Prow's Motel, Inc. v. State

• Decision Date: 08 September 1972
• Docket Number: Nos. 42793,42803 and 43362,s. 42793
• Citation: 294 Minn. 345,200 N.W.2d 910
• Parties: PROW'S MOTEL, INC., Respondent, v. STATE of Minnesota and Walter F. Mondale, its Attorney General, et al., Appellants.
• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

Page 910

200 N.W.2d 910

294 Minn. 345

PROW'S MOTEL, INC., Respondent, v. STATE of Minnesota and Walter F. Mondale, its Attorney General, et al., Appellants.

Nos. 42793, 42803 and 43362.

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

Sept. 8, 1972.

Syllabus by the Court

The evidence in inverse condemnation proceedings sustains a finding by the court that there has been a compensable taking by the state of access from a reconstructed highway. That being the only issue on which prior litigation was remanded for decision by the court rather than by the jury, and all other questions of fact having been submitted and resolved by the jury at the first trial pursuant to correct instructions, the original verdict awarding damages for the taking is reinstated, notwithstanding the court on the second trial erroneously held that there was a compensable loss for taking access in both directions Warren Spannaus, Atty. Gen., Eric B. Schultz, Deputy Atty. Gen., Gary H. Peterson, James M. Perrigo, Sp. Asst. Attys. Gen., St. Paul, for appellants.

rather in only one direction on divided highway.

Ranta & Michals, Minneapolis, for respondent.

Heard before KNUTSON, C.J., and OTIS, ROGOSHESKE, and PETERSON, JJ.

OPINION

OTIS, Justice.

This is a so-called inverse condemnation proceeding to determine whether the proprietor of a motel in the city of Rochester has been denied reasonably convenient and suitable access to the highway on which its property abuts. The trial court held there was a taking within the meaning of the constitution, and we affirm.

The facts are fully set forth in State, by Mattson, v. Prow's Motel, Inc., 285 Minn. 1, 171 N.W.2d 83 (1969), and will not be again recited. Two issues are raised by the state. First, whether the evidence permits a finding there was a constitutional taking; and, second, if there was a taking, whether the access denied was from a two-lane or from a four-lane highway.

1. The parties have stipulated that the date of taking was October 30, 1962. On that date, the state closed a crossover leading from Fourth Street, adjacent to respondent's property, to the newly completed four-lane divided highway. Since the date of taking, the nearest access to Prow's from Highway No. 52 has been from a service road entered from the highway by northbound traffic 1,800 feet south of the motel. The trial court held that this indirect access did not provide reasonably suitable and convenient access and that the service road mitigated but did not eliminate respondent's claim for damages.

The state has seized on language found in Gibson, Individually and on Behalf of Estate of Sazenski v. Commissioner of Highways, 287 Minn. 495, 500, 178 N.W.2d 727, 731 (1970), to support its argument that there has been no taking. There, we said:

'Since the evidence does not establish a change in the highest and best use of the property, we agree with the trial court's conclusion that appellant's property was not taken or damaged in the constitutional sense.'

No claim is made by Prow's that there has been a change in the highest and best use of its property. The Gibson case actually held that there was no evidence the property owner's access was 'altered, acquired, diminished, or interfered with.' 287 Minn. 500, 178 N.W.2d 730. The reference to evidence of highest and best use in Gibson was dictum which, out of context, is misleading. We did not intend by Gibson to imply that no taking occurs without a change in the highest and best use of the property. That test is simply one which we have used in fixing damages. Hendrickson v. State, 267 Minn. 436, 446, 127 N.W.2d 165, 173 (1964). The trial court's finding that the access is no longer reasonably suitable and convenient is amply supported by the evidence.

2. In the first Prow's appeal, we said, if access was denied, it was a fact question whether it was access to a two-lane or four-lane highway. In an amended finding on September 25, 1970, the trial court held as a matter of law that 'the denial of access on October 30, 1962, was clearly a denial of access to the four-lane highway which had been constructed in phase #1 of the construction.' The difficulty which arises over the nature of the taking is illustrated by the additional finding of the court 'that the landowner had no vested right in access at the Fourth Street, N.W. crossover,' and the court's reference in supplemental findings of July 1, 1971, to the closing of 'the Temporary Fourth Street crossover.'

It is the position of the state that the August 5, 1958, stipulation, referred to in our prior opinion, gave respondent only a right of access to a service road. Respondent's subsequent access to a four-lane highway from Fourth Street, it is argued, was simply temporary and, the denial of that access gave rise to no claim for damages. We do not so construe that settlement. As nearly as we can determine from the record, after the 1958 settlement Prow's had direct access to Highway No. 52 from Fourth Street, which adjoined its property. Now, its access is some 1,800 feet farther south. Clearly, the 1958 settlement did not address itself to that change in location.

However, we are troubled by the problem of whether the trial court was justified in finding that the access was taken from a four-lane highway. That issue is complicated by the stipulation that the date of taking was the date that access to the four-lane highway by way of Fourth Street was terminated by closing the crossover. We held in Hendrickson that property owners...