Project Basic Tenants Union v. RI HOUSING AND MORTGAGE FINANCE CORP.

Decision Date05 June 1986
Docket NumberCiv. A. No. 85-0131.
Citation636 F. Supp. 1453
PartiesPROJECT BASIC TENANTS UNION, Plaintiff, v. RHODE ISLAND HOUSING AND MORTGAGE FINANCE CORPORATION, et al., Defendants.
CourtU.S. District Court — District of Rhode Island

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

John W. Dineen, Michael V. Milito, Providence, R.I., for plaintiff.

William P. Robinson III, Michael DiBiase, Edwards & Angell, Providence, R.I., for defendant R.I. Housing.

Elizabeth A. Del Padre, Office of Atty. Gen., Providence, R.I., for defendant State of R.I.

Herbert DeSimone, Sr., Providence, R.I., for defendant DiPrete.

Faith A. LaSalle, Asst. City Sol., Providence, R.I., for defendant City of Providence.

Donald S. Ianazzi, Providence, R.I., for defendant Cianci.

John Tramonti, Providence, R.I., for defendant Ralph Pari.

Michael T. Robinson, HUD Office of Litigation, Washington, D.C., for defendant Dept. of Housing and Urban Development.

Michael P. Iannotti, Asst. U.S. Atty., Providence, R.I., for U.S.

OPINION

FRANCIS J. BOYLE, Chief Judge.

Plaintiff, Project Basic Tenants Union, sues Rhode Island Housing Mortgage Finance Corporation ("RIHMFC"), the City of Providence, the State of Rhode Island, the United States Department of Housing and Urban Development ("HUD"), and certain named City and State officials and ex-officials. It alleges that Defendants have violated federal law by adopting and promulgating racially discriminatory housing practices, in the City of Providence generally and in the Silver Lake area specifically. Defendants have moved to dismiss the action on the ground that Plaintiff lacks both the capacity and standing to sue. The Court heard argument and reserved decision. For reasons detailed below, the Court holds that Plaintiff has the capacity to sue and has standing as to some Defendants. The Plaintiff lacks standing as to other Defendants. The motions of Defendants RIHMFC, State of Rhode Island, City of Providence and HUD are denied. Those of the individual Defendants, Mayor Paolino, Governor DiPrete, Councilman Stravato, Commissioner Pisaturo, former Mayor Cianci and Ralph Pari, are granted.

I.

Plaintiff is an association of individuals who seek to rectify perceived inequalities in Providence housing.1 It has two self appointed chairpersons, and no set number of members. Membership in the association generally consists of lessees in public and private housing. Membership is voluntary, based on consistent attendance at association meetings. Project Basic Tenants Union operates under the umbrella of the John Hope Settlement House, a neighborhood community center which provides certain social services. The Tenants Union has no budget or bank account apart from that of the Settlement House. In fact, it is an association under the group known as Project Basic, an apparently more formal association within the Settlement House. Project Basic is also financially dependent upon the larger association. Project Basic Tenants Union is not incorporated and was not formed pursuant to any statutory authority.

In 1976, a development group known as Hillside Associates sought and received from RIHMFC financing for a federally subsidized housing project to be constructed in the Silver Lake area of Providence. As of the 1980 census, Silver Lake was the least integrated tract of the 36 Providence census tracts. At that time, the development group, through the efforts of RIHMFC, also received a commitment from HUD for federal rental subsidy for the project.

Shortly thereafter, Hillside Associates retained a builder who sought a building permit from the City of Providence. At this time, however, public objection to the Hillside Project was mounting. It is alleged that then Mayor Cianci and City Councilman Louis R. Stravato, both named Defendants, were among those speaking out against the project, and that they vowed to stop it. In 1978, the City changed its zoning in the Silver Lake area so that the project could not proceed.

Vincent J. Mesolella, owner of the targeted land in Silver Lake and organizer of Hillside Associates, challenged the City zoning change in the state courts. The Rhode Island Supreme Court ultimately sustained a Superior Court ruling which invalidated the zoning change and removed any zoning barrier to the Hillside Project. Mesolella v. City of Providence, 439 A.2d 1370 (R.I.1982).

While the zoning issue was being resolved, HUD and RIHMFC had not terminated their financing commitments, but had held them in abeyance. Opponents of Hillside Village learned of this fact and in February of 1985 "renewed their efforts to terminate the development or have it moved to South Providence." Former Mayor Cianci allegedly rejoined the effort, and Governor DiPrete and the State allegedly urged RIHMFC and its Executive Director Ralph Pari to withdraw their financing commitment. On March 1, 1985, RIHMFC did in fact withdraw its financing commitment. HUD has confirmed that, from its standpoint, the project is still feasible.

