Propst v. Southern Ry. Co.

• Decision Date: 31 October 1905
• Parties: PROPST v. SOUTHERN RY. CO.
• Court: North Carolina Supreme Court

51 S.E. 920

139 N.C. 397

PROPST v. SOUTHERN RY. CO.

Supreme Court of North Carolina

October 31, 1905

Appeal from Superior Court, Guilford County; Peebles, Judge.

Action by J. L. Propst against the Southern Railway Company. From an order changing the place of trial, plaintiff appeals. Affirmed.

While as a general rule, a proviso is not permitted to enlarge the meaning of the enactment to which it is appended, so as itself to operate as a substantive enactment, but is confined by construction to the subject-matter of the section of which it is a part, yet, if the context requires it, the proviso may be construed as extending to and qualifying other sections, or even as being tantamount to an independent provision.

John A Barringer and J. T. Morehead, for appellant.

King & Kimball and A. B. Andrews, Jr., for appellee.

WALKER J.

This action to recover damages for personal injuries alleged to have been caused by the negligence of the defendant, a nonresident corporation, was brought by the plaintiff in the superior court of Guilford county. The defendant moved that the place of trial be changed to Rowan county, where it was found, as a fact, the plaintiff resided and the cause of action arose. The court ordered the case to be removed for trial to sad county, under chapter 367, p. 398, Acts 1905 amending section 192 of the Code. That section provides for the trial of actions in the county where the plaintiffs or the defendants or any of them reside, and, if none of the defendants resides in the state, then in the county in which the plaintiffs or any of them reside, and, if none of the parties resides in the state, then in the county designated by the plaintiff in the summons and complaint, subject, however, to the power of the court to change the place of trial as provided by law. The section was amended by Acts 1905, p. 398, c. 367, as follows: "Provided that in all actions against railroads, the action shall be tried either in the county where the cause of action arose or in the county where the plaintiff resided at the time the cause of action arose, or in some other county adjoining the county in which the cause of action arose, subject however to the power of the court to change the place of trial in the cases provided by the statute."

The plaintiff's counsel contended that the proviso enacted in 1905 applies only to corporations residing in the state, and that, as the defendant is a nonresident corporation, it does not come within either the words or the intent of the proviso, and consequently actions against it must be brought and tried in accordance with the provisions of section 194 of the Code relating to suits against nonresident or foreign corporations, which section requires such actions to be brought in the county in which the cause of action arose, or in which the corporation has property or usually does business, or in which the plaintiff resides. We do not think this is the proper construction of the proviso, and it seems to us that, if it should be so interpreted, the clearly expressed intention of the Legislature would be defeated. It is our duty, in construing a statute, to ascertain from its words, if possible, the meaning which the Legislature intended it should have, and, when the intention is thus ascertained, it must always govern. The general office of a proviso is either to except something from the enacting clause, or to qualify or restrain its generality, or to exclude some possible ground of misinterpretation of it, and usually it is not permitted to enlarge the meaning of the enactment to which it is appended, so as itself to operate as a substantive enactment. It relates generally to what immediately precedes it, and is confined by construction to the subject-matter of the section of which it is a part. These rules are, however, not absolute, and after all, if the context requires it, the proviso may be construed as extending to and qualifying other sections, or even as being tantamount to an independent provision; the main object being to enforce the will of the Legislature as it is manifested by the entire en...