Proposed Annexation by Columbus City School Dist., In re, 75-230

• Decision Date: 11 February 1976
• Docket Number: No. 75-230,75-230
• Citation: 74 O.O.2d 215,341 N.E.2d 589,45 Ohio St.2d 117
• Parties: , 74 O.O.2d 215 In re PROPOSED ANNEXATION BY the COLUMBUS CITY SCHOOL DISTRICT et al. BOARD OF EDUCATION OF the GRANDVIEW HEIGHTS CITY SCHOOL DISTRICT et al., Appellants, v. STATE BOARD OF EDUCATION et al., Appellees.
• Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Page 117

45 Ohio St.2d 117

341 N.E.2d 589, 74 O.O.2d 215

In re PROPOSED ANNEXATION BY the COLUMBUS CITY SCHOOL DISTRICT et al.

BOARD OF EDUCATION OF the GRANDVIEW HEIGHTS CITY SCHOOL DISTRICT et al., Appellants, v. STATE BOARD OF EDUCATION et al., Appellees.

No. 75-230.

Supreme Court of Ohio.

Feb. 11, 1976.

Knepper, White, Richards & Miller, William L. Clark and John W. Leibold, Columbus, for appellants.

Porter, Stanley, Platt & Arthur, Samuel H. Porter and Curtis A. Loveland, Columbus, sp. counsel to the Atty. Gen., for appellee State Board of Education.

James J. Hughes, Jr., City Atty., William H. Brooks and Donna Bowman, Columbus, for appellee Board of Education of the Columbus City School District.

PER CURIAM.

R.C. 3311.06 states, in part:

'When all of the territory of a school district is annexed to a city or village, such territory thereby becomes a part of the city school district or the school district of which the village is part, and the legal title to school property in such territory for school purposes shall be vested in the board of education of the city school district or the school district of which the village is a part. When the territory so annexed to a city or village comprises part but not all of the territory of a school district, the said territory becomes part of the said city school district or the school district of which the village is a part only upon approval by the state board of education. * * *'

Appellants' essential argument in this appeal is that R.C. 3311.06 is unconstitutional in that it gives the State Board of Education no standards or guides to follow in determining whether territory should be transferred to the school district following a partial annexation for municipal purposes. To reach that result, appellants must first overcome two unanimous decisions of this court interpreting Section 26 of Article II of the Ohio Constitution in Bd. of Edn. of Jefferson Local School District v. Bd. of Edn. of Columbus City School District (1962), 173 Ohio St. 130, 180 N.E.2d 576, and Minsahll v. State ex rel. Merritt (1931), 124 Ohio St. 61, 176 N.E. 888.

Section 26 of Article II states:

'All laws, of a general nature, shall have a uniform operation throughout the state; nor, shall any act, except such as relates to public schools, be passed to take effect upon the approval of any other authority than the general assembly, except, as otherwise provided in the constitution.'

In Jefferson Local, supra, 173 Ohio St. at page 133, 180 N.E.2d at pge 578, this court said:

'Under Section 3311.06 before its 1955 amendment, when territory was annexed to a city, that territory automatically became a part of the city school district. After that amendment, some of the provisions making such territory a part of a city school district are not to 'take effect' except 'upon the approval of' some 'other authority than the general assembly,' i. e., the state board.

'Such an act is expressly prohibited by Section 26 of Article II 'except such (an act) as relates to public schools.' Obviously, Section 3311.06, Revised Code, does relate to public schools. Thus Section 26 of Article II expressly recognizes the authority of the General Assembly to do what it did in Section 3311.06, Revised Code.'

Appellants contend that this court placed a different interpretation on the 'take effect' language of Section 26 in Belden v. Union Central Life Ins. Co. (1944), 143 Ohio St. 329, 55 N.E.2d 629. In Belden, life insurance policyholders challenged the constitutionality of an act (119 Ohio Laws 70) under which a stock life insurance company could convert to a mutual life insurance company. The enabling legislation provided that such mutualization could only be effected upon the approval of a majority of the directors, shareholders and policyholders of the stock company, and then only upon the approval of the state Superintendent of Insurance. One of the constitutional arguments advanced by the policyholders opposing the mutualization was that the statute 'takes effect' as law upon the approval of the Superintendent of Insurance rather than the General Assembly and was, therefore, violative of Section 26, Article II. This court rejected that argument, stating at page 348, 55 N.E.2d at page 638:

'We think that the act definitely defines the legislative policy; that it does establish standards for the guidance of the...