Providence Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Neary
| Decision Date | 01 August 2012 |
| Docket Number | C.A. No. WC 11-0236 |
| Parties | PROVIDENCE MUTUAL FIRE INSURANCE COMPANY v. KEVIN NEARY; INEZ NEARY; PAMELA METRO, Individually and in her capacity as Administratrix of the Estate of Luke R. Metro; and PAUL METRO, Individually and as Father and Next of Kin to Luke Metro |
| Court | Rhode Island Superior Court |
DECISION
This matter is before this Court on Plaintiff Providence Mutual Fire Insurance Company's Motion for Summary Judgment seeking declarations from this Court that no coverage exists under the Providence Mutual homeowners' insurance policy for claims by Defendants Pamela and Paul Metro against the homeowners and policyholders, Defendants Kevin and Inez Neary.
Providence Mutual issued a Homeowners Insurance Policy for the period of June 25, 2008 to June 25, 2009, policy number HP 0122788-01 (the "Policy"), to Defendants Kevin and Inez Neary for their home in North Kingstown, Rhode Island. The Policy included personal liability coverage for "bodily injury" caused by an "occurrence," but certain exclusions applied during the policy period. One such exclusion contained in the Policy entailed that the personalliability and medical payments coverage did not apply to "bodily injury" if it occurred in connection with a business.
Inez Neary and Pamela Metro have known each other since elementary school and were family friends. See Inez Neary Dep. at 30-32. The Nearys and the Metros knew each other socially. See Paul Metro Dep. at 14, 15-17; Inez Neary Dep. at 30-32. Approximately six months before Luke was born, the Metros began to make arrangements for a babysitter, and Inez Neary agreed to watch him for payment of $25 per day. See Inez Neary Dep. at 43-44, 46. Pamela Metro and Inez Neary later arranged the details. Id. at 45-46. Inez Neary first watched Luke about eight weeks after he was born. Id. at 48. Pamela Metro always paid Inez Neary by check, id. at 48-49, and certain days were prorated to a lesser amount if Inez Neary only watched Luke for part of the day. See id. at 53-54. Inez Neary does not dispute that she received and cashed checks from Pamela Metro that accounted for the days she watched Luke. See id. at 52-57 (). Inez Neary did not watch Luke during April of 2008 because she had an externship with a doctor's office. See id. at 57. She testified that she used the money she received for watching Luke to pay for groceries and other household items. See id. at 63-67. She did not separate the money received for watching Luke from her general budget. See id.
Inez Neary watched four children, including Luke Metro, over the course of a number of years. See Inez Neary Dep. at 34. Inez Neary was paid $20 per day to watch her niece, Hanna Valley. See id. at 34, 37. She was paid $30 per day to watch Eric Burlingham, id. at 70-71, and $30 per day to watch Hanna Duva. Id. at 76-77.
On August 8, 2008, Luke R. Metro, approximately eighteen (18) months old at the time, was under the supervision of Inez Neary at her home, which is the home covered by the Policy. She agreed to watch him that day while his parents were at work, as had been her practice for the previous year. Sometime that morning, Luke Metro had been left unattended. He managed to leave the home through a sliding glass door that was found open to the outside. Inez Neary and her daughter searched for Luke Metro and found him in a Koi pond on the property. Despite rescue and revival efforts, Luke Metro died.
Pamela Metro and Paul Metro each filed separate complaints against the Nearys as a result of Luke Metro's death. See Pamela Metro, Individually and in her capacity as Administratrix of the Estate of Luke R. Metro v. Inez M. Neary and Kevin V. Neary, C.A. No. WC-2011-0156; Paul Metro, Individually and in his capacity as father and next of kin to Luke Metro v. Kevin and Inez Neary, C.A. No. WC-2011-0223. Plaintiff Providence Mutual Fire Insurance Company subsequently filed the instant declaratory judgment action pursuant to R.I. General Laws § 9-30-1, et seq., alleging that it does not owe Kevin and Inez Neary any defense or indemnity obligation under the Policy resulting from Luke Metro's death because of the business exclusion contained within the policy. Plaintiff seeks a declaration from this Court that it is not required to provide a defense or indemnity to Defendants with respect to either underlying action, C.A. No. WC-2011-0223 and WC-2011-0156. It also seeks costs and fees in association with this action.
Plaintiff submitted its Motion for Summary Judgment to this Court on March 2, 2012. Paul Metro filed a memorandum in support of his opposition to the motion on May 25, 2012, and Pamela Metro filed a memorandum in support of her opposition to the motion on June 7, 2012. Plaintiff filed a supplemental memorandum on June 15, 2012, which Paul and Pamela Metroresponded to by way of a joint response on July 5, 2012. Although Inez Neary and Kevin Neary were originally represented by counsel, a hearing justice of this Court granted counsel's motion to withdraw on June 18, 2012, which Order entered on June 29, 2012. See Order, dated June 29, 2012 (Thunberg, J.).
