Prunty v. State ex rel. Williams
| Decision Date | 23 September 1969 |
| Docket Number | No. L-116,L-116 |
| Citation | 226 So.2d 448 |
| Parties | John W. PRUNTY, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida ex rel. Broward WILLIAMS, State Treasurer and Ex Officio Insurance Commissioner; and National Service Fire Insurance Company, a Tennessee corporation authorized to transact an insurance business in the State of Florida, Appellees. |
| Court | Florida District Court of Appeals |
Peeples, Smith & Moore, Tallahassee, and Prunty, Olsen & Slotnick, Miami, for appellant.
Thomas A. Waddell, Charles Friend, Tallahassee, and Edward N. Paslick, Maderia Beach, for appellees.
A respondent in certain ancillary receivership proceedings has appealed from an order entered by the Circuit Court for Leon County, suspending an earlier order that had authorized the ancillary receiver to pay a certain sum to the said respondent.
The ultimate question presented for our determination in this appeal is whether the said court correctly entered the order appealed from in view of the fact that that order was entered following an ex parte hearing of which the appellant had received no notice, under the circumstances set forth below.
The timetable of events pertinent to the present consideration is briefly as follows:
On June 12, 1968, the said court entered an order appointing the appellee-relator, as Treasurer and ex officio Insurance Commissioner of the State of Florida, to be Ancillary Receiver, directing him in such capacity to take immediate possession of all of the property of the appellee National Service Fire Insurance Company, and directing all persons within the court's jurisdiction having possession of any books, papers, and property of the said company to deliver, upon demand, all such assets of that company.
A few weeks later the said ancillary receiver filed in the court a petition for a rule to show cause directed to the appellant and two other attorneys, alleging that these three attorneys had in their possession certain personal property of the said company, consisting of files, papers, correspondence, claim files, or other things necessary to the conduct of the receivership proceedings.
To the said petition the appellant's attorney filed his response, admitting that he had in his possession certain personal property of the said company, but that he had refused to deliver the said property to the ancillary receiver after demand therefor for the reason that he had not been paid for legal services rendered on behalf of the said company and had not been paid for out-of-pocket expenses in regard to such representation, the appellant claiming a retaining lien on all files, papers, correspondence, claim files, and other personal property allegedly belonging to the company.
On November 5, 1968, the said court entered an order finding that the said property in the appellant's possession was necessary to the conduct of the receivership proceedings, but finding that the appellant had a lien for fees upon the said property in the amount of $9,000, ordered the appellant to deliver the property to the ancillary receiver, who was ordered to pay the said sum to the appellant.
On November 13, 1968, however, the ancillary receiver filed a motion to set aside the order of November 5, on the ground that the latter order was based upon incorrect information.
The ancillary receiver's said motion was not served upon the appellant, nor was he given notice of any hearing on the motion. No such...
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