Provost v. Puget Sound Power and Light Co.
| Decision Date | 14 March 1985 |
| Docket Number | No. 51139-0,51139-0 |
| Citation | 696 P.2d 1238,103 Wn.2d 750 |
| Parties | Roger A. PROVOST and Carolyn M. Provost, husband and wife; and Carolyn M. Provost as Guardian Ad Litem for Cheryl L. Provost, a minor, Appellants, v. PUGET SOUND POWER AND LIGHT COMPANY (a Washington corporation); Ford Motor Company (a Delaware corporation); and William F. Dixon and Jane Doe Dixon, husband and wife and their marital community, Respondents. |
| Court | Washington Supreme Court |
Perey & Smith, Ron Perey, Michael Tierney, Seattle, for appellants.
Perkins, Coie, Stone, Olsen & Williams, Charles Gordon, Kerri J. Lauman, Seattle, for respondents.
William C. Smart, Kirk S. Portmann, Seattle, for Amicus Curiae Washington Ass'n of Defense Counsel.
This appeal raises the issue whether the exclusive remedy provisions of the Washington workers' compensation act, RCW 51.04.010 and RCW 51.32.010, apply to bar an action brought by members of the employee's immediate family against an employer and a fellow employee for negligent infliction of emotional distress, loss of spousal consortium, and loss of parental consortium. We hold that the Washington workers' compensation law bars this type of suit against employers and fellow employees.
This lawsuit arises out of an accident which occurred on November 6, 1980. Roger Provost and William F. Dixon were then members of a Puget Sound Power and Light Company work crew responding to an emergency. The accident occurred when Dixon was operating a truck manufactured and distributed by Ford Motor Company and owned by Puget Power. Roger Provost was pinned between this truck and another truck, causing severe injuries.
Provost's injuries included fractures to both hips, two broken legs, and severed arteries in both legs. Provost's right leg was subsequently amputated near the hip in an attempt to control bleeding. Provost is severely disabled and will probably never again be able to be employed as a workman.
The Provosts brought this action against Puget Power, Dixon and Ford. Carolyn Provost, individually, and as guardian ad litem for Cheryl Provost, seeks recovery from Puget Power and from Dixon for negligent infliction of emotional distress, loss of spousal consortium, and loss of parental consortium. Roger Provost has not sought recovery against Puget Power or Dixon because the Washington workers' compensation act, RCW Title 51, bars his claim against those parties.
On February 23, 1984, the trial court granted a motion for summary judgment brought by Puget Power and Dixon, and dismissed the causes of action against both of those parties. Carolyn Provost, individually, and as guardian ad litem for Cheryl Provost, then appealed that decision to this court.
By its express terms, the Washington workers' compensation act, RCW Title 51, bars all independent causes of action against the employer for damages arising out of unintentional injury to an employee. RCW 51.04.010, the statute's first exclusive remedy provision, states in relevant part:
The state of Washington, therefore, exercising herein its police and sovereign power, declares that all phases of the premises are withdrawn from private controversy, and sure and certain relief for workers, injured in their work, and their families and dependents is hereby provided regardless of questions of fault and to the exclusion of every other remedy, proceeding or compensation, except as otherwise provided in this title ...
RCW 51.32.010 governs who is entitled to compensation.
Each worker injured in the course of his or her employment, or his or her family or dependents in case of death of the worker, shall receive compensation in accordance with this chapter, and, except as in this title otherwise provided, such payment shall be in lieu of any and all rights of action whatsoever against any person whomsoever ...
The exclusive remedy provisions of RCW 51.32.010 also apply to bar common-law actions against fellow employees. See Peterick v. State, 22 Wash.App. 163, 589 P.2d 250 (1977).
Carolyn and Cheryl Provost assert that the exclusive remedy provisions of RCW 51.04.010 and 51.32.010 bar only causes of action possessed by the injured employee, Roger Provost. The Provosts contend that the intent expressed in the act as a whole establishes that the statute does not abolish causes of action for injuries suffered by persons other than the injured employee. Thus, each of these causes of action, possessed individually by Carolyn and Cheryl Provost and independent of any causes of action which Roger Provost may have against Puget Power and Dixon under the common law, are not barred by the workers' compensation law.
The Provosts direct the court's attention to RCW 51.24.020 and argue that a comparison of RCW 51.32.010 with that provision shows that the remedy is not exclusive.
Their reliance on RCW 51.24.020 is misplaced. That section, which applies only to intentional injuries, spells out an exception to the exclusive remedy provisions which otherwise would govern. The exception is intended to deter intentional wrongdoing by employers. By contrast, RCW 51.32.010 and the statute as a whole, are intended to provide sure and certain relief for workers, and their families and dependents, unintentionally injured in the course of their work regardless of questions of fault and to the exclusion of every other remedy.
This court squarely addressed the issue of the workers' compensation act barring a wife's cause of action against the injured husband's employer for loss of consortium in Ash v. S.S. Mullen, Inc., 43 Wash.2d 345, 261 P.2d 118 (1953), overruled on other grounds, Lundgren v. Whitney's, Inc., 94 Wash.2d 91, 614 P.2d 1272 (1980). The court in Ash denied the wife's recovery for loss of consortium on two independent grounds. It held that (1) the wife had no common law cause of action for loss of consortium, and (2) the workers' compensation act barred such an action. The court reasoned that not only does the act provide the exclusive remedy for the workers, but for the workers' families as well. It was of no significance that the injury for loss of consortium was incurred by the wife, separate and distinct from the injury incurred by her husband. Ash, 43 Wash.2d at 347-48, 261 P.2d 118.
The Provosts seek to avoid our holding in Ash on the ground that this court did not recognize a wife's cause of action for loss of consortium until Ash was overruled in Lundgren. The Provosts contend that Ash has no precedential value, and that the Legislature could not have foreseen this new cause of action when enacting the workers' compensation act and, therefore, could not have intended to preclude wives from bringing loss of consortium actions against injured spouses' employers.
In Lundgren, however, this court specifically...
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...in which the employer is alleged to have deliberately intended to injure the worker. RCW 51.24.020; Provost v. Puget Sound Power & Light Co., 103 Wash.2d 750, 753, 696 P.2d 1238 (1985).2 Among the cases cited by Larson in which the cause of action was held not to lie are the following: Samp......
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...suspect, and the right to compensation under this statute does not implicate a fundamental right. See Provost v. Puget Sound Power & Light Co., 103 Wash.2d 750, 755, 696 P.2d 1238 (1985) (the Act does not violate equal protection by immunizing negligent employers from civil Ms. Schuchman co......
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