Producers Gin Ass'n v. Beck, 38462

• Decision Date: 27 October 1952
• Docket Number: No. 38462,38462
• Citation: 60 So.2d 642,215 Miss. 263
• Parties: PRODUCERS GIN ASS'N (AAL) v. BECK.
• Court: Mississippi Supreme Court

Page 642

60 So.2d 642

215 Miss. 263

PRODUCERS GIN ASS'N (AAL) v. BECK.

No. 38462.

Supreme Court of Mississippi.

Oct. 27, 1952.

Smith & Jones, Cleveland, for appellant.

Alexander, Feduccia & Alexander, Cleveland, for appellee.

HALL, Justice.

Appellant brought an action of unlawful entry and detainer against appellee for recovery of possession of a dwelling house and from a judgment in its favor appellee appealed to the circuit court. While that cause was pending appellee brought suit against appellant in the circuit court for recovery of a balance of $500 due on his salary under an alleged contract of employment for one year under the terms of which it was claimed by appellee that appellant was to furnish him the dwelling house aforesaid and pay him a salary of $50 per week for his services as operator of appellant's cotton gin. By agreement of the parties the two causes were consolidated for trial in the circuit court with appellant 'being made the plaintiff in both cases and proceeding as plaintiff ordinarily proceeds, and with the same burden.'

In 1948 appellee was employed by appellant under an oral agreement in the capacity mentioned on a weekly basis and entered upon the discharge of his duties on July 5, 1948. Under this agreement appellant was to furnish him the dwelling house and pay him a salary of $33 per week until the ginning season started and his weekly salary was then to be $50. Appellee was to work under the orders and direction of D. F. Lifer who was manager of the gin as well as Secretary and Treasurer of appellant. Appellee established with considerable corroboration that in a short time after this employment he had an oral agreement with Lifer whereby his employment was to run for a period of one year ending July 5, 1949; that about the expiration of that term there was another oral agreement whereby he was employed for a period of another year ending July 5, 1950, at a straight salary of $50 per week, with the dwelling house furnished to him; and that about the expiration of that term there was another oral agreement whereby he was employed on the same basis for another year ending July 5, 1951. Appellee was discharged on January 2, 1951, after he had entered upon his duties for that day. Appellant notified him that possession of the dwelling house was desired but agreed that he might occupy it for the remainder of that month. Upon his failure to remove from the premises at the end of the month, the unlawful entry and detainer suit was instituted. Appellee sought other employment which he finally obtained on March 5, 1951, and brought suit for the salary due him up to that time.

On sharply conflicting testimony the issue was submitted to the jury on the question whether there was such a contract as above mentioned. The jury returned a verdict in favor of appellant for possession of the dwelling house but allowed no rent therefor, and it also returned a separate verdict in favor of appellee in the salary suit for the sum of $400 from which this appeal is presecuted.

Appellant's first contention is that there was no consideration for the alleged supplemental contract whereby appellee claims to have been employed for a year and that for this reason the supplemental contract was void. We do not agree with that contention. In 12 Am.Jur. p. 989, Contracts, Sec. 411, it is said: 'Although some authorities state that the consideration for the original contract is sufficient to support a substituted contract and that new consideration is unnecessary, most authorities support the rule that a new consideration is essential to the substitution of one contract for another. A contract may be superseded by another contract even though the new contract consists merely of mutual promises. The mutual agreement of the parties to a bilateral executory contract, before a breach thereof, to abrogate and discharge it and to substitute in its stead a new contract conferring advantages or imposing new burdens on both constitutes a sufficient consideration to support the substituted contract.' And in 12 Am.Jur. p. 960, Contracts, Sec. 412, it is said: 'Any new agreement between the parties to an existing executory contract, made in substitution or modification of the elder compact and bilateral in benefit or burden, has, like the primary contract, a sufficient consideration in the mutual advantages or obligations which it confers or imposes.' It is in evidence that during the ginning season, which usually lasts approximately four months of the year, the gin operator is compelled to work unusually long hours, sometimes as much as twenty-four hours a day without rest, while during the remaining months the hours of work are not long nor the work burdensome. It is further in evidence that as a result of this situation gin operators would frequently quit their employment at the beginning of the ginning season and that appellant had had trouble in this respect. It was therefore to appellant's advantage to bind its gin operator to a yearly contract so as to obviate the trouble and difficulty of having to find a new gin operator at the beginning of or during the...