Prudential Property & Casualty Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, A069092

• Decision Date: 28 June 1995
• Docket Number: No. A069092,A069092
• Citation: 36 Cal.App.4th 275,42 Cal.Rptr.2d 227
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: , 95 Daily Journal D.A.R. 8832 PRUDENTIAL PROPERTY AND CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY, Petitioner, v. SUPERIOR COURT of City and County of San Francisco, Respondent. Melissa LOUIE et al., Real Parties in Interest.

Page 227

42 Cal.Rptr.2d 227

36 Cal.App.4th 275, 95 Daily Journal D.A.R. 8832

PRUDENTIAL PROPERTY AND CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY, Petitioner, v. SUPERIOR COURT of City and County of San Francisco, Respondent Melissa LOUIE et al., Real Parties in Interest.

No. A069092.

Court of Appeal, First District, Division 5, California.

June 28, 1995.

Review Denied Sept. 28, 1995.

Robert P. Hamilton, Eileen S. Wright, Scadden, Hamilton & Ryan, San Francisco, for petitioner.

Anthony P. David, San Francisco, for real parties in interest.

THE COURT: ¹

In this case we hold that a trial court may order joinder of a personal injury action with a related uninsured motorist arbitration proceeding, where such joinder is necessary to prevent inconsistent rulings.

Real parties in interest Melissa and Ronald Louie are plaintiffs in a personal injury action against two motorists, each of whom rear-ended the Louies' car in two separate accidents within a period of about four weeks. The driver of the second car was not insured. Real parties filed an uninsured motorist (U/M) claim with their insurer, petitioner Prudential Property and Casualty Insurance Company. That claim is now in arbitration. Melissa Louie injured her lower back in both accidents. In order to avoid inconsistent rulings regarding the comparative fault of the two drivers, real parties petitioned the superior court to join the arbitration proceeding with the superior court action. (Code Civ.Proc., § 1281.2, subd. (c) (section 1281.2(c)).) The court ordered the joinder. Petitioner seeks a writ of mandate to compel the superior court to set the order aside. After full briefing and a waiver of oral argument by petitioner, we deny the petition. ² We publish our decision for guidance of the bench and bar.

On September 15, 1992, the Louies' car was rear-ended by a vehicle driven by Loren Stolle, who is insured. On October 11, 1992, it was again rear-ended by a truck driven by Willie Condon, an uninsured motorist. Ms. Louie, a professional jazz dancer, was riding in the car both times and suffered injuries to her lower back which substantially hindered her career. She is unable to tell which accident caused how much injury.

Real parties filed a personal injury action against Stolle and Condon and an uninsured motorist claim against petitioner, based on their policy's U/M coverage. An arbitration proceeding on the U/M claim was commenced. Subsequently, real parties amended their complaint in the personal injury action to add petitioner as a defendant, and to allege that petitioner breached the insurance contract by failing to participate in a settlement conference with defendant Stolle in the personal injury action. Petitioner had refused to participate in the settlement conference because it was not a proper party to the action, and on the ground that the two accidents were distinct and caused different injuries. Real parties had countered that both accidents contributed to the back injury to some degree and petitioner's participation was pertinent to a fair adjudication of the U/M claim. Petitioner demurred to the second amended complaint on the ground that the U/M statute, Insurance Code section 11580.2, contained a "no action" clause barring suit against the insurer until the action with the uninsured driver was terminated (id., subd. (f)). The superior court sustained the demurrer without leave to amend, and entered a judgment dismissing petitioner from the case. That judgment was not appealed from and is now final.

In arguing it had no duty to participate in the settlement conference because it was not a party to the action, petitioner explicitly noted that real parties were free to petition for joinder of the arbitration proceeding and the civil action under section 1281.2(c). After the demurrer was sustained, real parties did just that. Then petitioner opposed the request for joinder, arguing the court did not have jurisdiction to do so because the Legislature had intended U/M arbitration to be mandatory and joinder would interfere with the arbitration proceeding. ³ The trial court, expressing concern that separate proceedings could result in inconsistent rulings regarding the two drivers' comparative fault, granted the motion for joinder.

Section 1281.2(c) specifically gives the superior court the authority to order joinder of an arbitration proceeding and a civil action to avoid the possibility of conflicting rulings. Petitioner nevertheless insists the court lacks jurisdiction to do so in the case of U/M arbitration. Petitioner relies on the Legislature's mandate that all policies of car insurance include a provision for U/M coverage with an arbitration clause. (Ins.Code, § 11580.2, subd. (f).) Courts have interpreted this mandate as evidence the Legislature intends expeditious determination of disputes between an insurer and its insured. (See Goulart v. Crum & Forster Personal Ins. Co. (1990) 222 Cal.App.3d 527, 271 Cal.Rptr. 627; Chrisman v. Superior Court (1987) 191 Cal.App.3d 1465, 236 Cal.Rptr. 703.) While this is true, we perceive no legislative intent to abrogate the over-arching power of the...