Progressive Animal Welfare Soc. v. University of Washington
| Decision Date | 03 May 1990 |
| Docket Number | No. 56470-1,56470-1 |
| Citation | 114 Wn.2d 677,790 P.2d 604 |
| Parties | , 59 Ed. Law Rep. 1169, 17 Media L. Rep. 1977 PROGRESSIVE ANIMAL WELFARE SOCIETY, a Washington nonprofit corporation, Petitioner, v. UNIVERSITY OF WASHINGTON, Respondent. |
| Court | Washington Supreme Court |
John T. Costo, Seattle, for petitioner.
Kenneth O. Eikenberry, Atty. Gen., Noella Hashimoto and Steve Milam, Assistants, Seattle, for respondent.
This case involves the proper criteria for the award of attorneys' fees under the State of Washington's freedom of information act.
The Progressive Animal Welfare Society (PAWS) brought an action against the University of Washington (University) under the state freedom of information section of this State's public disclosure law, RCW 42.17.250-.340 (the act). PAWS sought to inspect or copy the "project review forms" submitted by the various research project directors to the University's Animal Care Committee. These are the forms used by that committee in its review of proposals for medical research involving animals.
PAWS made three requests to the University for release of the completed forms. To the first request, the University responded in writing by citing two exemptions to disclosure found in the act and concluded by denying access to the information:
For the reasons cited above, the entire project review form constitutes a policy formulation document and will not be released to you. It is difficult to determine what, if any, deletions could be made and for us to still be in accordance with RCW 42.17.310(2). I would, however, be willing to discuss this with you and have included a blank form for your information. Please call me ... if you would like to discuss this further.
(Deletion ours.)
Representatives of PAWS and the University subsequently discussed the matter by telephone. There is some factual dispute concerning the conversation, but it is agreed that the PAWS representative indicated he believed the PAWS then filed an action against the University under the state freedom of information act seeking disclosure of the records in question. The University moved to dismiss on the basis that PAWS had failed to exhaust its administrative remedies. In response, PAWS again requested the forms, this time from the University's public records officer. The University's public records officer responded in writing to the same effect as the University's prior response, i.e., that the forms were entirely exempt from disclosure. This time the refusal was based on three separate sections of the act. This letter contained no offer to negotiate or discuss potential deletions.
entire forms were discoverable and declined to negotiate past that. No one shows or suggests that copies of the forms, edited or otherwise, were ever offered to PAWS by the University
PAWS administratively appealed the public records officer's decision. Ultimately, the University's President responded with a letter which also denied PAWS' appeal and agreed with the University's previous decisions that the forms were exempt from disclosure in their entirety. Throughout the present course of litigation, the University's position has been that the forms were exempt from disclosure in their entirety, based upon both state and federal law. At no time did the University offer copies of the forms with allegedly exempt information deleted.
At a contested hearing on the merits of the disclosure action, the Superior Court entered an order requiring the University to disclose the requested forms. That court also, however, authorized the University to delete data from two portions of the forms which dealt "directly and specifically with the design and/or method of research". PAWS appealed the question of attorneys' fees. The University did not cross-appeal the disclosure order so the substantive issues decided thereby are not before us, only the attorneys' fees issue.
Pursuant to a provision of the state freedom of information act, specifically RCW 42.17.340(3), PAWS had The trial court denied PAWS' motion for reconsideration and PAWS appealed. On appeal, the Court of Appeals agreed with the trial court that PAWS' blanket refusal to negotiate was a valid reason to reduce the attorneys' fees awarded to it. The Court of Appeals concluded in this case that under the state freedom of information act, plaintiffs who seek attorneys' fees are required to negotiate with the public agency which has the records before filing suit. Progressive Animal Welfare Soc'y v. UW, 54 Wash.App. 180, 773 P.2d 114, review granted, 113 Wash.2d 1023, 782 P.2d 1070 (1989). The Court of Appeals went on, however, to vacate the fee award and remand for a determination of how the Superior Court arrived at its $3,500 figure.
requested the Superior Court to award attorneys' fees to it in the amount of $9,390. The University also sought attorneys' fees but the trial court denied the University's request on the basis that it was not the prevailing party under the act. While the trial court did find that PAWS was the prevailing party, it awarded only $3,500 in attorneys' fees. The trial court reduced the attorneys' fees award based upon PAWS' failure to negotiate with the University
We are here presented with one basic issue.