The parties, excepting Kevin Neary, appeared for argument on Plaintiff's motion on June 19, 2012. Although this Court heard argument, decision was reserved until July 10, 2012, to allow Inez and Kevin Neary to obtain representation or otherwise respond. The parties again appeared on July 10, 2012, and the Nearys were allowed until July 13, 2012, to respond. Inez Neary filed a response on behalf of herself and Kevin Neary, asserting that she was merely helping her family friend. After consideration of the briefs, arguments, and other papers filed, the Court issues the following decision.
Summary judgment is only appropriate '"if, when viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, there exists no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.'" Iozzi v. City of Cranston, -- A.3d --, 2012 WL 2588509, at *2 (R.I. 2012) (quoting Henderson v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 35 A.3d 902, 905 (R.I. 2012) (quoting Trust of McManus v. McManus, 18 A.3d 550, 552 (R.I. 2011))). Further, ""[t]he party opposing summary judgment bears the burden of proving, by competent evidence, the existence of facts in dispute.'" New London Cnty. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Fontaine, 45 A.3d 551 (R.I. 2012) (quoting Higgins v. Rhode Island Hosp., 35 A.3d 919, 922 (R.I. 2012) (quoting McManus, 18 A.3d at 552)). However, "in deciding whether or not summary judgment should be granted, it must at all times be borne in mind that "[t]he purpose of the summary-judgment procedure is toidentify disputed issues of fact necessitating trial, not to resolve such issues.'" Employers Mut. Cas. Co. v. Arbella Prot. Ins. Co., 24 A.3d 544, 553 (R.I. 2011) (quoting Rotelli v. Catanzaro, 686 A.2d 91, 93 (R.I. 1996)) (citing Estate of Giuliano, 949 A.2d 386, 391 (R.I. 2008) and Steinberg v. State, 427 A.2d 338, 340 (R.I. 1981))).
Thus, summary judgment or a declaration in this instance is only appropriate if there is no genuine issue of material fact, and Plaintiff has proven that the insurance policy and its provisions preclude coverage. Our Supreme Court has stated that "[i]t is well established that in 'interpreting the contested terms of [an] insurance policy, we are bound by the rules established for the construction of contracts generally.'" Empire Fire and Marine Ins. Companies v. Citizens Ins. Co. of America/Hanover Ins., 43 A.3d 56, 59 (R.I. 2012) (quoting Metro Properties, Inc. v. Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, Pa., 934 A.2d 204, 208 (R.I. 2007) (quoting Zarrella v. Minnesota Mut. Life Ins. Co., 824 A.2d 1249, 1259 (R.I. 2003))). Therefore, "'[w]hen the terms of an insurance policy are unambiguous, [the Superior Court] will give the words, when read in conjunction with the entire policy, their plain and ordinary meaning.'" Id. (quoting Metro Properties, Inc., 934 A.2d at 208). Finally, if "'the policy terms are ambiguous or capable of more than one reasonable meaning, the policy will be strictly construed in favor of the insured and against the insurer.'" Id. at 59-60 (quoting Mallane v. Holyoke Mut. Ins. Co. in Salem, 658 A.2d 18, 20 (R.I. 1995)); see also Derderian v. Essex Ins. Co., 44 A.3d 122, 127 (R.I. 2012) ("Only when the insurance policy's terms are ambiguous will this Court depart from the literal language of the policy; and, upon such a determination, 'the policy will be strictly construed in favor of the insured and against the insurer.'" (quoting Sjogren v. Metro. Prop. and Cas. Ins. Co., 703 A.2d 608, 610 (R.I. 1997)). "A court should not, however, stretch its imagination in order to read ambiguity into a policy where none is present." Mullins v. Fed. Dairy Co., 568 A.2d 759,762 (R.I. 1990) (citing McGowan v. Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co., 110 R.I. 17, 19, 289 A.2d 428, 429 (1972)).
In its Motion, Plaintiff asserts that the undisputed facts include that Luke Metro was in the care of Inez Neary on August 8, 2008, when he managed to leave the home and drowned in a Koi pond on the property. Plaintiff argues that there is no coverage under the policy pursuant to any of the four definitions of a "business" contained within the Policy, even though only one definition need apply to preclude coverage. First, it argues that Luke Metro died while Inez Neary watched Luke "as a trade, profession or occupation in which she engaged on a full-time, part-time or occasional basis," which is the first definition of "business" in the Policy. Pl.'s Mem. in Supp. of Mot. for Summ. J. Additionally, Plaintiff contends that Inez Neary watched Luke for money or other compensation and earned more than $2,000 in total compensation for the year...
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