Profit Wize Marketing v. Wiest
Decision Date | 04 December 2002 |
Citation | 812 A.2d 1270 |
Parties | PROFIT WIZE MARKETING, T/A Executrain of Allentown & Harrisburg, Appellee, v. Michael WIEST, Appellant. |
Court | Pennsylvania Superior Court |
Gary L. Mason, Manalapan, N.J., and Sara A. Austin, York, for appellant.
Jack M. Seitz, Allentown, for appellee.
¶ 1 Appellant, Michael Wiest, appeals from the November 30, 2001 order of the Court of Common Pleas of Lehigh County directing him to pay $14,979.63 in attorney fees and costs to Appellee, Profit Wize Marketing t/a Executrain of Allentown & Harrisburg ("Executrain"). Upon review, we reverse. The relevant facts and procedural history are as follows.
Executrain of Allentown and Harrisburg [Employment] Agreement, Section 14, Certified Record, at 2 (emphasis added).
¶ 3 On March 21, 2001, Appellant resigned from Executrain and found employment less than two weeks later with one of Executrain's competitors, New Horizons, Inc. While in his new position, Appellant allegedly solicited a number of Executrain's customers and utilized confidential information in violation of his Agreement with Executrain. Upon learning of this conduct, Executrain sought a preliminary injunction against Appellant to enforce the restrictive covenants in the Agreement. Specifically, Executrain wished to enjoin Appellant from (1) working for New Horizons in Executrain's marketing area for a period of two years, (2) divulging or using Executrain's customer information, and (3) soliciting, obtaining or attempting to obtain any of Executrain's customers or prospective customers. Complaint, Certified Record at 1. Executrain also requested that the court order Appellant to pay compensatory damages, costs and attorney fees in excess of $50,000.00. Id.
¶ 4 The court, sitting in equity, held a hearing on Appellant's motion for a preliminary injunction on July 3, 2001. During the course of this hearing, however, the parties informed the court that they had reached a settlement and would stipulate to the entry of a permanent injunction. Stipulation for the Entry of a Permanent Injunction, Certified Record, at 21. Pursuant to this stipulation, the parties agreed that Appellant would not communicate or solicit sixty-five of Executrain's customers for a period of one year. Id. As a condition of this settlement, Executrain agreed to waive its claims for damages and losses with the exception of its claim for attorney fees and costs. Id. The parties agreed to submit this remaining claim to the court for its consideration. Id.
¶ 5 The court held a hearing on Executrain's request for counsel fees and costs on November 28, 2001. At this hearing, Executrain's counsel submitted its invoices for legal fees and costs. The parties stipulated that the hourly-rate charged by Executrain's counsel was reasonable and that the invoices properly demonstrated the amount of time spent on the claim. Additionally, the parties agreed that the court must determine (1) whether the amount of time spent was reasonable for the service rendered and (2) whether Executrain had "prevailed" in the underlying action thereby entitling it to an award of costs and attorney fees under Section 14 of the Employment Agreement. ¶ 6 On November 30, 2001, the court issued an order granting Executrain's request for attorney fees and costs in the amount of $14,979.63. In its order, the court provided the following explanation for its award: Certified Record, at 28.
¶ 7 Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal from this order on December 26, 2001. On this same date, the court issued an order, which directed Appellant to file a "Statement of Matters Complained Of" within fourteen days of the order. After Appellant failed to comply with this order, the court issued a 1925(a) opinion declaring that Appellant has waived all of his issues on appeal. Thereafter, on March 5, 2002, Appellant filed a petition requesting permission to file a 1925(b) statement nunc pro tunc. On March 18, 2002, the court granted this petition and directed that Appellant file the statement within fourteen days. Appellant filed his statement on April 1, 2002, and the court issued a 1925(a) opinion addressing each of the issues on May 1, 2002.1
¶ 8 In his brief, Appellant purportedly raises ten issues for our review:
10. Whether [Appellee's] motion should have been denied because [Appellee] failed to meet its burden in demonstrating the parties' agreed-upon meaning of the term "prevail."
Appellant's Brief, at 4-5. Our review of these issues assures us that Appellant has essentially raised one issue for our review: whether the Court erred in its interpretation of Section 14 of the Employment Agreement when it determined that Executrain "prevailed" in the underlying action.
¶ 9 While addressing this issue, we are mindful that the interpretation of a contract is a question of law. Flanagan v. Fidelity Bank, 438 Pa.Super. 516, 652 A.2d 930, 932 (1995). Therefore, our standard of review is plenary. Id.2
¶ 10 When interpreting the language of a contract, the intention of the parties is a paramount consideration. Thomas Rigging & Constr. Co., Inc. v. Contraves, Inc., 798 A.2d 753, 755 (Pa.Super.2002). "In determining the intent of the parties to a written agreement, the court looks to what they have clearly expressed, for the law does not assume that the language of the contract was chosen carelessly." Meeting House Lane, Ltd. v. Melso, 427 Pa.Super. 118, 628 A.2d 854, 857 (1993), appeal denied, 537 Pa. 633, 642 A.2d 486 (1994) (citations omitted).
¶ 11 When interpreting agreements containing clear and unambiguous terms, we need only examine the writing itself to give effect to the parties' intent. Osial v. Cook, 803 A.2d 209, 213 (Pa.Super.2002). The language of a contract is unambiguous if we can determine its meaning "without any guide other than a knowledge of the simple facts on which, from the nature of the language in general, its meaning depends." Baney v. Eoute, 784 A.2d 132, 136 (Pa.Super.2001). "When terms in a contract are not defined, we must construe the words in accordance with their natural, plain, and ordinary meaning." Cordero v. Potomac Ins. Co. of Illinois, 794 A.2d...
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