Prosper v. Attorney Gen.
| Decision Date | 12 September 2022 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action 20-2279 (TJK) |
| Parties | BONNIE PROSPER, Plaintiff, v. THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF ANTIGUA AND BARBUDA et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Columbia |
Starting in 1994, Bonnie Prosper worked in several administrative roles in Washington, D.C. for the embassies of Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Antigua and Barbuda, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, and Dominica. In 2017, she was laid off by these embassies. Proceeding pro se, Prosper sued them asserting several claims related to her termination. The Saint Kitts and Nevis embassy settled with Prosper. The other four embassies move to dismiss the case for failure to state a claim. For the following reasons, the Court will grant in part and deny in part these motions and dismiss all but three of Prosper's claims.
According to the complaint, in 1994, Prosper-a national of Antigua and Barbuda who became a U.S. citizen in 2010 and has resided in Maryland at all relevant times-began working as a receptionist and administrative assistant for the embassies of Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Antigua and Barbuda, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, and Dominica in the Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States (“OECS”) Building in Washington, D.C. See ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 1, 4-5, 9, 32; ECF No. 1-1 at 1, 20; ECF No. 1-2 at 1.[1] Her “Letter of Appointment” listed her salary, warned her that taxes would not be withheld from her salary but were her responsibility to pay, mentioned the healthcare coverage the embassies would provide for her, stated that she would begin work with a “three month[] probationary period,” and described her job duties. ECF No. 1-1 at 1; ECF No. 1 ¶ 6. The Letter of Appointment was silent on the duration of Prosper's employment or protections against termination, and besides healthcare coverage it did not mention employment-related benefits she would receive. See ECF No. 1-1 at 1; ECF No. 1 ¶ 4.
Over time, Prosper's workplace responsibilities allegedly “dramatically increased,” and she periodically requested and received salary increases. See ECF No. 1 ¶ 6; ECF No. 1-1 at 3-5, 13, 15. In 2009, Prosper wrote the embassies to ask them for a “definitive answer” about receiving “entitlement[]” benefits such as social-security- and pension-related benefits. See ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 17-18; ECF No. 1-1 at 10-11. In this letter, she requested that they “mak[e] the necessary provisions” to provide these benefits for her. ECF No. 1-1 at 11.
In January 2010, the embassies responded. See ECF No. 1 ¶ 19; ECF No. 1-1 at 12. They told her that they would work on having her become an employee of the OECS Secretariat-how they would provide these benefits-said that they would pay her an “interim monthly allowance” of $250 until her “employment status” was “rectified,” and “pledge[d] to have these issues resolved as quickly as possible.” ECF No. 1-1 at 12; see also ECF No. 19 at 5-6; ECF No. 32 at 4, 7.
Apparently, that did not happen. See ECF No. 1 ¶ 20-21; ECF No. 1-1 at 13-16. Instead, Prosper's employers allegedly acted repeatedly to “frustrate” and “embarrass[]” her in the performance of her duties. See ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 22-24. Matters came to a head in July 2017, when Prosper received a “notice of separation of service” from the embassies informing her that she was being laid off effective August 31, 2017 because of a prospective sale of the OECS Building that rendered her “current post” redundant. Id. ¶ 25; ECF No. 1-1 at 17. The embassies offered Prosper a $35,000 severance package but said nothing about addressing the entitlement-related issues they had pledged before to resolve. ECF No. 1-1 at 17. Prosper responded, telling them that terminating her “without fulfilling their obligations to provide social security and other benefits would be a breach of contract” and that the severance-package offer was lower than what she was entitled to under the “severance laws in the OECS countries.” See ECF No. 1 ¶ 27. The embassies replied on August 23, reiterating that Prosper would be laid off effective August 31 and offering her $45,000 as a “once-for-all payment of appreciation.” ECF No. 32-1 at 1. Prosper eventually was laid off on August 31 “with no compensation.” ECF No. 1 ¶ 28.
