Providence Journal Co. v. Rodgers

• Decision Date: 21 May 1998
• Docket Number: No. 97-29-A,97-29-A
• Citation: 711 A.2d 1131
• Parties: 26 Media L. Rep. 2025 PROVIDENCE JOURNAL COMPANY v. Joseph F. RODGERS, Jr., in His Capacity as Presiding Justice for the Superior Court of the State of Rhode Island. ppeal.
• Court: Rhode Island Supreme Court

Page 1131

711 A.2d 1131

26 Media L. Rep. 2025

PROVIDENCE JOURNAL COMPANY v. Joseph F. RODGERS, Jr., in His Capacity as Presiding Justice for the Superior Court of the State of Rhode Island.

No. 97-29-Appeal.

Supreme Court of Rhode Island.

May 21, 1998.

Joseph V. Cavanagh, Jr., Raymond A. Marcaccio, Providence, for Plaintiff.

Joseph F. Penza, Jr., Warwick, for Defendant.

Before WEISBERGER, C.J., and LEDERBERG, FLANDERS and GOLDBERG, JJ.

OPINION

LEDERBERG, Justice.

"The public's interest in knowing about its government is protected by the guarantee of a Free Press, but the protection is indirect. The Constitution itself is neither a Freedom of Information Act nor an Official Secrets Act." ¹

The right to obtain information on criminal proceedings is essential to a free and responsible government. But other compelling state interests can intersect with the First Amendment guarantee of a free press. In the case before us, we address one such interest, namely, that of protecting the identity and privacy rights of child victims of crime. Specifically, Rhode Island's major daily news publication has challenged the policy of the Presiding Justice of the Superior Court of sealing court files in criminal prosecutions involving child victims of sexual assault. We are asked to resolve the conflict between the right to obtain information on criminal proceedings and the need to ensure the confidentiality of the identity of such child victims. This matter was certified to the Supreme Court pursuant to the provisions of G.L.1956 § 9-24-25, upon the filing of an agreed statement of facts by the parties in the Superior Court. The plaintiff, the Providence Journal Company (plaintiff or Journal), and the defendant, Joseph F. Rodgers, Jr., in his capacity as Presiding Justice of the Superior Court of the State of Rhode Island (Presiding Justice), seek a resolution of their conflicting interpretations of G.L.1956 § 11-37-8.5.

Facts and Procedural History

At issue in this case is § 11-37-8.5, the statute governing "Identification of victims of child molestation sexual assault." The statute provides in pertinent part:

"(a) All court records which concern the identity of a victim of child molestation sexual assault shall be confidential and shall not be made public.

"(b) Every agency of state or local government shall protect the confidentiality of documents containing the identity of victims of child molestation sexual assault." ²

The facts of this case are not in dispute. The parties filed a "Joint Statement of Material Facts" in which they stipulated to the following:

"1. The Clerk for the Providence County Superior Court maintains possession of all court records that refer or relate to the indictment, prosecution, and/or conviction of persons charged with first and second degree molestation of children.

"2. As the Presiding Justice for the Superior Court of the State of Rhode Island, defendant Rodgers is the public official charged with the responsibility of managing the internal affairs of the Superior Court.

"3. The Presiding Justice has interpreted § 11-37-8.5 as mandating that all court records and documents, which concern the identity of a victim of child molestation or sexual assault, shall be confidential and shall not be made public and the Presiding Justice has advised the Chief Clerks of the Superior Court of that interpretation and said clerks, in reliance on said advice, have adopted as a policy of the court that all files pertaining to the indictments, prosecution, and/or conviction of persons charged with first and second degree molestation of children are to remain sealed and not available for public inspection.

"4. On or about March 11, 1996, the Journal, through counsel, submitted a written request to the presiding justice, to examine certain records. Said request was made pursuant to R.I. Gen. Laws §§ 38-2-2 and 11-37-8.5. * * *

"5. The aforesaid letter requested defendant Rodgers to make available for inspection and/or copying records located in the Providence County Superior Court Clerk's office, regarding first and second degree molestation charges. Said letter further stated that the Journal did not seek access to those court records that identified the alleged victims, as protected by R.I. Gen. Laws § 38-2-2. The Journal requested redacted copies of any documents that identified the alleged victims.

