Prutch v. Town of Quartzsite, 1 CA–CV 12–0290.

• Decision Date: 26 February 2013
• Docket Number: No. 1 CA–CV 12–0290.,1 CA–CV 12–0290.
• Citation: 655 Ariz. Adv. Rep. 32,296 P.3d 94,231 Ariz. 431
• Parties: John PRUTCH, a resident and qualified elector of the Town of Quartzsite, Arizona, Petitioner/Appellant, v. TOWN OF QUARTZSITE, an Arizona municipal corporation; Quartzsite Town Council, in their official capacity as election official for the Town of Quartzsite; Terry Frausto, in her official capacity as Town Clerk for the Town of Quartzsite, Respondents/Appellees, and Mike Jewitt, purported candidate elect to the Town of Quartzsite Town Council, Real Party in Interest/Appellee.
• Court: Arizona Court of Appeals

231 Ariz. 431

296 P.3d 94

655 Ariz. Adv. Rep. 32

John PRUTCH, a resident and qualified elector of the Town of Quartzsite, Arizona, Petitioner/Appellant,

v. TOWN OF QUARTZSITE, an Arizona municipal corporation; Quartzsite Town Council, in their official capacity as election official for the Town of Quartzsite; Terry Frausto, in her official capacity as Town Clerk for the Town of Quartzsite, Respondents/Appellees,andMike Jewitt, purported candidate elect to the Town of Quartzsite Town Council, Real Party in Interest/Appellee.

No. 1 CA–CV 12–0290.

Court of Appeals of Arizona, Division 1, Department B.

Feb. 26, 2013.

As Amended Feb. 26, 2013.

Ellen M. Van Riper, Phoenix, Attorney for Petitioner/Appellant.

Sims Murray Ltd. By Jeffrey T. Murray, Phoenix, Attorneys for Respondents/Appellees.

HOWE, Judge.

¶ 1 John Prutch appeals the dismissal of his complaint against the Town of Quartzsite, its Town Council and Town Clerk, and Mike Jewitt (collectively, “Quartzsite”), challenging Jewitt's election to the Town Council. We hold that the trial court erred as a matter of law in dismissing the complaint based on the defense of laches. That defense requires a trial court to find not only that a plaintiff caused prejudicial delay, but also that the plaintiff acted unreasonably in causing the delay. The trial court erred in applying laches because although it found that Prutch caused prejudicial delay in pursuing his complaint, it expressly declined to find that he acted unreasonably. We reject Prutch's other claims of error.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶ 2 In 2011, Jose Lizarraga vacated his seat on the Quartzsite Town Council to run for mayor in a recall election. The Town Council appointed Jewitt to fill the vacancy until the next regularly scheduled council election, and scheduled a primary election for March 13, 2012. However, the Town issued a press release in January 2012 referring to the scheduled primary as a special election. Prutch ran against Jewitt as a write-in candidate. At the election, neither candidate received a majority of the 657 votes cast, but Jewitt received more votes (263) than Prutch received (230).

¶ 3 On March 30, 2012, the Town Council accepted the canvass of the votes and adopted Resolution Number 12–08 (“the Resolution”), which declared Jewitt the winner for the remaining two-year term.¹ The Resolutionasserted that waiting to fill the seat at the general election would leave Quartzsite “without a Council Member and[ ] potentially a government” for eleven to thirteen weeks. The Town Council ordered that Jewitt be issued a certificate of election and sworn in as “soon as practicable.” The Town Clerk issued the certificate and swore in Jewitt the same day.

¶ 4 On April 4, 2012, Prutch filed a special action petition in Maricopa County Superior Court challenging the Resolution. He claimed that Quartzsite fraudulently misrepresented the primary as a special election and that Jewitt should be removed from the Council seat and the seat filled at the May 15, 2012, general election. Quartzsite filed a notice of improper venue, and the Maricopa County Superior Court dismissed the case without objection on April 11. Prutch moved for reconsideration on April 12, arguing that the case should have been transferred to the proper venue instead of dismissed. The court agreed, reinstated the case, and transferred it to La Paz County Superior Court.

¶ 5 Quartzsite moved to dismiss the complaint in La Paz County Superior Court on April 13. It argued that the doctrine of laches barred the complaint because Prutch had acted unreasonably by (1) waiting until the last day permitted by statute to challenge the election, (2) filing the complaint in an improper venue, and (3) failing to object to dismissal of the complaint but then asking for reconsideration the next day. Quartzsite argued that these delays prejudiced it and the “administration of justice” because it had already printed sample ballots for the general election and would be unable to print new ballots in time for early voting if the court ruled in Prutch's favor. Moreover, Quartzsite argued, the trial court did not have time to adequately address the merits of the complaint, and neither party would have time to appeal an adverse ruling before early voting began. Prutch responded to the motion, arguing that he did not act unreasonably. He also moved to proceed ex parte because Quartzsite had not answered the complaint.

