVAL STORES CO. et al.

Florida Supreme Court, Division A.

October 26, 1938

Rehearing Denied Jan. 4, 1939.

Suit by H. E. Pritchett and others against the Brevard Naval Stores Company and others to restrain a certain sale of realty to satisfy a judgment. From the decree dismissing the bill of complaint, the complainants appeal and the defendants cross-appeal.

Affirmed.

BUFORD J., and ELLIS, C.J., dissenting. Appeal from Circuit Court, Polk County; W. J Barker, Judge.

COUNSEL

Claude L. Gray and George W. Johnson, both of Orlando, for appellants.

Bryant & Trantham, of Lakeland, Waller & Meginniss, of Tallahassee and W. C. Brooker, of Tampa, for appellees.

OPINION

TERRELL Justice.

The property involved in this litigation is an orange grove. It was acquired by Mrs. Effie F. Pritchett in 1911 with her inheritance and was sold by her to A. Silverburg in 1925, for which she took a cash payment and a mortgage back for deferred payments. In 1926, creditors of H. E. Pritchett, the husband of Effie F. Pritchett, filed a creditor's bill in the Circuit Court of Polk County, seeking to subject the proceeds of the mortgage to the payment of claims held by it against Mrs. Pritchett. While this suit was pending, Silverburg reconveyed the land described in the mortgage to Mrs. Pritchett who in turn on March 8, 1928, conveyed it to Brevard Naval Stores Company, a Florida Corporation.

Mrs. Pritchett died in April, 1928, after which those creditors filed a supplemental bill attacking her conveyance to Brevard Naval Stores Company as a fraud on creditors. The heirs of Mrs. Pritchett were made parties defendant to this suit. While it was pending, the Gulf Fertilizer Company instituted actions against Brevard Naval Stores Company which resulted in judgments in its favor. While the latter suits were pending, Pritchett procured a charter for Polk Investment Company and had Brevard Naval Stores Company convey the property in question to it, it being shown that at the time of Mrs. Pritchett's death, she owned all the stock in Brevard Naval Stores Company, that said stock descended to her heirs who now own all the stock in Brevard Naval Stores Company and Polk Investment Company.

On securing its judgments against Brevard Naval Stores Company, Gulf Fertilizer Company filed a bill of complaint to set aside the deed from Brevard Naval Stores Company to Polk Investment Company as a fraud on creditors. Final decree was ultimately entered in compliance with the prayer of the bill and further holding that the judgments of Gulf Fertilizer Company were a lien on the property which was ordered sold to satisfy them. The instant suit was brought to restrain said sale. In a former appeal herein, Pritchett v. Brevard Naval Stores Co., 126 Fla. 156, 170 So. 610, the judgment below was reversed because of the exclusion and refusal to consider material evidence. This appeal is from a final decree adjudging the equities to be with the complainant Gulf Fertilizer Company, and dismissing the bill of complaint.

Numerous questions are argued on this appeal but they all resolve under these propositions, (1) when the cause was first reversed, had the Chancellor power to refer the issues to master for taking further testimony? (2) Does the decree appealed from find ample support in the record? and (3) Was the Chancellor's finding on the question of estoppel and on issues incident thereto warranted by the record?

When the cause was reversed on the former appeal, the Gulf Fertilizer Company moved that it be referred for the taking of further testimony. The granting of this motion is the ground on which the first error was assigned and argued in this Court.

It is shown that the cause was reversed and remanded for appropriate proceedings. The general rule is that when a case is returned to the lower court in this state, it is in the same condition as if a new trial had been ordered. Aside from this fact, in all such reversals, the trial court is vested with a broad discretion in handling or directing the course of the cause when it is remanded and there is no showing that he abused that discretion. We find no merit in this contention. Sarasota Ice Co. v. Lyle & Co., 58 Fla. 517, 50 So. 993; Simpson v. Warran, 106 Fla. 688, 143 So. 602, 144 So. 324; 4 C.J. 1224.

The second question we are called on to resolve is whether or not Mrs. Pritchett appeared before the Notary Public and acknowledged her signature when she executed the deed to Brevard Naval Stores Company.

The evidence on this point is in conflict and susceptible of more than one interpretation. It is not charged that fraud or overreaching of any kind was perpetrated on Mrs. Pritchett to induce her to execute the deed. It is shown that she was very ill at the time the deed was executed and in fact died soon...