Prosser v. Prosser

• Citation: 102 S.E. 787,114 S.C. 45
• Decision Date: 13 April 1920
• Docket Number: 10402.
• Parties: PROSSER v. PROSSER.
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of South Carolina

102 S.E. 787

114 S.C. 45

PROSSER v. PROSSER.

No. 10402.

Supreme Court of South Carolina

April 13, 1920

Appeal from Common Pleas Circuit Court of Florence County; T. J Mauldin, Judge.

Action by Eola A. Prosser against James B. Prosser. From judgment dismissing the complaint on demurrer, plaintiff appeals. Order reversed, and cause remanded for trial.

Gary C.J., dissenting.

Willcox & Willcox, of Florence, for appellant.

Arrowsmith Muldrow, Bridges & Hicks, of Florence, for respondent.

GAGE J.

A wife sued her husband in tort for willfully beating her, and the circuit court held that for such she had no cause of action. The complaint was dismissed on demurrer, the plaintiff has appealed, and the only question to be decided is the right of the wife in such circumstances.

The gravamen of the demurrer is: (1) That by the common law the wife had no such right, (2) that the Legislature alone can give her such right, and (3) that the Legislature has not done so. The first and second postulates are pitifully true. The third postulate is not true, and we come immediately to the consideration of that issue.

Neither the Constitution of 1868, nor that of 1895, nor the statutes enacted pursuant thereto, by so many words give to a married woman power "to sue." The act of 1891 (20 St. at Large, p. 1121; section 3761, Code of Laws) declared she might "enforce" the "contract" made with her, but it makes no mention of actions for tort.

The Constitution of 1868 merely conferred on the wife the power to hold property; that of 1895 added to so much the power to contract. The act of 1870 (14 St. at Large, p. 325), passed "to carry into effect the provisions of the Constitution," did little more than enact the provisions of the Constitution of 1868 and added the power to contract.

But the Code of Procedure enacted in 1870 provides comprehensive "remedies" for the redress of wrongs.

At the common law it was, of course, an actionable wrong for a stranger to beat a married woman. If the beating was by her husband the wrong was none the less, for the act was at least a violation of the criminal law. But the courts denied a civil action to the wife upon the theory that she could not sue herself, and the husband was part of herself. The judges pointed her for a remedy to the divorce courts and the criminal courts. The anomaly was thus presented of incarcerating a wife beater if he should beat his wife-self, but loosing his purse if he should commit the identical act. For the beating she suffered the wrong, but she had not the remedy by civil action.

The act of 1870 entitled the Code of Procedure gave her the remedy. That statute defines an action as a proceeding, amongst other things, to redress a private wrong (section 114); and it provides that actions shall be prosecuted by the real p...