¶ 6 At a hearing on April 16, 2012, Prutch moved for default in addition to moving to proceed ex parte. The court denied both motions and then heard arguments on the motion to dismiss. Quartzsite argued that the court did not have enough time to resolve the dispute because early voting would begin on the following Thursday and that Prutch had acted unreasonably by waiting five days to file his complaint and filing it in the wrong venue. Prutch responded that he had no reason to delay the case, had tried to proceed as quickly as possible, and reasonably believed that Maricopa County was a proper venue based on his interpretation of the venue statute.

¶ 7 The court found that venue was improper in Maricopa County and that the case should have been filed in La Paz County. It stated, however, that it was “not sure [Prutch's] conduct was unreasonable.” Instead, it lamented that the delay from filing the case in the wrong county prevented it from resolving the dispute in time for early balloting. The court recognized that “there also has to be prejudice shown,” and discussed the unfairness a delayed challenge would cause the court and all the participants in the electoral process. The court found prejudice because it did not have time to render a decision that the parties could appeal before the early balloting deadline. The court therefore granted the motion to dismiss on laches “on those grounds.”

¶ 8 Prutch timely appealed. We have jurisdiction pursuant to Arizona Revised Statutes (“A.R.S.”) section 12–2101(A)(1) (West 2013).²

DISCUSSION

1. Mootness

¶ 9 During the pendency of this appeal, Quartzsite moved to dismiss this appeal as moot because the general election was held on May 15, 2012, and the relief that Prutch requests is no longer available. This Court denied the motion without prejudice to reconsideration of the issue when resolving the merits of case. Upon reconsideration, we again decline to dismiss this case as moot.

¶ 10 This Court generally declines to address moot issues as a policy of judicial restraint, although this Court is not bound by the case or controversy requirements of the United States Constitution. Lana A. v. Woodburn, 211 Ariz. 62, 65, ¶ 9, 116 P.3d 1222, 1225 (App.2005). We will make an exception, however, for matters of public importance or those capable of repetition yet evading review. Id. (reviewing the illegal detention of juveniles even though they had been released because it was a question of public importance). Quartzsite argues that we should not exercise discretion to review this case because a similar situation would not likely evade review in the future.

¶ 11 Because this case involves matters of public importance, however, we exercise our discretion to review this case even though the general election has already occurred. Moreover, we note that not all of Prutch's claims are necessarily moot. Prutch has requested, among other remedies, that Jewitt be removed from office because he was elected through fraud and misrepresentation. That claim is still justiciable and the remedy still available.

2. Motion to Dismiss Based on Laches

¶ 12 Prutch first argues that the trial court erroneously dismissed his case based on the equitable doctrine of laches. We review the dismissal of a complaint based on laches for an abuse of discretion. See McComb v. Superior Court (Parker), 189 Ariz. 518, 525, 943 P.2d 878, 885 (App.1997). A finding of laches is within the trial court's sound discretion, and “absent erroneous interpretation of the law or clearly erroneous factual underpinnings, the trial court's determination can be overturned only if its decision represents an unreasonable judgment in weighing relevant factors.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).

¶ 13 The defense of laches bars a claim when, under the totality of circumstances, the delay in prosecuting the claim “would produce an unjust result.” Harris v. Purcell, 193 Ariz. 409, 410 n. 2, ¶ 2, 973 P.2d 1166, 1167 n. 2 (1998). The defense is often raised in time-sensitive election cases. Id. at 412–13, ¶¶ 15–17, 973 P.2d at 1169–70 (citing Mathieu v. Mahoney, 174 Ariz. 456, 459, 851 P.2d 81, 84 (1993) (“Our concern with timeliness stems in part from the notion that disputes concerning election and petition matters must be initiated and heard in time to prepare the ballots for absentee voting to avoid rendering an action moot.”) (internal quotation marks omitted)). Equity, however, “does not encourage laches, and the doctrine may not be invoked to defeat justice but only to prevent injustice.” Beltran v. Razo, 163 Ariz. 505, 507, 788 P.2d 1256, 1258 (App.1990). Mere delay in pursuing a claim is not enough to establish laches. Mathieu, 174 Ariz. at 459, 851 P.2d at 84. A defendant must not only prove that a plaintiff's delay prejudiced the defendant, the court, or the public, but also that the plaintiff acted unreasonably. Id. at 459, 461, 851 P.2d at 84, 86.

¶ 14 Here, the trial court erroneously granted dismissal based on laches because it did not find that Prutch had acted unreasonably. Quartzsite concedes that the trial court refused to “state affirmatively that [Prutch] acted unreasonably,” but argues that the court nevertheless “tacitly” found that Prutch's “tactical decisions” created “an unreasonable delay.” But Quartzsite's concession is a recognition that the record does not support this element of laches. Laches requires a finding that the plaintiff acted unreasonably in causing the delay, and although the court believed that...