Professional Firefighters of Omaha, Local 385 v. City of Omaha, S-90-1206

• Decision Date: 09 April 1993
• Docket Number: No. S-90-1206,S-90-1206
• Citation: 243 Neb. 166,498 N.W.2d 325
• Parties: PROFESSIONAL FIREFIGHTERS OF OMAHA, LOCAL 385, Appellant and Cross-Appellee, v. CITY OF OMAHA, Appellee and Cross-Appellant.
• Court: Nebraska Supreme Court

Page 325

498 N.W.2d 325

243 Neb. 166

PROFESSIONAL FIREFIGHTERS OF OMAHA, LOCAL 385, Appellant and Cross-Appellee, v. CITY OF OMAHA, Appellee and Cross-Appellant.

No. S-90-1206.

Supreme Court of Nebraska.

April 9, 1993.

Syllabus by the Court

1. Summary Judgment. Summary judgment is properly granted only when the record discloses that there is no genuine issue concerning any material fact or the ultimate inferences deducible from such fact or facts and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

2. Summary Judgment: Appeal and Error. In reviewing an order sustaining a motion for summary judgment, an appellate court views the evidence in a light most favorable to the party opposing the motion and gives that party the benefit of all reasonable inferences that may be deduced from the evidence.

3. Statutes: Appeal and Error. The interpretation of statutes is a matter of law in connection with which an appellate court has an obligation to reach an independent, correct conclusion irrespective of the determination made by the trial court.

4. Actions: Parties: Judgments: Words and Phrases. An indispensable party is one whose interest in the subject matter of the controversy is such that the controversy cannot be finally adjudicated without affecting the indispensable party's interest, or which is such that not to address the interest of the indispensable party would leave the controversy in such a condition that its final determination may be wholly inconsistent with equity and good conscience.

5. Actions: Parties: Judgments: Words and Phrases. The portion of the definition of indispensable party which speaks in terms of not ending up with a final determination which may be wholly inconsistent with equity and good conscience relates not to questions of general policy, but to some legal right of the indispensable party.

6. Jurisdiction: Standing. Only a party who has standing may invoke the jurisdiction of a court.

7. Actions: Standing. One must have some legal interest in the outcome of the litigation in order to maintain suit.

8. Actions: Standing. Standing is not a mere pleading requirement, but, rather, an indispensable component of a party's case.

9. Taxation: Standing. Standing arises upon a special injury to the suing party itself or on that party's status as a resident taxpayer.

10. Declaratory Judgments: Claims. Declaratory judgment may be available to a litigant when a controversy exists as a result of a claim asserted against one who has an interest in contesting such claim, the controversy is between persons whose interests are adverse, the party seeking declaratory relief has a legally protectable interest or right in the subject matter of the controversy, and the issue involved is capable of present judicial determination.

11. Jurisdiction. The existence of an actual case or controversy is necessary for the exercise of judicial power.

12. Actions: Equity: Taxation: Municipal Corporations. A taxpayer, for the benefit of a municipal or public corporation, may commence and prosecute to judgment an equitable action to enforce a right of action which the governing body has refused to enforce.

13. Actions: Equity: Taxation: Municipal Corporations. A resident taxpayer may invoke the interposition of a court of equity to prevent the illegal disposition of money of a municipal corporation or the illegal creation of a debt which he or she, in common with other property holders, may otherwise be compelled to pay.

14. Actions: Taxation: Injunction. A resident taxpayer, without showing any interest or injury peculiar to itself, may bring an action to enjoin the illegal expenditure of public funds raised for governmental purposes.

15. Actions: Pleadings: Taxation: Municipal Corporations. To plead a resident taxpayer's action, the plaintiff must allege a demand made upon the municipal or public corporation and a refusal by the corporation to bring the action itself, or facts which show that such a demand would be useless.

16. Municipal Corporations. A municipal corporation possesses, and can exercise, the following powers and no others: first, those granted in express words; second, those necessarily or fairly implied in or incident to the powers expressly granted; and third, those essential to the declared objects and purposes of the corporation--not simply convenient, but indispensable.

17. Municipal Corporations: Legislature. A municipality is a creature of the Legislature and derives its powers from that source.

18. Statutes: Municipal Corporations. Statutes granting powers to municipalities are to be strictly construed, and where doubt exists, such doubt must be resolved against the grant.

John P. Fahey and Gerellen R. Rome, of Broom, Johnson, Fahey & Clarkson, Omaha, for appellant.

Herbert M. Fitle, Omaha City Atty., James E. Fellows, and Wendy E. Hahn, Omaha, for appellee.

