Prunty v. Arkansas Freightways, Inc.

• Decision Date: 21 March 1994
• Docket Number: No. 92-4338,92-4338
• Citation: 16 F.3d 649
• Parties: 64 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 451 Mildred PRUNTY, Plaintiff-Appellant. v. ARKANSAS FREIGHTWAYS, INC., and Chuck Baugh, Defendants-Appellees.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit

Page 649

16 F.3d 649

64 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 451

Mildred PRUNTY, Plaintiff-Appellant. v. ARKANSAS FREIGHTWAYS, INC., and Chuck Baugh, Defendants-Appellees.

No. 92-4338.

United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit.

March 21, 1994.

Suggestion for Rehearing En Banc Denied April 18, 1994.

Sybil K. Colson, Cornett & Colson, Paris, TX, for plaintiff-appellant.

Joseph F. Gilker, Gilker & Jones, Mountainburg, AR, for Arkansas Freightways.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas.

Before JOHNSON, SMITH, and EMILIO M. GARZA, Circuit Judges.

JOHNSON, Circuit Judge:

The petition for rehearing is GRANTED. We withdraw our opinion of August 4, 1993, and substitute the following.

Mildred Prunty worked for Arkansas Freightways, Inc. ("AFI") from April 1987, until June 1, 1989. Throughout the last nine months of her employment with AFI, Mrs. Prunty was subjected to extreme and outrageous sexual harassment by her supervisor, Chuck Baugh. Mrs. Prunty brought this cause of action against AFI and Mr. Baugh, ¹ alleging that both defendants were liable for intentional infliction of emotional distress and violations of Title VII ² and the Texas Commission on Human Rights Act ³ ("article 5221k"). Although the district court found that Mrs. Prunty had suffered severe emotional distress at the hands of Mr. Baugh, it held that AFI was not liable for the damages which flowed therefrom. The court also found that AFI was responsible for the sexual harassment of Mrs. Prunty, having violated Title VII. However, the court held that neither Title VII nor article 5221k authorized the type of relief which Mrs. Prunty sought. We affirm in part and reverse and remand in part.

I. Facts and Procedural History

Arkansas Freightways, Inc. is a trucking company which has numerous terminals throughout several states, including Texas. In 1987, AFI opened a terminal in Paris, Texas, and hired Mildred Prunty as a clerical worker for that terminal. Mrs. Prunty had the responsibility, for the most part, of running the entire Paris operation. Among other things, she interviewed applicants for truck-driver positions, made recommendations as to which applicants should be hired, dispatched drivers, ensured that the trucks were maintained, performed administrative functions, took care of customer service, and, if necessary, drove trucks. On July 13, 1987, AFI promoted Mrs. Prunty to operations supervisor and made her a salaried employee.

From the beginning of her employment until as late as September 1988, Mrs. Prunty was supervised by Robert Smart, the terminal manager in charge of the Paris and Sherman terminals. ⁴ AFI hired Chuck Baugh as the terminal manager for the Paris terminal in September 1988. Shortly after his arrival in Paris, Mr. Baugh began to daily make vulgar, offensive, and degrading comments about Mrs. Prunty both to Mrs. Prunty and to AFI truck drivers and dock workers.

Throughout this time, Mrs. Prunty communicated with Baugh's supervisor, Mr. O.D. Rippy. Mr. Rippy, the vice president of AFI's southwestern operations, worked in the Dallas office. Mrs. Prunty telephoned Mr. Rippy several times to discuss Baugh's unprofessional behavior. She also wrote a letter to Mr. Rippy to inform him of Baugh's abusive language and scurrilous remarks. She ended the letter by asking Rippy for help. ⁵ Mrs. Prunty's husband also telephoned Mr. Rippy to inform him of the abuse which Mrs. Prunty was experiencing. Mr. Prunty told Rippy about the remarks and gestures which Mr. Baugh had made to and about Mrs. Prunty and asked him to put an end to the situation. However, Mr. Rippy informed the Pruntys that Mr. Baugh and Mrs. Prunty would have to work out the problems themselves.

Receiving no help from Mr. Rippy, Mildred Prunty sent a letter through express mail to Mr. Sheridan Garrison, AFI's president. In this letter, she stated that Mr. Baugh had made rude and obscene comments to her and about her. As a result of this letter, Mr. Rippy, the vice president who had previously ignored Mr. and Mrs. Prunty's pleas for help, was ordered to investigate the Paris office to determine whether Mrs. Prunty's allegations were meritorious. Rippy then determined that the allegations were, indeed, legitimate. He had the workers at the Paris terminal to write down the types of statements which Baugh had made about Prunty. Mr. Rippy then faxed those statements to AFI's office in Arkansas. Chuck Baugh was promptly dismissed.

