Progressive Haw. Ins. Corp. v. Garza
| Decision Date | 14 July 2021 |
| Docket Number | NO. 3:20-cv-00980,3:20-cv-00980 |
| Parties | PROGRESSIVE HAWAII INSURANCE CORP., Plaintiff, v. LINDA GARZA and JOSEPH PRIVETT, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Tennessee |
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Pending before the Court are Plaintiff's Motion for Default Judgment Against Defendant Joseph Privett (Doc. No. 24), and Plaintiff's Motion for Default Judgment Against Defendant Linda Garza (Doc. No. 25). As the below discussion makes clear, the two motions are readily susceptible to resolution via virtually identical analyses, and so the Court will analyze and rule of them together.
Via the motions, Plaintiff seeks a default judgment that consists of a declaration that it is not obligated to provide coverage to Defendant Privett or Defendant Garza (collectively "Defendants") under the a Tennessee Auto Policy, bearing policy number 937284872-000, effective March 20, 2020, "either through defense or indemnity, for any liability, claims, or damages" arising out of a particular automobile accident that occurred on September 11, 2020 in Humphreys County, Tennessee. (Doc. No. 24 at 1-2; Doc. No. 25 at 1-2). Defendants have failed to answer or otherwise respond to Plaintiff's Complaint. Plaintiff filed a request for clerk's entry of default as to Defendant Garza and Defendant Privett on March 31, 2021 (Doc. Nos. 19, 20), and the clerk entered default against both Defendants on April 27, 2021 (Doc. No. 22). Subsequently, Plaintiff filed the instant motions seeking default judgment.
The Complaint in this case alleges the facts set forth in this section. As all of these facts are well-pleaded under the standard, and for the reasons, identified below in a footnote, they will be accepted as true for purposes of the motions.
Plaintiff issued a Tennessee Auto Policy to Defendant Garza, bearing policy number 937284872-000, effective March 20, 2020 to September 20, 2020 (hereinafter "Policy"). (Doc. No. 1 at ¶ 7). Defendant Garza is listed and identified in the Policy as the "Named Insured" under the "Drivers and household residents" section of the Policy's declarations page. (Id. at ¶ 9). Defendant Privett is listed and identified as an "excluded driver" under the "Drivers and household residents" section of the declaration page. (Id. at ¶ 10). An endorsement to the Policy, entitled "Named Driver Exclusion Election," ("Exclusion") provides as follows:
Although Defendant Privett's name is misspelled on the declarations page and the Endorsement, Defendant Garza later acknowledged to Plaintiff that Defendant Privett was the person she intended to be identified as the "excluded driver" on the Policy. (Id. at ¶ 12). Plaintiff further confirmed that Defendant Privett was the person Defendant Garza intended to be the "excluded driver" on the Policy based on the fact that Defendant Privett's date of birth is February 3, 1972 as shown on the Endorsement beside his misspelled name. (Id.).
On or about September 11, 2020, Defendant Privett was involved in an automobile accident while driving Defendant Garza's vehicle. (Id. at ¶ 15). Defendant Privett collided with another vehicle at or near the intersection of Tennessee Ridge Road and Highway 13 in Waverly, Tennessee. (Id.). Defendant Garza was traveling as a passenger in the front passenger seat at the time of the accident. (Id. at ¶ 16). The other vehicle involved in the accident contained three occupants—one driver and two passengers. (Id. at ¶ 18). One of the passengers reportedly died as a result of the accident. (Id.). The driver and remaining passenger were reportedly transported by ambulance from the accident scene due to bodily injuries they sustained in the accident. (Id.).