HASTINGS, C.J., BOSLAUGH, WHITE, CAPORALE, SHANAHAN, FAHRNBRUCH, and LANPHIER, JJ.

CAPORALE, Justice.

I. STATEMENT OF CASE

The plaintiff-appellant, Professional Firefighters of Omaha, Local 385, a labor organization, seeks a declaration that the defendant-appellee, the City of Omaha, is required to provide specialized aircraft rescue and firefighting services to its airport authority. Concluding that the city is under no mandatory duty to provide such services to the authority, the district court granted the city's motion for summary judgment. The local has appealed, asserting that the district court erred in so ruling. The city has cross-appealed, asserting that the local lacks standing to sue. We affirm.

II. SCOPES OF REVIEW

Summary judgment is properly granted only when the record discloses that there is no genuine issue concerning any material fact or the ultimate inferences deducible from such fact or facts and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Economy Preferred Ins. Co. v. Mass, 242 Neb. 842, 497 N.W.2d 6 (1993); Parrish v. Omaha Pub. Power Dist., 242 Neb. 783, 496 N.W.2d 902 (1993); Sports Courts of Omaha v. Meginnis, 242 Neb. 768, 497 N.W.2d 38 (1993); Jaramillo v. Mercury Ins. Co., 242 Neb. 223, 494 N.W.2d 335 (1993). In reviewing an order sustaining a motion for summary judgment, an appellate court views the evidence in a light most favorable to the party opposing the motion and gives that party the benefit of all reasonable inferences that may be deduced from the evidence. Abdullah v. Gunter, 242 Neb. 854, 497 N.W.2d 12 (1993); Economy Preferred Ins. Co. v. Mass, supra; Parrish v. Omaha Pub. Power Dist., supra.

However, on matters of law, including the interpretation of statutes, we, as an appellate court, have an obligation to reach an independent, correct conclusion irrespective of the determination made by the trial court. Stratbucker Children's Trust v. Zoning Bd., 243 Neb. 68, 497 N.W.2d 671 (1993); Sports Courts of Omaha v. Meginnis, supra; Curry v. State ex rel. Stenberg, 242 Neb. 695, 496 N.W.2d 512 (1993); Northern Bank v. Federal Dep. Ins. Corp., 242 Neb. 591, 496 N.W.2d 459 (1993).

III. FACTS

Pursuant to the Nebraska Cities Airport Authorities Act, Neb.Rev.Stat. ch. 3, art. 5 (Cum.Supp.1957), the city created the authority on March 3, 1959. The city then, while retaining title, conveyed to the authority the use of real property upon which the authority constructed an airport terminal and related facilities.

Under a series of cooperative agreements, the city, for the ensuing three decades, provided the authority with city firefighters. The authority supplied this airport firefighting unit with housing and with special equipment which enabled the unit to conduct aircraft rescue and firefighting operations, a specialized firefighting service.

In 1977, the authority began reimbursing the city 50 percent of the airport unit personnel costs and in 1984 increased its reimbursement to 66 percent. On January 19, 1990, the authority decided to discontinue its cooperative arrangements with the city and to hire its own personnel to perform the specialized firefighting services the city's employees had been performing with the authority's equipment.

Having previously expressed its displeasure with the authority's decision to hire its own specialized firefighters, the city then removed its firefighters from the airport and reassigned these 12 employees throughout its fire division. Thus, none of its employees suffered a reduction in classification or benefits.

As the recognized collective bargaining representative for the employees of the city's fire division, the local contends that the removal of the city's firefighters from the airport reduced the division's numbers, thereby reducing the local's membership and revenue.

IV. ANALYSIS

Although the issue is not raised by the parties, at first blush it would appear that the authority is an "indispensable party" to the adjudication of this matter. Such, however, proves not to be the case.

An indispensable party is one whose interest in the subject matter of the controversy is such that the controversy cannot be finally adjudicated without affecting the indispensable party's interest, or which is such that not to address the interest of the indispensable party would leave the controversy in such a condition that its final determination may be wholly inconsistent with equity and good conscience. See Helter v. Williamson, 239 Neb. 741, 478 N.W.2d 6 (1991).

In determining whether the authority is such a party, it must be borne in mind that the local asks only that the city be compelled to provide the authority with specialized firefighting services; the local does not ask that the authority be prevented from also providing its own such services if it wishes or that it be required to pay the city for any services the city provides. Admittedly, it would be wasteful in the extreme for both the city and the authority to provide the same firefighting services, but this lawsuit does not concern itself with waste or...