Pruitt v. Gause
| Decision Date | 23 June 1922 |
| Docket Number | 33926 |
| Citation | 188 N.W. 798,193 Iowa 1354 |
| Parties | MATILDA PRUITT et al., Appellees, v. A. E. GAUSE, Appellant |
| Court | Iowa Supreme Court |
Appeal from Monroe District Court.--C. W. VERMILION, Judge.
ACTION in equity, to set aside a deed of conveyance of land by J. J Gause to his son, A. E. Gause. There was a decree for the plaintiffs as prayed, and defendant appeals.
Affirmed.
David Strieff and Mabry & Mabry, for appellant.
John F Abegglen and D. W. Bates, for appellees.
On September 25, 1917, J. J. Gause, widower, resident of Monroe County, Iowa, was the owner in fee of 70 acres of land there situated. On the date named, said J. J. Gause executed and delivered to his son A. E. Gause a deed of warranty, conveying to him all of said property for the expressed consideration of "one dollar and love and affection." The described land was of the value of about $ 10,000, subject to a mortgage lien of $ 5,000, and was all the real estate owned by him. On October 1, 1917, J. J. Gause died intestate, leaving as heirs at law seven children, among whom are the plaintiffs, Pruitt, Gustin, and Jamison, and the defendant, A. E. Gause. There are other children, who are not parties to this action, having disclaimed interest therein. After the death of J. J. Gause, the plaintiffs, as three of his heirs, instituted this action to set aside and cancel the deed to A. E. Gause, alleging that, at the date thereof, deceased was mentally incompetent to transact such business or to comprehend the import of the deed. It is further alleged that, if such deed was, in fact, made by the alleged grantor, it was obtained without consideration and by undue influence on part of the defendant. It is further alleged and charged that the deed is a forgery.
The defendant denies all charges of fraud and undue influence on his part, and of mental unsoundness or incompetence on the part of the grantor, and alleges, in substance, that the conveyance was made to him in recognition of his prior services to his father, and in pursuance of a promise and understanding on the part of the father that he would thus compensate the son. Upon trial of the issues thus joined, the court, after hearing the testimony offered, found for the plaintiffs, that, at the time the deed under which the defendant claims title was made, the grantor, J. J. Gause, "was incapable and incompetent of executing the same, and that said deed should be set aside and held for naught as against the plaintiffs." From this decree the defendant has appealed.
The legal and equitable rules applicable to cases of this character are too familiar and well settled for restatement or discussion. It is enough here to say, without citing authorities, that, if the deed from J. J. Gause to the defendant was executed at a time when the grantor was mentally incompetent to fairly understand or comprehend the nature and effect of the transaction, or if its execution was procured by the exercise of undue influence by the grantee, or if it was procured under circumstances or in a manner amounting to actual or constructive fraud upon the grantor, the decree setting it aside may be affirmed. In other words, the applicable law being conceded, the vital issue is one of fact. There would be little profit in attempting to recite or review the testimony of the many witnesses, but a statement of some of the principal facts and circumstances, concerning which there is little or no dispute, will be helpful.
At the date of the deed, September 25, 1917, the deceased, J. J. Gause, was about 77 years old. He had seven living children, of whom the eldest (defendant herein) and a daughter, Nancy, a person of feeble mind, lived with him on the farm. His property at that time consisted mainly of the farm of 70 acres, worth about $ 10,000, on which there was a mortgage lien of $ 5,000. Such personal estate as he had previously owned had already been given by him to the defendant. His wife had recently died, and defendant and Nancy continued to live with him at the farm home, as they had been doing for several years. He was in failing health, and the loss of his wife had affected him deeply. On September 23, 1917, the defendant and the daughter took him to a physician, who briefly examined him, and says that the symptoms observed indicated "senility or general breakdown" and very high blood pressure. On the next day, there was no marked change in his symptoms. One of his daughters came to see him, and while there, wrote to each of her absent sisters, apparently to inform them of his failing condition. On Tuesday, the 25th, defendant went to a notary in a neighboring town, and talked with him about procuring a deed of the farm from the deceased. After such consultation, defendant returned home, procured the father's old deed, and took it to the notary, who filled in the blanks conveying the land to the defendant, and handed it back to defendant, directing him to take it home and have his father sign it, and saying that he (the notary) would drive out there, later in the day, and take the grantor's acknowledgment. The notary has since died, his evidence never having been preserved. The facts concerning the making of the deed, except such as appear from the paper itself, are shown only by the testimony of the defendant, given subject to the plaintiffs' objection to his competency to testify thereto. On the afternoon of that day, and, as defendant says, after the notary had left the house, the deceased complained of being worse. A physician was called, arriving about 7:30 P. M., and found him in "
From that time, he lapsed into more complete unconsciousness, and died on the following Monday. On Thursday, the second day after procuring the deed, defendant delivered it to the county recorder for record. So far as appears, no other member of the family had any knowledge of the conveyance until after the grantor was buried, when several of them met at the farm, with a view to a settlement of the estate; and then, when the subject of appointing an administrator and taking an inventory of the property was broached, defendant announced, in effect, that there was no estate, and that he claimed the entire property, by title derived from his father before his death. Thereafter, this action was begun, with the result above mentioned.
It may be said at the outset that the evidence is insufficient to sustain a finding of mental...
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