Prout v. Pittsfield Fire Dist.

• Decision Date: 23 October 1891
• Citation: 154 Mass. 450,28 N.E. 679
• Parties: PROUT v. INHABITANTS OF FIRE-DIST. OF TOWN OF PITTSFIELD.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

154 Mass. 450

28 N.E. 679

PROUT v. INHABITANTS OF FIRE-DIST. OF TOWN OF PITTSFIELD.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Berkshire.

October 23, 1891

COUNSEL

Henry

L. Dawes and John C. Crosby, for plaintiff.

Marshall Wilcox and W.R. Plunkett, for defendant.

OPINION

ALLEN J.

The defendant is a fire-district, duly organized and established under the general laws of the commonwealth. St.1844, c. 152; Pub.St. c. 35, §§ 40-61. By express provision of statute fire-districts may raise money for the purchase of engines and other articles necessary for the extinguishment of fires for the purchase of land, for the erection and repairs of necessary buildings, for the erection and maintenance of street lamps within their limits, and for other incidental expenses of the fire department. Pub.St. c. 35, § 51. Certain other powers were specially conferred upon the defendant by the legislature, in respect to water supply and to sewers and drains. St.1854, c. 210; St.1867, c. 132. By virtue of its general authority, defendant established an electric fire-alarm system, one of the wires of which ran into the house where the plaintiff lived, and during a thunder-storm she was injured by electricity conducted into the house by means of the wire. It is not controverted that the establishment of the fire-alarm system was within the defendant's authority. The plaintiff sued the defendant for this injury, and obtained a verdict, with substantial damages, in the superior court, under instructions from the presiding justice authorizing the same to be rendered. Exceptions were taken to these instructions, and before the same were argued in this court the defendant passed the vote which is the subject of the present action, appropriating a sum less than the verdict to be paid in compromise of the action and claim, and the plaintiff accepted the vote and the offer therein contained. The defendant now contends that it was not liable in the first instance for any negligence of the fire department, or of its members and officers, and that it was wholly beyond its power to assume liability therefor by a compromise of the plaintiff's claim. This latter ground of objection is clearly untenable, and we have therefore no occasion to consider the former. The defendant as a fire-district, is a quasi corporation, with certain limited corporate powers, which are to be measured by its other powers, its privileges and duties. Among its inherent corporate powers is the power to sue and be sued. School-Dist. v. Wood, 13 Mass. 193; Stebbins v Jennings, 10 Pick. 173, 188; Lineham v. Cambridge, 109 Mass. 212; 2 Kent, Comm. 277, 278, 283, 284, and notes; Ang. & A. Corp. §§ 23, 24, 78; Dill.Mun.Corp. §§ 21, 22. The general power to compromise doubtful and disputed claims is necessarily incident to the power to sue and the liability to be sued. If a claim against the defendant cannot be adjusted by way of compromise, neither could a claim in its favor. If this doctrine were applied generally to all claims, the result would be that in all disputed cases the defendant must perforce engage in a litigation, the expense of which would be certain, but the result doubtful. The defendant would be under the necessity of insisting at all hazards upon a judicial determination of all its controverted rights, and would be bound to pursue or resist all doubtful claims until final adjudication by the court of last resort. The learned counsel for the defendant does not carry his objection so far as this, but he contends that liability for negligence of the kind now in question is so far removed from any obligation imposed upon the defendant by law that it was entirely outside of its power to assume any such liability, even by way of compromise. This argument overlooks the ground upon which compromises rest and are upheld by courts. Whether the result of a litigation depends chiefly upon the ascertainment of the facts by the verdict of a jury, or upon the determination of the rules of law found applicable by the court, in either case there is an uncertainty until the decision is reached. No better illustration could be needed than the present case affords. The counsel for the defendant asks us to say that the rules of law so clearly exempted the fire-district from liability that a settlement of the claim by way of compromise was ultra vires. But the learned justice of the superior court ruled that the fire-district might be held liable. It certainly could not be said, therefore, that the law was so plain as to be free from doubt. It must at least be assumed that the defendant was involved in a litigation in which the result might be adverse to it. If the defendant had chosen to rest content with the verdict of the jury and the ruling of the judge of the superior court, there would have been a final judicial determination that it was liable. Could it be urged, in such a case, that it would be beyond its powers to raise money to pay the judgment against it? Or could it be urged that it would be beyond its powers to submit to the result in the superior court, without taking or pressing in this court exceptions in matters of law? What the defendant has done is, in effect, to agree to waive its exceptions taken at the trial in consideration that the plaintiff will accept a sum less than the verdict of the jury. This verdict was rendered in the due course of the administration of justice. Although subject to be set aside upon a further hearing in this court of the...