Pritt v. Republican Nat. Committee

• Decision Date: 12 December 2001
• Docket Number: No. 29326.,29326.
• Citation: 210 W.Va. 446,557 S.E.2d 853
• Court: West Virginia Supreme Court
• Parties: Charlotte PRITT, Plaintiff Below, Appellant, v. The REPUBLICAN NATIONAL COMMITTEE, et al., Defendants Below, Appellees.

557 S.E.2d 853

210 W.Va. 446

Charlotte PRITT, Plaintiff Below, Appellant, v. The REPUBLICAN NATIONAL COMMITTEE, et al., Defendants Below, Appellees.

No. 29326.

Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia.

Submitted October 3, 2001.

Decided December 12, 2001.

Margaret L. Workman, Esq., Margaret Workman Law, L.C., H.H. Roberts, Esq., Charleston, for the Appellant.

Michael W. Carey, Esq., Carey Scott & Douglas, PLLC, Charleston, Bobby R. Burchfield, Esq., Jason A. Levine, Esq., Covington & Burling, Washington, District of Columbia, for the Appellees. DAVIS, Justice.

The appellant herein and plaintiff below, Charlotte Pritt [hereinafter referred to as "Ms. Pritt"], appeals from orders entered May 15, 2000, and June 13, 2000, by the Circuit Court of Fayette County. In the first order, the circuit court granted summary judgment for the appellees herein and defendants below, the Republican National Committee, et al. [hereinafter collectively referred to as "RNC"],¹ concluding that statements made in advertisements sponsored by RNC during the 1996 West Virginia Gubernatorial race were not false or published with actual malice as alleged by Ms. Pritt. The circuit court's second order denied Ms. Pritt's "motion for reconsideration". On appeal to this Court, Ms. Pritt assigns numerous errors, including (1) summary judgment was not proper because there existed a genuine issue of material fact; (2) the circuit court failed to determine whether the statements in issue were defamatory; (3) deposition testimony was erroneously excluded; and (4) in rendering its decision, the circuit court neglected to address the remaining counts asserted in her amended complaint. Upon a review of the parties' arguments, the record submitted for appellate review, and the pertinent authorities, we agree with Ms. Pritt that genuine issues of material fact do preclude the disposition of this matter by summary judgment. Accordingly, we reverse the circuit court's ruling to the contrary, and remand this case for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

In 1996, Ms. Pritt, a former West Virginia schoolteacher and state legislator, was the Democratic party's candidate for the office of Governor of the State of West Virginia. During the month immediately preceding the general election, the National Republican Senatorial Committee [hereinafter referred to as "NRSC"] formally organized the West Virginia State Victory Committee [hereinafter referred to as "Victory Committee"] pursuant to the election laws of this State. See generally W. Va.Code § 3-8-1, et seq. Among other activities, the Victory Committee sponsored and published numerous radio and television advertisements, during the final weeks of the campaign, which called into question Ms. Pritt's character and campaign platform. One of these radio spots specifically charged:

Behind Charlotte Pritt's campaign smile is a liberal voting record she can't hide from.

In the State Senate, Charlotte Pritt proposed teaching first graders about condoms.

Surprised? You shouldn't be.

Senator Pritt also voted to permit the sale of pornographic Videos to children.

She even voted to allow convicted drug abusers to work in our public schools.

If parents can't trust Charlotte Pritt to protect our children, think also of our veterans.

Charlotte Pritt voted against honoring the men and women of West Virginia who fought in the Gulf War.

Senator Pritt voted to allow the burning of the American Flag that all veterans fought so hard to defend.

She even opposed requiring students to begin their day with the Pledge of Allegiance.

Look behind the Smile.

Charlotte Pritt — wrong on the issues.

Wrong for West Virginia[.]

Paid for by West Virginia State Victory Committee

Mary M. Dotter, Treasurer

Not authorized by Underwood for Governor

Television advertisements backed by the Victory Committee made similar claims.

Given the temporal restraints of the campaign's culmination, Ms. Pritt was unable to respond to many of these allegations.² Ultimately, she lost the general election to the Republican nominee for Governor, Cecil Underwood. Shortly after Governor Underwood assumed office, the Victory Committee was dissolved.

Subsequently, on October 31, 1997, Ms. Pritt filed a civil action in the Circuit Court of Fayette County against RNC, NRSC, the Victory Committee, John Doe, and Jane Doe.³ In her lawsuit, Ms. Pritt alleged that the defendants had defamed her,⁴ exposed her to "false light" publicity, and violated W. Va.Code § 3-8-11(c) (1995) (Repl.Vol.1999).⁵ Following discovery, the defendants collectively moved for summary judgment.⁶ By order entered May 15, 2000, the circuit court granted the defendants' motion, ruling, in part, that

As a former state legislator and candidate for the office[ ] of Governor, plaintiff [Ms. Pritt] is a "public figure" for purposes of this lawsuit....