Thereafter, a claim was reported to Plaintiff seeking coverage under the Policy for the injuries and damages sustained in the accident, and the claim was assigned Claim Number 20-3273809 (hereinafter the "Claim"). (Id. at ¶ 19). Plaintiff investigated the Claim and discovered that Defendant Privett, an excluded driver, was driving Defendant Garza's vehicle at the time of the automobile accident that occurred on September 11, 2020. (Id. at ¶ 20). Based on the information discovered during its investigation, Plaintiff advised Defendants Garza and Privett that since Defendant Privett—an excluded driver—was driving Defendant Garza's vehicle at the time of the automobile accident, the Policy did not provide coverage for any injuries or damages allegedly caused by the accident at issue in the Claim. (Id. at ¶ 21).
Rule 55 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure governs entry of judgment by default. In order to obtain judgment by default, the proponent must first request the clerk's entry of default pursuant to Rule 55(a). Once a default has been entered by the clerk, the plaintiff's well-pleaded allegations are deemed admitted. See, e.g., Thomas v. Miller, 489 F.3d 293, 299 (6th Cir. 2007).1 The plaintiff may then file for default judgment by the clerk or by the court. Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(b).
When the plaintiff's complaint alleges damages for a sum certain, the clerk "on plaintiff's request, with an affidavit showing the amount due—must enter judgment for that amount and costs against a defendant who has been defaulted for not appearing . . . ." Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(b)(1). "In all other cases, the party must apply to the court for a default judgment." Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(b)(2). A default judgment may be entered without a hearing unless it is necessary to determine the amount of monetary damages. Id.2 The court must exercise "sound judicial discretion" when determining whether to enter the default judgment. 10A Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Mary Kay Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure, § 2685 (3d ed. 1988); see also Applebaum v. Target Corp., No. 11-cv-15035, 2015 WL 13050014, at *1 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 10, 2015).
The Declaratory Judgment Act states that "[i]n a case of actual controversy within its jurisdiction . . . any court of the United States, upon the filing of an appropriate pleading, may declare the rights and other legal relations of any interested party seeking such declaration, whether or not further relief is or could be sought." 28 U.S.C. § 2201. The general standard for determining whether a declaratory judgment is appropriate is whether it will "serve a useful propose in clarifying and settling the legal relations in issue and whether it will terminate and afford relief from the uncertainty, and insecurity, and controversy giving rise to the proceedings." Omaha Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 923 F.2d 446, 447-48 (6th Cir. 1991). In insurance coverage cases, declaratory judgment can be important because "a prompt declaration of policy coverage would surely serve a useful purpose in clarifying the legal relations at issue." Northland Ins. Co. v. Stewart Title Guaranty Co., 327 F.3d 448, 454 (6th Cir. 2003) (citation omitted).
Before a court can enter default judgment, it must establish that it has subject-matter jurisdiction. 10A Charles Alan Wright et al., Federal Practice and Procedure § 2682 (4th ed. 2019). Plaintiff alleges this Court has jurisdiction over this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) and the Federal Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201, et seq.
Diversity jurisdiction exists when the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000, exclusive of interest and costs, and there is complete diversity of citizenship between the parties. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). "Once a default is entered against a defendant, that party is deemed to have admitted all of the well pleaded allegations in the Complaint, including jurisdictional averments." Ford Motor Co. v. Cross, 441 F. Supp. 2d 837, 846 (E.D. Mich. 2006). Plaintiff alleges that the parties are completely diverse inasmuch as it is an Ohio corporation, with its principal place of businessin Ohio, and both Defendants are citizens of the state of Tennessee (Doc. No. 1 at ¶¶ 1-3). Plaintiff also alleges that the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000. (Id. at ¶ 5).
The Policy provides liability to others for bodily injury in the amount of $100,000 per automobile accident. (Doc. No. 1-1 at 1). This suggests that in this litigation concerning the parties' respective rights related to the Policy, the amount in controversy in $100,000. See Williamson v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 481 F.3d 369, 376 (6th Cir. 2007) (); see also Safeco Ins. Co. of Am. v. Schweitzer, No. 3:18-05059-CV-RK, 2019 WL 1646408, at *2 (W.D. Mo. Apr. 16, 2019) (); Guardian Life Ins. Co. of America v. Muniz, ...
To continue reading
Request your trial