Does a party seeking disclosure of information from a public agency under our state freedom of information act (RCW 42.17.250-.340) have a duty to negotiate with the public agency prior to initiating a lawsuit, and face a reduction of attorneys' fees if it does not so negotiate?
CONCLUSION. We conclude that the effect of the decisions of the trial court and the Court of Appeals, if we were to affirm them, would be to extract the teeth from our State's public disclosure act. There is no requirement in Washington law, statutory or otherwise, that a party requesting public records must negotiate with the public agency involved in order to recover attorneys' fees provided by the act. We decline to read such a duty into the statute and reverse.
What we are dealing with here is a provision of the state freedom of information act which authorizes a party prevailing against an agency in an action in the courts seeking the right to inspect or copy public records to recover reasonable attorneys' fees incurred in connection with bringing such legal action (RCW 42.17.340(3)). In order to determine whether the trial court and the Court of Appeals were justified in imposing "a duty to negotiate" prior to the award of such fees, it is necessary to briefly consider the scheme of the act.
We have recently and repeatedly held that the act is a strongly worded mandate for broad disclosure of public records. 1 The act's declaration of policy states that it is to be liberally construed to promote "full access to public records so as to assure continuing public confidence [in] ... government processes, and so as to assure that the public interest will be fully protected." RCW 42.17.010(11).
Judicial intervention is provided for if an agency refuses to provide requested public records, or attempts to edit them in a fashion deemed unacceptable by the requester. 2 In such an action, the following rules apply: the agency has the burden of proving that the records should be exempt from disclosure; judicial review of the agency decision is de novo; and a party successfully obtaining disclosure over agency objection may recover costs including reasonable attorneys' fees. 3 This court has held that "[t]he statutory scheme establishes a positive duty to disclose public records unless they fall within the specific exemptions." 4 An agency which discloses only edited parts of a public record has the burden of proving that full disclosure is not required. 5
An agency has an affirmative duty to promptly provide access to public records unless the records fall within a specific statutory exemption. The mandate for disclosure is liberally construed and the exemptions are inapplicable if the agency can delete information which would violate privacy or vital government interests. 6 A refusal to provide records (or parts of records) must be in writing and supported by reasons. 7 A statute's mandate for liberal construction includes a liberal construction of the statute's provision for award of reasonable attorneys' fees. 8
The attorneys' fees section of the act provides:
Any person who prevails against an agency in any action in the courts seeking the right to inspect or copy any public record shall be awarded all costs, including reasonable attorney fees, incurred in connection with such legal action. In addition, it shall be within the discretion of the court to award such person an amount not to exceed twenty-five dollars for each day that he was denied the right to inspect or copy said public record.
The University concedes that attorneys' fees are mandatory under the act but argues that the amount thereof is within the trial court's discretion. The University is correct that under RCW 42.17.340(3) the award of reasonable attorneys' fees is mandatory. 9 The court's decision, therefore, is limited to determining the prevailing party and the amount of attorneys' fees that is "reasonable". The present case presents the question of what factors a trial court should utilize in making this determination.
Before making a fee award, the trial judge must determine whether the party seeking disclosure is the "prevailing party" in the lawsuit. Here, the trial court determined that PAWS was the prevailing party and was therefore entitled to attorneys' fees. The University does not contest that finding. In Tacoma News, Inc. v. Tacoma-Pierce Cy. Health Dep't, 55 Wash.App. 515, 525, 778 P.2d 1066 (1989), review denied, 113 Wash.2d 1037, 785 P.2d 825 (1990), the court held that a prevailing party for purposes of the public disclosure act "is the one who has an affirmative judgment rendered in his...
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