As a public figure, plaintiff must prove by "clear and convincing evidence" that the statements at issue were both false and published with "actual malice"—that defendants had "knowledge at the time of publication that they were false" or published them with "reckless and willful disregard for the truth." ...

Summary judgment on all four Counts is warranted because the statements at issue are not false. Defendants analyzed the legislative record and explained at length why all but one of the statements at issue are true, and why the last one is a protected expression of opinion.... In particular, defendants set forth plaintiff's legislative votes that supported each statement and countered the interpretations giving rise to plaintiff's claims....

Summary judgment on all four Counts is also warranted because there is no record evidence that any defendant acted with "actual malice."

(Citations omitted). In response to this ruling, Ms. Pritt filed, on May 25, 2000, a "motion for reconsideration," which the circuit court denied by order entered June 13, 2000. It is from these orders of the circuit court that Ms. Pritt now appeals to this Court.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

The instant appeal comes to this Court from decisions of the circuit court granting summary judgment in favor of RNC and denying Ms. Pritt's post-judgment motion. We typically apply a plenary review to an order of a circuit court deciding a summary judgment motion. "A circuit court's entry of summary judgment is reviewed de novo." Syl. pt. 1, Painter v. Peavy, 192 W.Va. 189, 451 S.E.2d 755 (1994). Also involved in this proceeding are numerous legal questions, the resolution of which is integral to the summary judgment ruling. In this regard, we likewise review anew a lower tribunal's determination of questions of law. "Where the issue on an appeal from the circuit court is clearly a question of law or involving an interpretation of a statute, we apply a de novo standard of review." Syl. pt. 1, Chrystal R.M. v. Charlie A.L., 194 W.Va. 138, 459 S.E.2d 415 (1995).

Finally, we must ascertain the appropriate standard of review to apply to the circuit court's order of June 13, 2000, whereby it denied Ms. Pritt's "motion for reconsideration". Generally speaking, "a `motion to reconsider' is not a properly titled pleading in West Virginia." Richardson v. Kennedy, 197 W.Va. 326, 329, 475 S.E.2d 418, 421 (1996) (citations omitted). Nevertheless, we routinely re-characterize such motions as those made pursuant to Rules 59(e) or 60(b) of the West Virginia Rules of Civil Procedure depending upon when they were filed in the circuit court.

When a party filing a motion for reconsideration does not indicate under which West Virginia Rule of Civil Procedure it is filing the motion, the motion will be considered to be either a Rule 59(e)⁷ motion to alter or amend a judgment or a Rule 60(b)⁸ motion for relief from a judgment order. If the motion is filed within ten days of the circuit court's entry of judgment, the motion is treated as a motion to alter or amend under Rule 59(e). If the motion is filed outside the ten-day limit, it can only be addressed under Rule 60(b).

Syl. pt. 2, Powderidge Unit Owners Ass'n v. Highland Props., Ltd., 196 W.Va. 692, 474 S.E.2d 872 (1996) (footnotes added). Accord Syl. pt. 1, Richardson v. Kennedy, 197 W.Va. 326, 475 S.E.2d 418 ("`A motion to amend or alter judgment, even though it is incorrectly denominated as a motion to "reconsider", "vacate", "set aside", or "reargue" is a Rule 59(e) motion if filed and served within ten days of entry of judgment.' Syllabus Point 1, Lieving v. Hadley, 188 W.Va. 197, 423 S.E.2d 600 (1992).").

In the case sub judice, it appears from the record that Ms. Pritt filed her "motion for reconsideration" within ten days of the circuit court's summary judgment order. Accordingly, we will treat this motion as one made pursuant to Rule 59(e) of the West Virginia Rules of Civil Procedure. See Syl. pt. 2, Powderidge, 196 W.Va. 692,474 S.E.2d 872.

The standard of review applicable to an appeal from a motion to alter or amend a judgment, made pursuant to W. Va. R. Civ. P. 59(e), is the same standard that would apply to the underlying judgment upon which the motion is based and from which the appeal to this Court is filed.

Syl. pt. 1, Wickland v. American Travellers Life Ins. Co., 204 W.Va. 430, 513 S.E.2d 657 (1998). Therefore, we apply a de novo standard of review to the circuit court's ruling in this regard. See Syl. pt. 1, Painter v. Peavy, 192 W.Va. 189, 451 S.E.2d 755. Having established the standards of review applicable to this case, we proceed to consider the parties' arguments.

III. DISCUSSION

On appeal to this Court, Ms. Pritt raises numerous assignments of error, including the circuit court (1) improperly granted summary judgment to RNC when there existed a genuine issue of material fact; (2) failed to determine whether the Victory Committee's advertisements were defamatory; (3) erroneously excluded deposition testimony; and (4) neglected to address the remaining claims...