Proctor v. Southern Ry. Co.

• Decision Date: 17 July 1901
• Citation: 39 S.E. 351,61 S.C. 170
• Parties: PROCTOR v. SOUTHERN RY. CO.
• Court: South Carolina Supreme Court

39 S.E. 351

61 S.C. 170

PROCTOR v. SOUTHERN RY. CO.

Supreme Court of South Carolina

July 17, 1901

Appeal from common pleas circuit court of Greenwood county; Benet. Judge.

Action by John M. Proctor against the Southern Railway Company. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant appeals. Reversed.

The following complaint was filed:

"John M. Proctor, the plaintiff above named, by Graydon & Giles, his attorneys, complaining of the Southern Railway Company, the defendant aforesaid, alleges:

(1) That the said defendant, the Southern Railway Company, is a corporation, duly chartered under and by virtue of the laws of the state of Virginia, and owns and operates a certain railroad between the cities of Greenville and Columbia, in this state, known as the 'Columbia & Greenville Railroad Company,' together with the tracks, cars, locomotives and other appurtenances thereunto belonging. (2) That on the 13th day of September, 1899, while the plaintiff was returning from the city of Greenwood to his home in the county of Greenwood, in the state of South Carolina, and while traveling along the public road near the track of the defendant, driving two mules hitched to a two-horse wagon, at a point near the oil mill in the town of Ninetysix, said county, the plaintiff observed and engine and a train of freight cars attached thereto belonging to the defendant, and operated by its agents, servants, and employés on the track of the defendant, and moving in the direction of the said town of Ninetysix, and towards the plaintiff, and about to meet the plaintiff's wagon and team. (3) That the plaintiff, to avoid meeting the said engine and train of freight cars attached thereto, drove out of and off of the said public road, and away from the track of the defendant and stopped his said team to allow the said engine and train of freight cars attached thereto to pass, the said plaintiff being then and at all times in plain and open view of the defendant, its agents, servants, and employés; when the defendant, its agents, servants, and employés, saw that the plaintiff had moved his wagon and team off from the public road, and away from the noise of said engine and train of freight cars attached thereto, then the defendant, its agents, servants, and employés, caused the said engine and train of freight cars attached thereto to come to a full stop on the track of the defendant's road. (4) That the plaintiff, seeing that the said engine and train of freight cars attached thereto had come to a full stop, then drove his said wagon and team back into the said public road, and attempted to pass the said engine and train of freight cars attached thereto while standing; but, as soon as the plaintiff approached near and opposite to the said engine, he being in the said public road, the defendant, its agents servants, and employés who were in charge of the said engine and train of freight cars attached thereto, and being in full and plain view of the plaintiff and his wagon and team, with intent to frighten and scare the plaintiff's team and injure the plaintiff, willfully, wantonly, and recklessly, and not regarding the rights of the plaintiff in that regard, let off steam from said engine, blew the whistle attached to said engine, so that the said team of mules became frightened and unmanageable, and were made to run away, and threw the plaintiff out of said wagon, and the wheels of said wagon were made to pass over the body of the plaintiff, inflicting serious and painful wounds and bruises on plaintiff's back, foot, and injuring the plaintiff internally, so that he became ill and sick, and for a long time was unable to attend to his business, and was confined to his bed, and suffered intense pain from the injuries to his left kindey; and he fears that from the effects of said injuries he will never be strong and well again. (5) That by reason of the injuries as aforesaid, received by the willful, wanton, and negligent conduct of the defendant, its agents, servants, and employés, the plaintiff has been damaged by the defendant in the sum of $1,995. Wherefore the plaintiff demands judgment against the defendant in the sum of $1,995, and the cost of this action."

