Prosser v. Callis

• Decision Date: 25 January 1889
• Docket Number: 13,389
• Citation: 19 N.E. 735,117 Ind. 105
• Parties: Prosser v. Callis et al
• Court: Indiana Supreme Court

19 N.E. 735

117 Ind. 105

Prosser v. Callis et al

No. 13,389

Supreme Court of Indiana

January 25, 1889

From the Morgan Circuit Court.

The judgment is reversed, at the costs of the appellees, with instruction to overrule the demurrer to the complaint, and for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.

L Ferguson, C. G. Renner and G. A. Adams, for appellant.

J. V Mitchell, W. R. Harrison and W. E. McCord, for appellees.

OPINION

Coffey, J.

This was an action brought in the Morgan Circuit Court by the appellant against the appellees and one McCord. The amended complaint in the cause is substantially as follows: That the plaintiff prior to and on the 22d day of August, 1885, was the auditor of Morgan county, Indiana; that as such auditor he made, signed and published a certain report of the finances of said county, which report for the year ending May 31st, 1885, he made, signed and published prior to said 22d day of August, 1885; that the defendant Lizzie O. Callis is, and, on the said 22d day of August, was, the owner and publisher of the "Weekly Gazette," a newspaper of general circulation in said county of Morgan, printed and published at the city of Martinsville, in said county and State; that the defendant Edwin W. Callis is, and, on said 22d day of August, 1885, was, the editor and business manager of said newspaper; that on said 22d day of August, 1885, the defendant Elam M. McCord did write, and the defendants did print, utter and publish in the columns of said Weekly Gazette, of and concerning the plaintiff, and referring to the report so made by the plaintiff, the following false, libellous and slanderous words and figures, to wit:

"At last, after many days of weary waiting and particular prodding, the county dads come out with a statement pretending to show the financial condition of Morgan county. Such a statement! It can not be understood by even a Philadelphia lawyer. One quite big item of expenditure, the cost of building the bridge at Mooresville, amounting to about $ 15,000, is entirely left out of the calculation. We suspect there may be other omissions of the same character, but have not time to search them out for this issue. Now, if such an important item as this is omitted while the statement is sworn to as correct, there is every reason to believe that the whole statement is a piece of financial botch-work, patched up to ease popular clamor. If an officer [plaintiff meaning] will swear to one lie, he will swear to another," thereby charging, and intending to charge, that the plaintiff was guilty of the crime of perjury and of falsehood, and of making a false report in the leaving out of said report said item of $ 15,000, cost of said Mooresville bridge, when, in truth and in fact, the cost of said bridge at Mooresville was in said report as made, signed and published by this plaintiff; that the publication of said false, libellous and slanderous article is to plaintiff's damage $ 5,000. Wherefore, etc.

The defendants filed a demurrer to this complaint, alleging as cause that the same did not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action against them.

The cause was voluntarily dismissed by the plaintiff as to the defendant McCord.

The court then sustained the demurrer of the other defendants to the complaint. The plaintiff elected to stand by his complaint, and the defendants had judgment for costs.

The appellant assigns for error the sustaining of the demurrer of the appellees to his complaint.

It is not necessary that the words used in a published article should be slanderous to sustain an action for libel. Odgers on Libel and Slander, p. 20, says: "In cases of libel, any words will be presumed defamatory which expose the plaintiff to hatred, contempt, ridicule, or obloquy, which tend to injure him in his profession or trade, or cause him to be shunned or avoided by his neighbors. 'Everything, printed or written, which reflects on the character of another, and is published without lawful justification or excuse, is a libel, whatever the intention may have been.' The words need not necessarily impute disgraceful conduct to the plaintiff; it is sufficient if they render him contemptible or ridiculous. Any written words are defamatory which impute to the plaintiff that he has been guilty of any crime, fraud, dishonesty, immorality, vice, or dishonorable conduct, or has been accused or suspected of any such misconduct; or which suggest that the plaintiff is suffering from any infectious disorder; or which have a tendency to injure him in his office, profession, calling, or trade. And so too are all words which hold the plaintiff up to contempt, hatred, scorn, or ridicule, and which, by thus engendering an evil opinion of him in the minds of right-thinking men, tend to deprive him of friendly intercourse and society."

Appended to this statement of the law by Mr. Odgers is a note, in which is found a list of cases where the use of certain language has been held to be libellous, among which are the following: "He is an infernal villain." Bell v. Stone, 1 B. & P. 331. "He is an impostor." Cooke v. Hughes, R. & M. 112. "He is a hypocrite." Thorley v. Lord Kerry, 4 Taunt. 355. "He is a frozen snake." Hoare v. Silverlock, 12 Q. B. 624. "He is a rogue and a rascal." Villers v. Monsley, 2 Wils. 403. "He is a dishonest man." Austin v. Culpepper, Skin. 123. "A mere man of straw." Eaton v. Johns, 1 Dowl. (N. S.) 602. "He is an itchy old toad." Villers v. Monsley, 2 Wils. 403. "He is a desperate adventurer, association with whom would inevitably cover gentlemen with ridicule and disrepute." Wakley v. Healey, 7 C. B. 591; 18 L. J. C. P. 241. "He grossly insulted two ladies." Clement v. Chivis, 9 B. & C. 172. "He is unfit to be trusted with money." Cheese v. Scales, 10 M. & W. 488.

Many more illustrations are given, but it is not necessary to pursue them further.

In Starkie on Slander and Libel, section 156, the learned author says: "According to another learned authority everything written of another which holds him up to that scorn and ridicule which might reasonably (i. e., according to our natural passions), be considered as provoking him to a breach of the peace is a libel. No man has a right, in any form of publication, to...