Humphreys v. Medical Towers, Ltd.

• Decision Date: 30 June 1995
• Docket Number: Civ. A. No. H-94-1226.
• Parties: Carol M. HUMPHREYS, Plaintiff, v. MEDICAL TOWERS, LTD., Diva Corporation, and David A. Lawson, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of Texas

893 F. Supp. 672

Carol M. HUMPHREYS, Plaintiff, v. MEDICAL TOWERS, LTD., Diva Corporation, and David A. Lawson, Defendants.

Civ. A. No. H-94-1226.

United States District Court, S.D. Texas.

June 30, 1995.

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Penney P. Bell, Houston, TX, for plaintiff.

Bobbie G. Bayless, Bayless & Stokes, Houston, TX, for defendants.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

CRONE, United States Magistrate Judge.

Pending before the court is Defendants Medical Towers, Ltd. (MTL), Diva Corporation ("Diva"), and David A. Lawson's ("Lawson") Motion for Summary Judgment (# 45). MTL, Diva, and Lawson seek summary judgment on Humphreys' claims of intentional infliction of emotional distress, hostile environment and quid pro quo sexual harassment, sex discrimination, retaliation, constructive discharge, and violations of the Texas Commission on Human Rights Act ("TCHRA"). Defendants also contend that Lawson cannot be held personally liable in this action and dispute certain elements of damages claimed by Humphreys.

Having reviewed the motion, the submissions of the parties, the pleadings, and the applicable law, this court is of the opinion that the defendants' motion for summary judgment should be granted in part and denied in part.

I. Background.

On April 1, 1988, Humphreys was hired by MTL, a limited partnership which owns the Medical Towers Building located at 1709 Dryden in Houston, Texas. Humphreys was originally employed as an administrative assistant to Lawson, who was her supervisor. Lawson is the president and sole shareholder of Diva, which, in turn, is the general and managing partner of MTL. Lawson is also a limited partner of MTL. Diva has a contract to provide management services for MTL. Humphreys was promoted to bookkeeper and later, in the Spring of 1989, to building manager. Humphreys' responsibilities as building manager included administration of the office, tenant relations, and overseeing the bookkeeping.

In November 1989, there was an altercation between Humphreys and Roger Bailey ("Bailey"), the chief engineer for the Medical Towers Building, over a maintenance matter. According to Humphreys, Bailey called her a "bitch" and a "whore" and threw a paperweight at her. Humphreys asserts that after this incident, Bailey repeatedly exhibited abusive behavior towards her throughout the course of her employment. She also contends that Bailey, ostensibly her subordinate, refused to take directions from her and did not allow employees working under him to communicate with her directly.

In April 1993, Lawson hired a personal friend, Drew Crispin ("Crispin"), to work on a safety project and to serve as a buffer between Humphreys and Bailey, who were not on speaking terms. According to Humphreys, Crispin started assuming some of her duties and ultimately functioned as the de facto building manager. When Humphreys was no longer employed at MTL, Crispin officially replaced Humphreys as building manager.

On August 27, 1993, when Bailey called a tenant's employee who had answered the telephone in the management office a "bitch," mistakenly believing her to be Humphreys, Humphreys and Lawson disagreed over Humphreys' handling of the situation. Humphreys' employment at MTL ended on August 30, 1993, when she left the building after arguing with Lawson.

Humphreys filed a charge of discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") on September 24, 1993, alleging violations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VII"), including sexual harassment, sex discrimination, and retaliation. After the EEOC issued Humphreys a right to sue letter, she initiated this action on April 12, 1994. On May 15, 1995, MTL, Diva, and Lawson filed the instant motion for summary judgment on all of Humphreys' claims.

II. Analysis.

A. The Applicable Standard.

Rule 56(c) provides that "summary judgment shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." FED.R.CIV.P. 56(c). The party seeking summary judgment bears the initial burden of informing the court of the basis for its motion and identifying those portions of the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions on file, and affidavits, if any, which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2552-53, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2510, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986); Williams v. Adams, 836 F.2d 958, 960 (5th Cir.1988). Once a proper motion has been made, the non-moving party may not rest upon mere allegations or denials in the pleadings, but must set forth specific facts showing the existence of a genuine issue for trial. Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 322-23, 106 S.Ct. at 2552-53; Anderson, 477 U.S. at 257, 106 S.Ct. at 2514-15; Topalian v. Ehrman, 954 F.2d 1125, 1131 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 113 S.Ct. 82, 121 L.Ed.2d 46 (1992). Summary judgment is mandated if the nonmovant fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to her case on which she bears the burden of proof at trial. Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 322, 106 S.Ct. at 2552.

B. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress.

To prevail on her claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress, Humphreys must establish:

(1) the defendant acted intentionally or recklessly;

(2) the defendant's conduct was extreme and outrageous;

(3) the defendant's actions caused her emotional distress; and

(4) the emotional distress suffered by her was severe.

MacArthur v. University of Tex. Health Ctr., 45 F.3d 890, 898 (5th Cir.1995); McKethan v. Texas Farm Bureau, 996 F.2d 734, 742 (5th Cir.1993), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 114 S.Ct. 694, 126 L.Ed.2d 661 (1994); Ugalde v. W.A. McKenzie Asphalt Co., 990 F.2d 239, 243 (5th Cir.1993); Ramirez v. Allright Parking El Paso, Inc., 970 F.2d 1372, 1375 (5th Cir.1992); Johnson v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 965 F.2d 31, 33 (5th Cir.1992); Dean v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 885 F.2d 300, 306 (5th Cir.1989); Wornick Co. v. Casas, 856 S.W.2d 732, 734 (Tex.1993).

While "extreme and outrageous," as used in the second element of this standard, is an amorphous phrase that escapes precise definition, there appears to be a consensus that conduct is "outrageous" if it is "atrocious" and surpasses "all possible bounds of decency," such that it is "utterly intolerable in a civilized community." See MacArthur, 45 F.3d at 898; Ugalde, 990 F.2d at 243; Johnson, 965 F.2d at 33; Dean, 885 F.2d at 306; Wornick, 856 S.W.2d at 734. In Dean, the Fifth Circuit (citing Restatement (Second) of Torts § 46, comment d (1965)) stated:

Liability for outrageous conduct has been found only where the conduct has been so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community.... Generally, the case is one in which a recitation of the facts to an average member of the community would lead him to exclaim, "Outrageous."

885 F.2d at 306. Liability does not extend to mere insults, indignities, threats, annoyances, petty oppressions, or other trivialities. Ugalde, 990 F.2d at 243; Johnson, 965 F.2d at 33; Wilson v. Monarch Paper Co., 939 F.2d 1138, 1143 (5th Cir.1991). There is no occasion for the law to intervene in every case where someone's feelings are hurt. Id.

Specifically, in the employment context, the Fifth Circuit, applying Texas law, has repeatedly stated that a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress will not lie for "mere employment disputes." MacArthur, 45 F.3d at 898; Johnson, 965 F.2d at 33. The courts recognize that in order to manage its business properly, an employer must be able to supervise, review, criticize, demote, transfer, and discipline employees. Id. at 34; Wilson, 939 F.2d at 1143. Even conduct which may be illegal in an employment setting may not be the sort of behavior that constitutes "extreme and outrageous" conduct. Ugalde, 990 F.2d at 243.

In her first amended original complaint, Humphreys alleges that the defendants' conduct "constitutes intentional infliction of emotional distress in view of the frequency and duration of the discriminatory conduct, its severity and offensiveness, including the physical intimidation and public humiliation, its interference with her ability to perform her job, and its devastating effect on her psychological well being and physical health." Humphreys acknowledges that her claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress is based on the same allegations as those underlying her claims of sexual harassment, sex discrimination, and retaliation.

Humphreys' first allegation of misconduct is the "paperweight" incident involving Bailey. Humphreys states that on November 20, 1989, several months after she had been promoted to building manager, she was notified of a water leak on one floors in the Medical Towers Building. Humphreys spoke with Scott Medve ("Medve"), stationary engineer, concerning this matter because Bailey was not in the building. Humphreys asserts that Medve told her the leak was the result of the building engineers not having sufficient time to perform certain maintenance. Humphreys wrote a memorandum to Bailey stating that he needed to keep up with maintenance. According to Humphreys, after Bailey received the memorandum, he "stormed in and called her a bitch and a whore and shot the finger at her and told her to get a real job." Humphreys further contends that Bailey physically assaulted her by gathering all the items off the top of the desk, including a metal...