Progressive Express Ins. Co. v. H&C Fla. Trucking, Inc.
| Decision Date | 24 August 2018 |
| Docket Number | Case No: 6:18-cv-165-Orl-37KRS |
| Parties | PROGRESSIVE EXPRESS INSURANCE COMPANY, Plaintiff, v. H&C FLORIDA TRUCKING, INC., YOANDY CARRASCO and THE ESTATE OF CARLOS ORLANDO CRUZ, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Florida |
This cause came on for consideration without oral argument on the following motion filed herein:
On February 8, 2018, Plaintiff Progressive Express Insurance Company ("Progressive") filed an Amended Complaint against Defendants H&C Florida Trucking Inc. ("H&C"), Yoandy Carrasco, and the Estate of Carlos Orlando Cruz ("the Estate"). Doc. No. 7. Progressive sought a declaratory judgment determining its obligations under an insurance policy it issued to H&C for a Volvo VNL Truck, which H&C's employee and president, Carrasco, was driving when it struck and killed Carlos Orlando Cruz ("Decedent"). Id. at 2-5. Specifically, Progressive alleged that it had no duty to indemnity Carrasco or H&C for any damages arising from the death of the Decedent because Carrasco was an excluded driver under the Policy and neither he nor H&C were entitled to bodily injury liability coverage under the Policy. Id. at 3.
All Defendants were properly served with the Amended Complaint. Doc. Nos. 14, 15, 26. None answered or otherwise responded to the Amended Complaint. Upon motion, the Clerk of Court entered defaults against H&C and Carrasco on April 3, 2018 (Doc. Nos. 19, 20), and against the Estate on July 2, 2018 (Doc. No. 28).
On July 9, 2018, Progressive moved for entry of default judgments against all Defendants, which motion was referred to me for issuance of a Report and Recommendation. Doc. No. 29. On July 19, 2018, I issued an order to show cause why this case should not be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Doc. No. 30. On July 23, 2018, Progressive responded to the Order with a copy of a $500,000 demand for settlement that counsel for the Decedent, Jack B. Woodard, served on Progressive. Doc. No. 31-1.1 Based on this response, I ordered Progressive to serve on Attorney Woodard a copy of the Amended Complaint and a copy of the motion for default judgment. Doc. No. 32. I also ordered Progressive to file proof of service of these documents on Attorney Woodard and gave counsel for the Estate until August 15, 2018, to respond to Progressive's motion for default judgment. Id. Progressive filed proof of service (Doc. No. 33, 34), and neither Attorney Woodard nor other counsel for the Estate have responded to that order.
As of the writing of this Report and Recommendation, no Defendant has responded to the motion for default judgment. Accordingly, the matter is now ripe for consideration.
A court may enter a default judgment only if the factual allegations of the complaint, which are assumed to be true, provide a sufficient legal basis for such entry. See Nishimatsu Constr. Co. v. Houston Nat'l Bank, 515 F.2d 1200, 1206 (5th Cir. 1975) (). Therefore, in considering a motion for default judgment, a court must "examine the sufficiency of plaintiff's allegations to determine whether plaintiff is entitled to" a default judgment. Fid. & Deposit Co. of Md. v. Williams, 699 F. Supp. 897, 899 (N.D. Ga. 1988).
The Supreme Court has explained that a complaint need not contain detailed factual allegations, Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). This analysis applies equally to motions for default judgment. De Lotta v. Dezenzo's Italian Rest., Inc., No. 6:08-cv-2033-Orl-22KRS, 2009 WL 4349806, at *5 (M.D. Fla. Nov. 24, 2009) (citations omitted).
Progressive issued a commercial automobile insurance policy to H&C providing coverage for H&C's Volvo VNL Truck from February 28, 2017 through February 28, 2018. Doc. No. 7 ¶¶ 9-10 (the "Policy"). The Policy listed Yoandys Carrasco as an excluded driver2, and the Policy stated that Progressive would not provide coverage for an excluded driver. Id. ¶¶ 11-12; Doc. No.7-1, at 3, 43.3 Specifically, the Policy had a "Named Driver Exclusion Endorsement" stating that Progressive:
[W]ill not provide coverage for any claim under Part I - Liability To Others for bodily injury liability, Part II - Damage To Your Auto, or under any applicable Medical Payments Coverage under this policy, arising from an accident or loss involving a motorized vehicle being operated by that excluded driver. This includes any claim for damages made against any named insured, any person insured under the policy, or any other person or organization that is vicariously liable for an accident arising out of the operation of a motorized vehicle by the excluded driver. If we have certified this policy as proof of financial responsibility,4 then we will pay the minimum limits required by law under Part I - Liability To Others.