Prosper's termination and subsequent events allegedly left her anxious, stressed, “severely depressed,” and “emotionally drained.” ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 28, 36, 42. She first sought unemployment benefits but was informed that she was ineligible because her employers made no such contributions on her behalf. Id. ¶ 28. It took her about eight months to find a new job. Id. ¶ 29. Through an attorney, she tried to negotiate with the embassies to resolve her nascent claims, but they did not respond. Id. ¶ 33. Prosper then sued the embassies in Antigua and Barbuda, which prompted the embassies to tell her that they were mulling an “amicable proposed settlement.” Id. ¶ 34. But they later “abandoned the idea” and successfully got Prosper's Antigua and Barbuda lawsuit dismissed on jurisdictional grounds in June 2019. Id. ¶¶ 34, 36, 38-40; ECF No. 1-1 at 18-19. After that, Prosper again attempted to settle her claims amicably. ECF No. 1 ¶ 41. The embassies proposed that Prosper sign a release in exchange for $60,000. Id.; ECF No. 1-1 at 20-21. In January 2020, she counteroffered for $90,000, and she reiterated this counteroffer in February 2020 after not hearing back about it. See ECF No. 1-1 at 22; ECF No. 32-1 at 2.
Prosper ultimately did not settle with them, and she sued on August 14, 2020. See ECF No. 1; ECF No. 22 at 1.[2] The Saint Kitts and Nevis embassy then settled with Prosper, while the other four embassies (“Defendants”) moved to dismiss for insufficient service and for failure to state a claim. See ECF No. 9; ECF No. 9-1; ECF No. 15; ECF No. 15-1; ECF No. 18. The Court denied those motions without prejudice, agreeing that Prosper's attempts at service were insufficient but allowing her to perfect service. See ECF No. 22. Prosper then re-served Defendants. See ECF No. 28. Now Defendants once more move to dismiss-the Saint Lucia embassy by itself; and the embassies of Antigua and Barbuda, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, and Dominica jointly-this time arguing only that Prosper has failed to state a claim. ECF No. 29; ECF No. 291; ECF No. 30; ECF No. 30-1.[3]
A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim tests the legal sufficiency of a plaintiff's complaint. See Herron v. Fannie Mae, 861 F.3d 160, 173 (D.C. Cir. 2017). To overcome such a motion, the plaintiff must allege “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). Doing so requires alleging sufficient “factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. In considering a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, the Court must treat a complaint's factual allegations as true and grant the plaintiff the benefit of all inferences that can flow from the facts alleged. See Sparrow v. United Air Lines, Inc., 216 F.3d 1111, 1113 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (cleaned up). Further, when a plaintiff proceeds pro se, the Court must construe the complaint “liberally.” See Untalasco v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 249 F.Supp.3d 318, 322 (D.D.C. 2017). And the Court typically “should look to all filings, including filings responsive to a motion to dismiss, to discern whether the [pro se] plaintiff has nudged her claims across the line from conceivable to plausible.” See Mehrbach v. Citibank, N.A., 316 F.Supp.3d 264, 268 (D.D.C. 2018) (cleaned up). That said, the “complaint must still present a claim on which the Court can grant relief.” See Untalasco, 249 F.Supp.3d at 322 (internal quotation marks omitted). And in assessing this, the Court need not accept inferences unsupported by the facts alleged or legal conclusions that are cast as factual allegations. See Peavey v. United States, 128 F.Supp.3d 85, 93 (D.D.C. 2015).
Construing her complaint liberally and considering it through the lens of her other filings, the Court discerns that Prosper has asserted four sets of claims. First, she asserts three distinct breach-of-contract claims. Second, she brings a claim for wrongful discharge in violation of public policy. Third, she alleges intentional infliction of emotional distress (“IIED”). And fourth, she asserts several related claims for violating social-security-, severance-pay-, and pension-related legal obligations (“Entitlement Claims”).[4] Defendants move to dismiss all of Prosper's claims for failure to state a claim. For the following reasons, the Court will dismiss all of them except two of her breach-of-contract claims and her severance-pay Entitlement Claim.
As best the Court can tell, Prosper alleges that Defendants breached two different contracts they had with her-a general employment contract as well as a contract embodied in the embassies' January 2010 letter to Prosper-in three different ways. As for the general employment contract Prosper alleges that Defendants violated it in laying her off because she was not an at-will employee (“At-Will Claim”). See ECF No. 1 ¶ 4; ECF No. 32 at 8. As for the January 2010 contract, Prosper alleges that Defendants violated it both by laying her off without first rectifying her employment status to ensure she would receive social-security- and pension-related benefits (“Rectification Claim”) as well as by failing to keep paying her...
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