Prudoehl v. Randall

• Decision Date: 18 June 1909
• Docket Number: Nos. 16,101-(69).,s. 16,101-(69).
• Citation: 108 Minn. 185
• Parties: BERTHOLD PRUDOEHL v. SAMUEL RANDALL.<SMALL><SUP>1</SUP></SMALL>
• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

Page 185

108 Minn. 185

BERTHOLD PRUDOEHL v. SAMUEL RANDALL.¹

Nos. 16,101-(69).

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

June 18, 1909.

Action in the district court for Winona county upon a cropping contract under which plaintiff, as tenant, surrendered possession upon notice to vacate because of a sale of the premises. The first cause of action was for $187 for one half of the hay; the second cause of action was for $100 for the conversion of eight cords of fire wood felled on the premises; the third cause of action was for $7.50 pasture money

received. The prayer was for an accounting by defendant of one half share in all grains, vegetables, hay, and produce raised during the season of 1907 and to recover the value thereof. The answer set up counterclaims for various breaches of the contract by plaintiff and demanded $125. The case was tried before Snow, J., and a jury which rendered a verdict in favor of plaintiff for $107.50. From an order denying defendant's motion for a new trial, he appealed. Affirmed.

Webber & Lees, for appellant.

Herbert M. Bierce, for respondent.

JAGGARD, J.

Plaintiff leased defendant's farm. The contract which the parties signed was made by filling out a current blank form of agreement in common use. The plaintiff entered into possession of the farm and operated it for a period of about two years. During the second summer defendant sold the farm, gave plaintiff the notice provided for in the contract, paid him $100 stipulated for in case of a sale, and demanded that he vacate on the following September 1, as agreed. Plaintiff did not, however, vacate until some time about the middle of October following. He brought this action to recover damages resulting from the alleged failure of defendant to comply with the terms of the lease. Defendant put in issue these allegations, and set up by way of counterclaim various failures of plaintiff to perform. The jury returned a verdict for plaintiff in the sum of $107.50. This appeal was taken from an order denying defendant's motion to vacate the verdict and have a new trial.

The assignments of error involve the construction of a number of clauses of a form of farm lease in current use which has previously been construed by this court. See Strangeway v. Eisenman, 68 Minn. 395, 71 N. W. 617; Anderson v. Liston, 69 Minn. 82, 72 N. W. 52; Avery v. Stewart, 75 Minn. 106, 77 N. W. 560, 78 N. W. 244; McNeal v. Rider, 79 Minn. 153, 81 N. W. 830, 79 Am. St. 437; Graves v. Walter, 93 Minn. 307, 101 N. W. 297.

One group of assignments charges error on the part of the trial court in its rulings and instructions pertaining to the item of wood cut by plaintiff on defendant's farm. The contract provided on this point that "the party of the first part is accorded the right to cut and haul off of the wood lot owned by the second party such fuel as he personally needs for his own use, under the direction and guidance of the party of the second part." The trial court properly took judicial notice of "a general custom among farmers to provide during the comparative leisure of winter and early spring a supply of fuel sufficient for family use during the succeeding year." 5 Wigmore, Ev. p. 3617, § 2581; Ross v. Boswell, 60 Ind. 235; Abel v. Alexander, 45 Ind. 523, 528, 15 Am. 270.

In the light of such knowledge, this provision of the contract is susceptible of three constructions. It may mean that the plaintiff had the right merely to take wood from the wood lot and use it while he resided on the premises. This construction would exclude the right to take any part of the wood away in case the land was sold by the owner and vacated by the tenant before the wood cut would be used. Or the contract may mean that the tenant had the right, not only to cut and haul off the wood for reasonable family use for one season while on the premises, but also to take away from the premises the unused portion of such cut wood on the vacation of the premises by him pursuant to sale by the owner. Or it may mean that the tenant would have the right under such circumstances to all wood cut, whether sufficient for the current season's use or for more than that season.

The last construction is clearly unreasonable; the first conforms to the common-law rule; the second to that suggested by the construction applied to similar, but not at all identical, contracts for the cutting of timber by one person upon the land of another. Thus it was said in Alexander v. Bauer, 94 Minn. 174, at page 176, 102 N. W. 387, at page 388: "It seems much more equitable and just, as well as consonant with the rights of the parties and the analogies of the law, to hold that as to standing timber, which is a part of the freehold, when cut under the authority of the owner and converted into chattel property, the ownership of which becomes vested in the person cutting the same, while the right to remove is limited to a certain time, there is no implied condition that such title shall...