Provo v. Conrad
| Decision Date | 16 July 1915 |
| Docket Number | 19,370 - (245) |
| Parties | JOHN D. PROVO v. E. A. CONRAD |
| Court | Minnesota Supreme Court |
Action in the district court for Hennepin county to recover $5,000 for personal injury received in a collision with plaintiff's automobile. The answer specifically denied that at the time and place indicated in the complaint defendant drove an automobile, and specifically denied that he ran into or came in contact with plaintiff. The case was tried before Steele, J., and a jury which returned a verdict for $2,100. From an order denying his motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict or for a new trial, defendant appealed. Reversed.
Automobile -- liability of owner for acts of driver.
The owner of an automobile is not liable for the negligent acts of his chauffeur, committed when wrongfully operating the automobile outside the scope of his employment, and contrary to directions is using the same in furtherance of his own personal affairs.
Henry Deutsch and Charles G. Laybourn, for appellant.
Stiles & Devaney and Earl J. Frisbee, for respondent.
Defendant is a real estate dealer residing and doing business in the city of Minneapolis. He owns and uses in connection with such business and for his personal convenience an automobile, and employs a chauffeur to operate the same. Plaintiff was riding his bicycle upon one of the streets of Minneapolis and was negligently and carelessly run down and injured by defendant's car, driven by his chauffeur. He brought this action to recover for the injuries so received, on the theory and claim that defendant was responsible for the conduct of the chauffeur, and liable for his negligence while operating the automobile. Plaintiff had a verdict and defendant appealed from an order denying his alternative motion for judgment or a new trial.
There is no controversy about the facts and it stands admitted that defendant owned the automobile, that it was operated by his chauffeur, and that plaintiff was injured through the latter's negligence. It further appears that the chauffeur was in the employ of defendant and was clothed with authority to use the automobile in connection with defendant's business, and in driving members of his family about the city, but he was expressly forbidden to use the same for his, the chauffeur's, personal affairs, and was authorized to use it in furtherance of defendant's business only when expressly so authorized by defendant. There is no evidence in the record to sustain the claim that the chauffeur was in the habit of taking and using the automobile outside of the business of defendant, with the knowledge and consent of defendant or otherwise. On the day of the injury to plaintiff the chauffeur had taken defendant to his home in the car, and was then directed by defendant to go to his own home and after supper to return to defendant's residence and take defendant and members of his family to the theater. The chauffeur did not comply with these directions. Instead of proceeding directly to his own home he drove past his residence and some eight or ten blocks beyond on a mission of his own, and to inform a friend that he could not keep an engagement with him that evening. He was some eight blocks beyond his own home when the accident in question occurred. These facts are all undisputed.
The relation between the owner of an automobile and the person employed by him to operate it is that of master and servant, and liability for injuries to third persons caused by the negligence of the servant operating the same differs in no essential respect from the rules and principles of law applicable to that relation. Efforts have been made to extend such rules of liability, by statute and judicial decisions, on the theory that the automobile is a dangerous instrumentality, requiring for the protection of the public a high degree of care in safeguarding its use. These efforts have not met with success, and the courts are practically uniform in applying in such cases the law of master and servant. Daugherty v. Thomas, 174 Mich 371, 140 N.W. 615, 45 L.R.A.(N.S.) 699, Ann. Cas. 1915A 1163; Huddy, Automobiles, § 30, and authorities there cited. The rule is that the master is liable for the negligent acts of his servant while engaged within the scope of his employment and in furtherance of his master's business, but he is not liable for acts committed outside of and beyond such employment. So the primary inquiry and test of liability centers around the question whether at the time complained of the servant was pursuing the master's work. 2 R.C.L. 1198. The rule has been applied by this court in all automobile cases heretofore presented. Slater v. Advance Thresher Co. 97 Minn. 305, 107 N.W. 133, 5 L.R.A.(N.S.) 5...
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