Prout v. Bluebird Ranch, Inc.
| Decision Date | 09 February 1982 |
| Citation | 440 A.2d 1047 |
| Parties | James M. PROUT v. BLUEBIRD RANCH, INC. and Commercial Union Assurance Company. |
| Court | Maine Supreme Court |
Francis J. Hallissey (orally), Machias, for plaintiff.
Mitchell & Stearns, Kevin M. Cuddy, Peter M. Weatherbee (orally), Bangor, for defendants.
Before McKUSICK, C. J., and GODFREY, NICHOLS, CARTER, VIOLETTE and WATHEN, JJ.
The employee, James M. Prout, appeals from a pro forma decree of the Superior Court (Washington County) affirming a denial 1 by the Workers' Compensation Commission of the employee's petition to compel payment of compensation, brought pursuant to 39 M.R.S.A. § 104-A (1980). 2
We affirm the judgment below, finding, as the Commission did, that it had no jurisdiction to rule upon such a petition.
On March 26, 1979, the employee received an injury arising out of, and in the course of, his employment. He began receiving compensation on March 27, 1979, in accordance with an agreement approved by the Commission on February 7, 1980. On September 10, 1980, the employer, Bluebird Ranch, Inc., and the insurance carrier, Commercial Union Assurance Co., filed a petition for review of incapacity, together with the certificate required by statute before the carrier may suspend payment of compensation. 3 The basis of suspension of payments in this case was that the employee had resumed work.
The Commission has only those powers expressly granted by statute. Anania v. City of Portland, Me., 394 A.2d 782, 784 (1978); Levesque v. Levesque, Me., 363 A.2d 951, 953 (1976). Insofar as this employee was seeking to test the propriety of a suspension of payments of compensation, under the Act his remedy was, not a petition for the Commission to compel payments of compensation to him, but the statutorily authorized petition for review. The petition for review may be brought by any party, but is required to be brought by an employer in implementing any suspension of payments under 39 M.R.S.A. § 100 ().
The legislative reason for establishing this procedure is that it brings to the adjudication of the propriety of the suspension the Commission's expertise in such matters, which are often of a technical nature, and avoids the possibility that almost identical issues might be raised at the same time in Superior Court and before the Commission with the possibility of inconsistent results. See Leo v. American Hoist & Derrick Company, et al., Me., 438 A.2d 917 (1981).
Concluding that, upon the petition which it had before it, it was without jurisdiction to compel payment of compensation, the Commission properly dismissed the petition.
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Cote v. Georgia-Pacific Corp.
...The Commission may exercise only those powers expressly granted to it by the Workers' Compensation Act. See Prout v. Bluebird Ranch, Inc., 440 A.2d 1047, 1048 (Me.1982). Section 52 of the Act provides in pertinent An employee sustaining a personal injury arising out of and in the course of ......