Because Rippy faxed the statements, additional AFI employees were able to view the vulgarities spoken by Mr. Baugh to and about Mrs. Prunty. Baugh's replacement, Scott Harris, was one of the Arkansas employees who read the statements. Mrs. Prunty testified that when she learned that Scott Harris knew about the obscenities uttered about her, she felt so humiliated and degraded that she could no longer work with or for him. Prunty therefore resigned her position as operations supervisor ⁶ and found employment in Dallas with the United States Postal Service.

Prunty brought this cause of action in Texas state court, and AFI removed it to federal court. After a bench trial, the district court found that Baugh's conduct was intentional, offensive, extreme, and outrageous; the court further held that Baugh's conduct created an abusive, hostile, and offensive working environment. The court decided that the sexual harassment was so pervasive that AFI was charged with constructive knowledge thereof. Further, finding that Mr. Rippy actually knew of the sexual harassment, the court found that Rippy had done nothing to remedy the problem prior to April 1989--when Prunty contacted AFI's president. ⁷ The district court also determined that Mrs. Prunty had, indeed, suffered severe emotional distress as a result of Baugh's conduct and that Prunty had successfully established a Title VII claim against AFI.

However, the court went on to hold that Mrs. Prunty was not entitled to any relief. Furthermore, the court decided that AFI could not be held liable for the intentional infliction of emotional distress because the court determined that Baugh had not acted within the course and scope of his employment. ⁸ Finally, the court denied Mrs. Prunty's requests for compensatory and punitive damages under Title VII and article 5221k because it concluded that such damages could not be recovered under those provisions.

Mrs. Prunty appeals, challenging the district court's legal conclusions that Title VII and article 5221k disallow the recovery of compensatory and punitive damages. She also challenges the district court's holding that AFI could be liable for Baugh's actions only if Baugh acted within the course and scope of his employment.

II. Discussion

A. Title VII and Article 5221k Damages

Mrs. Prunty sought damages for the differences in wages and benefits between her job at AFI and her position with the Postal Service. She also sought damages for the travel expenses she incurs in driving to and from Dallas each day. The district court, however, determined that Mrs. Prunty presented no evidence of wage or benefit differentials. ⁹ The court further decided that Title VII and article 5221k do not authorize the grant of compensatory and punitive damages under their provisions. The district court's interpretation of those statutes was a legal conclusion which this Court would usually review de novo. Palmco Corp. v. American Airlines, Inc., 983 F.2d 681, 684 (5th Cir.1993). However, we need not address the propriety of the district judge's conclusions, for our review of the record reveals that Mrs. Prunty did not present any evidence of damages whatsoever.

It is truistic, indeed elementary, that one who seeks compensatory damages must present evidence of those damages. DAN B. DOBBS, REMEDIES Sec. 3.2, at 140 (1973). Hence, when one of the prima facie elements of a claim is damages and the claimant fails to introduce evidence of those damages, he or she commits a fatal error. In such cases, the district court has no choice but to deny the monetary relief requested. Thus, in this case, Mrs. Prunty's failure to prove damages precluded her recovery of those damages, regardless of whether Title VII and/or article 5221k authorized the type of damages she requested. ¹⁰ We therefore affirm the district court's denial of the requested relief under Title VII and article 5221k, albeit for reasons other than those given by the district court.

B. Ratification

The district court concluded that an employer can be held liable for the intentional torts of its employee only when the employee acts within the course and scope of his employment and when the act furthers the object for which the employee was hired. This legal conclusion is subject to de novo review. Palmco Corp., 983 F.2d at 684.

A review of Texas law reveals quite readily that the district court erred in its legal conclusion. The law has been well-settled in Texas for well over a century that if an employer or a manager for an employer ratifies ¹¹ or approves the intentional, malicious or grossly negligent acts of an agent, the employer may be liable, not only for compensatory damages, but also for exemplary damages. ¹² Purvis, 595 S.W.2d at 104; King, 234 S.W.2d at 404; Ft. Worth Elevators Co., 70 S.W.2d at 404-06; Gulf, Colorado and Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Reed, 80 Tex. 362, 15 S.W. 1105, 1107 (1891); Hays v. Houston and Great Northern R.R. Co., 46 Tex. 272 (1876); Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc. v. Tucker, 806 S.W.2d 914, 925 (Tex.App.--Corpus Christi 1991, writ dism'd w.o.j.); Al Parker Buick Co. v. Touchy, 788 S.W.2d 129, 130 (Tex.App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 1990); Group Hospital Services, Inc. v. Daniel, 704 S.W.2d 870, 877 (Tex.App.--Corpus Christi 1985); see also Hitt v. East Texas Theatres, Inc., 203 S.W.2d 963, 969 (Tex.Civ.App.--Texarkana 1947) (Finding that the employee had not acted within the scope of his employment, the court then turned to the question of whether the...