Plaintiff alleges in substance that the policies and practices of the Defendants both generally and in relation to Hillside Village have, in a racially discriminatory manner, denied low income minorities access to open and integrated housing in the City of Providence. With respect to all non-federal Defendants, Plaintiff alleges violations of the Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3601, Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d, the civil rights laws of 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1982, the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments, and the United States Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1437. It alleges that the federal Defendant, HUD, in violation of the Fair Housing Act, has provided funds to Providence and Rhode Island despite known Title VIII non-compliance by the City. Plaintiff seeks damages, declaratory relief, and injunctive relief including but not limited to:

1. a direction that RIHMFC rescind its announcement withdrawing financing for Hillside Village and seek the necessary extensions of its financing commitment and HUD's reservation of funds;
2. an injunction against further opposition to the Hillside project against the named City and State officials and former Mayor Cianci;
3. a direction that the City, State and RIHMFC develop a plan to alleviate a general "imbalance in terms of geographical location and elderly-family proportionality" in Providence housing; and
4. a direction that HUD withhold federal funding earmarked for Providence until the City establishes its compliance with its Title VIII obligations.

Plaintiff seeks to raise and protect the rights of certain named members of its association. By way of affidavit, Plaintiff certifies that two members, Mary-Lou Tetreault and Cassandra Plummer, are income eligible for Section 8 housing, would like to live in Silver Lake, and would apply for admission to Hillside Village if it were built. The depositions of these two individuals reveal that neither has sought any housing, let alone Section 8 housing, in at least two years, and the eligibility of each for Section 8 housing is questionable—Ms. Tetreault, because of a lack of credit worthiness, and Ms. Plummer, due to income in excess of the maximum requirement.

All Defendants question Plaintiff's standing to sue in either its own right as an organization or as representative of its members. Defendant RIHMFC raises a more basic concern—whether the Plaintiff is a legal entity capable of bringing suit at all. The Court will first address this capacity concern and then the standing questions.

II.

At common law, an unincorporated association had no capacity to sue or be sued. See Puerto Rico v. Russell & Co., 288 U.S. 476, 480, 53 S.Ct. 447, 448, 77 L.Ed. 903 (1933). However, two exceptions to this rule have developed. First, an unincorporated association may sue or be sued if the law of the forum state recognizes such capacity. 3A Moore's Federal Practice ¶ 17.25. Secondly, "a partnership or other unincorporated association ... may sue or be sued in its common name for the purpose of enforcing for or against it a substantive right existing under the Constitution or laws of the United States." Fed. R.Civ.P. 17(b); see 3A Moore's Federal Practice ¶ 17.25. Here, Plaintiff association clearly seeks to raise federal rights and, therefore, has capacity to sue if it in fact can be characterized as an "unincorporated association."

An unincorporated association is generally defined as "a body of persons acting together and using certain methods for prosecuting a special purpose or common enterprise." Motta v. Samuel Weiser, Inc., 768 F.2d 481, 485 (1st Cir.), cert. den., ___ U.S. ___, 106 S.Ct. 596, 88 L.Ed.2d 575 (1985). "The common purpose or interest affords a court objective criteria by which it may ascertain the membership." Motta v. Samuel Weiser, Inc., 598 F.Supp. 941, 950 (D.Me.1984), aff'd, 768 F.2d 481 (1st Cir.), cert. den., ___ U.S. ___, 106 S.Ct. 696, 88 L.Ed.2d 575 (1985). Associations that are not actual assemblages of people, but rather are "amorphous and attenuated ..." groups or "the most informal or transitory of organizations," have been held not to constitute unincorporated associations. See Motta, 768 F.2d at 486; California Clippers, Inc. v. United States S.F. Ass'n., 314 F.Supp. 1057, 1067 (N.D.Cal.1970).

Project Basic Tenants Union lacks structure. It has no elected officers, no budget, no by-laws and apparently no set group of members. Yet, it has a distinct purpose and performs specific functions toward that end. Its purpose is to aid low income residents of Providence in their search for decent and affordable housing, and in addition, to assist tenants, who are or who become housed, with various problems that arise amongst tenants. The Union, through sub-committees, meet once every two months to discuss Union action. Its members knock on doors and make phone calls to make known their views and concerns, and the concerns of other members. Union members have met with City officials in...

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