On November 15, 2017, Carrasco was driving the Volvo VNL Truck, which struck and killed the Decedent. Doc. No. 7 ¶ 14. Counsel for the Decedent made a demand for settlement to Progressive under the insurance policy based on Carrasco's negligence. Id. ¶ 15. The record does not reflect whether the Estate has filed a lawsuit against H&C and Carrasco arising from the events that caused the death of the Decedent.
In its Amended Complaint, Progressive sought declaratory relief that Carrasco was an excluded driver under the insurance policy and was not entitled to bodily injury liability coverage for the damages claimed by counsel for Decedent. Doc. No. 7 ¶ 16. Progressive also sought a declaration that H&C likewise was not entitled to coverage as Carrasco's employer. Id. ¶ 17. Therefore, Progressive contended that it had no duty to indemnify either H&C or Carrasco for bodily injury sustained by the Decedent. Id. ¶ 18. Progressive asserted that there exists an actual presentneed for declaration of coverage, there is controversy regarding such coverage, and it needs a declaration of its rights and obligations under the policy. Id. ¶¶ 19-24.
A party invoking the Court's jurisdiction under the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C.§ 2201, must demonstrate "at an 'irreducible minimum,' that at the time the complaint was filed, he has suffered some actual or threatened injury resulting from the defendant's conduct, that the injury fairly can be traced to the challenged action, and that the injury is likely to be redressed by favorable court disposition." Atlanta Gas Light Co. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 68 F.3d 409, 414 (11th Cir. 1995) (quoting U.S. Fire Ins. Co. v. Caulkins Indiantown Citrus Co., 931 F.2d 744, 747 (11th Cir. 1991)). If the claim concerns the threat of future injury, "[t]here must be a substantial likelihood that the plaintiff will suffer [such] future injury: a 'perhaps' or 'maybe' chance is not enough." Malowney v. Fed. Collection Deposit Grp., 193 F.3d 1342, 1347 (11th Cir. 1999) (citations omitted).
Generally, an insurer's duty to indemnify is dependent on the outcome of a case; therefore, a declaratory action on the duty to indemnify is premature until the underlying claim is resolved. Northland Cas. Co. v. HBE Corp., 160 F. Supp. 2d 1348, 1360 (M.D. Fla. 2001). "The only exception to this general principle is if the court can determine that the allegations in the complaint could under no circumstances lead to a result which would trigger the duty to indemnify." Id. (citations omitted); see also Laboss Transp. Servs., Inc. v. Glob. Liberty Ins. Co. of N.Y., 208 F. Supp. 3d 1268, 1280 (S.D. Fla. 2016) .
Because counsel for the Decedent made a demand to Progressive for payment under the terms of the Policy, I recommend that the Court find that a justiciable controversy exists. Cf. Laboss Transp. Servs., Inc., 208 F. Supp. 3d at 1280 ().
In this diversity action, the Court must apply Florida law to determine whether Carrasco was an excluded driver under the insurance policy at issue, and whether Progressive has a duty to indemnify or defend either H&C or Carrasco against a claim brought on behalf of the Decedent based on Carrasco's negligence. See S.-Owners Ins. Co. v. Easdon Rhodes & Assocs. LLC, 872 F.3d 1161, 1164 (11th Cir. 2017). In Florida, language in an insurance contract is given its ordinary meaning, "and the policy must be construed as a whole 'to give every provision its full meaning and operative effect.'" Id. (quoting Auto-Owners Ins. Co. v. Anderson, 756 So. 2d 29, 34 (Fla. 2000)). The terms of an insurance policy must be interpreted "'in their ordinary sense [to provide] a reasonable, practical and sensible interpretation consistent with the intent of the parties.'" Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Siegle v. Progressive Consumers Ins. Co., 819 So. 2d 732, 736 (Fla. 2002)).
Florida law allows insurance policies to exclude specific persons from coverage who are driving an insured motor vehicle when...
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