The trial judge instructed the jury as follows:

"The case you have been trying, and have now about reached the conclusion of, is an action for damages brought by the plaintiff, Proctor, against the Southern Railway Company, for alleged injuries said to have been inflicted upon him by the railroad company or its servants. The allegations are of such a character as, if established by testimony, by the preponderance of proof, would justify a jury in finding a verdict for damages, either actual damages or punitive, or both, or only actual or only punitive. It depends entirely on the testimony. The allegations are so framed that counsel had the right to introduce testimony as to actual damages, and also evidence as to punitive vindictive damages; and it is left entirely with the jury to say from the testimony whether the plaintiff has made out his case for damages of any kind, or in any amount. You have heard counsel on both sides speak of actual and compensatory damages, and of punitive, vindictive, or exemplary damages, and perhaps a word or two of explanation may help you so that you may the better weight the testimony. When a man seeks only actual damages, called also 'compensatory damages,' he seeks at the hands of the jury only enough money to place him where he was before,--to pay him back, to compensate him for the actual injury. But when he seeks and obtains punitive damages as well as actual, the jury in the case, if it is a proper case, are allowed in law, after having ascertained how much he ought to receive as compensation, to add another amount of money, not for the purpose of the compensation of the plaintiff, but for the purpose of inflicting a penalty upon the defendant for the wrongdoing proved,--something in the nature of a punishment, very similar to a fine imposed in a criminal court for a violation of the law;

and intended not only to punish for the wrongdoing in the past, but to act as a warning for the future not to repeat such wrongdoing. Hence they are called 'punitive damages,' the word 'punitive' meaning of the character of punishment. They are also called 'vindictive damages,' supposed to embody the righteous indignation of a jury at wanton, reckless, willful wrongdoing; and they are also called 'exemplary damages,' because they are supposed to operate as an example not only to the defendant who suffers the penalty, but to others in the same line of business, who will take warning.

Now, in this case, the plaintiff alleges that the injuries which h he alleges in his complaint were inflicted upon him because of the willful, wanton, and reckless conduct of the railway company and its servants. These allegations, if they are sustained by sufficient proof, by the preponderance of the testimony, would justify a jury in finding punitive damages, and also actual, if proved. It is alleged here that the conduct spoken of as willful, wanton, and reckless consisted in blowing the whistle of the engine and in letting off steam in a willful, wanton, and reckless manner; and, further, that those acts were done with the intent to frighten the plaintiff's team of mules, and also to injure him. So that, under the allegations of this complaint, the plaintiff charges not only that the conduct was willful, wanton, and reckless, but with intent to frighten his mules, and to injure him. He alleges, further, in his complaint, that, as a consequence of that conduct on the part of the railroad servants, he suffered injury; that his team ran off, having been frightened by the blowing of the whistle and the letting off of steam in the manner described; and that he suffered painful wounds and bruises in his back, and he also suffered internal injury, which caused him to be ill and sick, and unable to attend to business for a long time; and that he was confined to his bed, and suffered intense pain from injuries to his left kidney, so that he will never be well and strong again; and for these alleged injuries he claims damages to the extent of $1,995,--that otherwise odd sum being manifestly, of course, to come within the amount for which a suit of this character can be allowed in this court, and not removed to the federal court. If they had asked for more,--for $2,000,--probably the railroad company would have had a petition to remove it to the other court; so that the amount alleged in the complaint may be explained in that way. $1,995 might have been $1,999.99, so far as that is concerned. The railway company, answering, denies that the plaintiff is entitled to any damages at all; denies all the allegations of the complaint. Therefore the burden of proof is put upon the plaintiff to establish his case according to the measure of proof, which is always applied in the court of common pleas before a jury. In the court of common pleas he is not required to prove it beyond a reasonable doubt, but by the preponderance of the testimony. So that you will take all the evidence that seems to favor, tends to favor, or does favor the plaintiff's claim on all these allegations, and put that evidence in one scale, and in the other scale over against it put all the evidence, no matter from what witness, that is against the plaintiff's claim, weigh the two batches of testimony, and, if the testimony in favor of the plaintiff's claim clearly weighs more than the testimony against it, then the plaintiff's claim has been established by the preponderance of the testimony,--which means the greater weight of the testimony; and I need not charge this intelligent jury that 'greater weight of the testimony' cannot and should

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