Pruitt v. State

• Decision Date: 04 September 1972
• Docket Number: No. 5730,5730
• Citation: 253 Ark. 19,484 S.W.2d 87
• Parties: John PRUITT, Appellant, v. STATE of Arkansas, Appellee.
• Court: Arkansas Supreme Court

Page 87

484 S.W.2d 87

253 Ark. 19

John PRUITT, Appellant, v. STATE of Arkansas, Appellee.

No. 5730.

Supreme Court of Arkansas.

Sept. 4, 1972.

Donald Poe and Donald Goodner, Waldron, for appellant.

Ray Thornton, Atty. Gen., by Milton Lueken, Asst. Atty. Gen., Little Rock, for appellee.

HOLT, Justice.

The appellant was convicted of the crime of first degree rape by a jury which imposed a life sentence in the State Penitentiary. There was no appeal from that judgment. After two years as an inmate he now has filed a petition for post-conviction relief pursuant to our Criminal Procedure Rule 1. The trial court, by written findings of fact and conclusions of law, dismissed appellant's petition. On appeal the appellant first contends for reversal that 'his apprehension without warrant in his home and isolation in jail without bail and questioning by prosecuting attorney without being advised he was entitled to counsel and he could remain silent were acts and conducts on the part of the State invading and destroying his constitutional rights.' We find no merit in these multiple contentions.

The appellant was arrested at his home without a warrant. The arresting officer testified that the mother of the eight-year-old victim complained to him and he referred her to the prosecuting attorney. Thereupon the prosecuting attorney called the arresting officer and instructed him to apprehend and arrest the appellant inasmuch as there was a warrant being issued charging appellant with the crime of rape. The records reflect that an information charging this offense was filed by the prosecuting attorney and a bench warrant issued for appellant's arrest on this same date. The bench warrant was served on appellant in jail the following day. The arresting officer also testified that when he arrested the appellant he advised him that a warrant had been issued for him for the alleged crime. Certainly there were sufficient reasonable grounds for the officer to believe appellant had committed the alleged felony and, therefore, his arrest was valid without a warrant. Ark.Stat.Ann. § 43--403 (1971 Repl.), Clubb v. State,230 Ark. 688, 326 S.W.2d 816 (1959), Jones v. State, 246 Ark. 1057, 441 S.W.2d 458 (1969).

In response to appellant's testimony that he was never advised of his constitutional rights, the state adduced testimony from an arresting officer that appellant was advised of his rights at the time of his arrest. Also, the next day this witness was present along with another officer when the prosecuting attorney advised appellant of his constitutional rights or the Miranda requirements. This evidence is sufficient to support the trial court's finding that appellant was advised of his constitutional rights. Indeed, the appellant in his argument admits that no confession was ever secured from him. The officers merely testified that appellant said he was too drunk to remember his activities except that he thought he 'got stuck somewhere' and had to be 'pulled out.' As to being held without bail, we observe that no testimony was adduced that application for bail was ever made or denied.

Appellant next asserts he was denied the right to testify and available defense witnesses were not 'called or used.' The appellant testified that he expressed the desire to take the witness stand in his own behalf and was advised by his attorney that 'it wouldn't do any good for me to testify.' Appellant's wife testified that she was present and available as a witness and desired to testify, and appellant's counsel told her that 'it would be better if we didn't testify.' The appellant's attorney testified that since the appellant had previously been convicted of crimes of homicide and indecent exposure that he advised him about...