"6. Defendant Rodgers denied the request submitted by the Journal, by letter dated March 18, 1996. Defendant Rodgers stated that his decision was made pursuant to R.I. Gen. Laws § 38-2-2. * * *

"7. Defendant Rodgers has refused, and continues to refuse to permit public access to the aforesaid records." ³

On April 5, 1996, the Journal filed a complaint in the Superior Court alleging that the Presiding Justice's refusal to provide access to the requested records violated its rights under the United States Constitution and the Rhode Island Constitution as well as its rights at common law. The Journal sought, inter alia, the issuance of "such orders * * * as may be necessary" to compel the Presiding Justice to make the requested records available.

On January 9, 1997, the parties' joint motion to certify the matter regarding the interpretation of the statute to this Court pursuant to § 9-24-25 ⁴ was heard before another Superior Court justice. An order granting the motion was entered on January 15, 1997.

On October 30, 1997, the Presiding Justice issued an interoffice memorandum (1997 order) to all clerks of the Superior Court, instructing in part that pursuant to § 11-37-8.5,

"[w]hen a member of the public requests information pertaining to a case involving child molestation sexual assault, the clerk's office may verbally indicate the defendant's name and the disposition of the case, but nothing further. No documents or other papers in the court file may be viewed by the person inquiring. Should an individual desire more information, [he or she] may be advised to file a motion requesting that the papers of the case be unsealed."

Standard of Review

"[W]hen the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, this Court must interpret the statute literally and must give the words of the statute their plain and ordinary meanings" in establishing and effectuating statutory intent. Accent Store Design, Inc. v. Marathon House, Inc., 674 A.2d 1223, 1226 (R.I.1996). In so doing, "[w]e do not * * * interpret a legislative enactment literally when to do so would produce a result at odds with its legislative intent. * * * Rather, we will give the enactment 'what appears to be the meaning that is most consistent with its policy or obvious purpose.' " Kirby v. Planning Board of Review of Middletown, 634 A.2d 285, 290 (R.I.1993) (quoting Zannelli v. DiSandro, 84 R.I. 76, 81, 121 A.2d 652, 655 (1956)). Additionally, when interpreting a legislative enactment that contains ambiguous language, we "constru[e] the enactment so as to effectuate the intent of the Legislature. * * * In so doing, this Court examines statutory provisions in their entirety, attributing to the act the meaning most consistent with the policies and purposes of the Legislature." In re Advisory to the Governor (Judicial Nominating Commission), 668 A.2d 1246, 1248 (R.I.1996).

Moreover, we are bound "to construe a duly enacted statute as constitutional if such a construction is reasonably possible." Bouchard v. Price, 694 A.2d 670, 677 (R.I.1997) (citing Landrigan v. McElroy, 457 A.2d 1056, 1061 (R.I.1983)). In addition, the Legislature "is 'presumed to know the state of existing relevant law when it enacts or amends a statute.' " Smith v. Retirement Board of Employees' Retirement System of the State of Rhode Island, 656 A.2d 186, 189 (R.I.1995) (quoting Narragansett Food Services, Inc. v. Rhode Island Department of Labor, 420 A.2d 805, 808 (R.I.1980)). Finally, legislation "that is in derogation of the common law" is subject to strict construction. Kelly v. Marcantonio, 678 A.2d 873, 876 (R.I.1996).

The Issue

We begin by emphasizing what is not at issue in this case. The plaintiff has not challenged the constitutionality of the statute or the purpose of § 11-37-8.5 to keep confidential the identities of victims of child molestation sexual assault nor has plaintiff contested the Legislature's authority to effectuate that purpose. The Journal specified that it "seeks access to those records that do not identify the victims of [child] molestation and also seek[s] copies of records that have redacted the information that identifies such victims." It argued that the issue to be resolved is "how the intent of the legislature, to protect the identity of child molestation victims, can be achieved while concurrently recognizing the public's legitimate interest in access to criminal proceedings and records."

We note that subsequent to the Presiding Justice's complete denial of access to child molestation sexual assault court files in March 1996, his 1997 order permitted the disclosure of limited verbal information, namely, a defendant's name and the disposition of the case. In his brief to this Court, the Presiding Justice asserted that "[i]n passing § 11-37-8.5 the legislature did not intend to deny access to all of the court records in child molestation cases." Moreover, counsel for the Presiding Justice stated at oral argument before this Court that any documents in a child molestation sexual assault criminal file that do not contain victim-identifying information would be exempt from the coverage of § 11-37-8.5. ⁵

We agree with the parties that § 11-37-8.5 does not grant confidentiality to the records or documents in child molestation sexual assault cases that do not contain victim-identifying information. ⁶ Therefore, we must (1) determine how to implement public access to documents that do not identify a child victim and (2) ascertain whether the statute contemplates public access to documents from which victim-identifying information...