Pryor v. Brown & Root USA, Inc.

• Decision Date: 15 September 1995
• Citation: 674 So.2d 45
• Parties: Willie Mae PRYOR v. BROWN & ROOT USA, INC. 1940431.
• Court: Alabama Supreme Court

Page 45

674 So.2d 45

Willie Mae PRYOR v. BROWN & ROOT USA, INC.

1940431.

Supreme Court of Alabama.

Sept. 15, 1995.

Application for Rehearing Overruled

Feb. 2, 1996.

Dissenting Opinion on Overruling of

Application for Rehearing by Chief

Justice Hooper Feb. 2, 1996.

Tony S. Hebson, Birmingham, for Appellant.

J. Glynn Tubb and Jenny L. McLeroy of Eyster, Key, Tubb, Weaver & Roth, Decatur, for Appellee.

HORNSBY, Chief Justice.

On July 18, 1993, Jeff Dealy, an employee of Brown & Root USA, Inc., had an automobile accident that also involved Willie Mae Pryor. Dealy was driving a vehicle owned by Brown & Root when the accident occurred. Pryor alleged negligence and wantonness against Dealy and Brown & Root, and she alleged negligent entrustment against Brown & Root.

The trial court entered a summary judgment in favor of Brown & Root on all counts. Pryor appeals. This appeal deals solely with the issue of Brown & Root's liability, and not with Dealy's liability. The sole question presented is whether Pryor met her requisite burdens of proof regarding the issues of respondeat superior liability and negligent entrustment, so as to warrant submitting those issues to the jury.

Factual Background

Jeff Dealy was employed by Brown & Root, a construction company, as a project engineer at the Champion Paper Plant in Courtland, Alabama. Dealy was scheduled to work Monday through Thursday from 6:00 a.m. until 4:30 p.m. and had the option of working on Friday, Saturday, or Sunday. Dealy testified that he was subject to being called in to work by his supervisor on those days. Dealy further testified that if he "was in town" on Friday, Saturday, or Sunday, then he was "on the job." On the day of the accident, Sunday, July 18, 1993, Dealy opted to work from 10:00 a.m. until noon at the Champion Plant. At noon, he left work in his company-supplied vehicle and went to Lucy's Branch, west of Athens off Highway 72. Dealy went to Lucy's Branch to meet friends in order to go sailing on Lake Wheeler. Dealy left Lucy's Branch at 5:30 p.m. to return to his home in Decatur. Dealy admitted to drinking four 12-ounce beers while he was at Lucy's Branch. On his way home from Lucy's Branch, Dealy ran a red light at an intersection in Athens, and his vehicle hit Pryor's vehicle, injuring Pryor. He was given a sobriety test on the scene of the accident and was found not to be intoxicated. Had Dealy gone straight home from the Champion Plant, he would have reached his home in Decatur by around 1:00 p.m., without passing through Athens.

Pryor's claims against Brown & Root are grounded in the law of agency, respondeat superior, and negligent entrustment. Pryor appeals from a summary judgment for Brown & Root on all counts. "In reviewing the disposition of a motion for summary judgment, we utilize the same standard as the trial court in determining whether the evidence before [it] made out a genuine issue of material fact" and whether the movant was "entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Bussey v. John Deere Co., 531 So.2d 860, 862 (Ala.1988) (citing Chiniche v. Smith, 374 So.2d 872 (Ala.1979)); Rule 56(c), A.R.Civ.P. The movant has the burden of "showing material facts, which, if uncontested, entitle the movant to judgment as a matter of law." Berner v. Caldwell, 543 So.2d 686, 688 (Ala.1989); Woodham v. Nationwide Life Ins. Co., 349 So.2d 1110, 1111 (Ala.1977). Once the movant has made this showing, the opposing party then has the burden of presenting evidence creating a genuine issue of material fact. Danford v. Arnold, 582 So.2d 545, 546 (Ala.1991); Bass v. SouthTrust Bank of Baldwin County, 538 So.2d 794, 797-98 (Ala.1989).

The nonmovant must meet the burden of establishing by substantial evidence the existence of a genuine issue of material fact. Ala.Code 1975, § 12-21-12; Bass v. SouthTrust Bank of Baldwin County, supra. "Substantial evidence" is "evidence of such weight and quality that fair-minded persons in the exercise of impartial judgment can reasonably infer the existence of the fact sought to be proved." West v. Founders Life Assurance Co. of Florida, 547 So.2d 870, 871 (Ala.1989).

Our review is further subject to the caveat that this Court must review the record in a light most favorable to the nonmovant and must resolve all reasonable doubts against the movant. Hanners v. Balfour Guthrie, Inc., 564 So.2d 412, 413 (Ala.1990).

Agency/Respondeat Superior

Pryor argues that Dealy was acting as an agent of Brown & Root at the time of the accident and that Brown & Root is thus liable for his actions. The agency issue centers upon the fact that Dealy was driving a Brown & Root vehicle when he hit Pryor and had been working for Brown & Root on the morning of the accident.

In response, Brown & Root argues that Dealy was not acting as its agent at the time of the accident. Brown & Root argues that the principle of respondeat superior and not the law of agency governs this case. In Southern Life & Health Ins. Co. v. Turner, 571 So.2d 1015, 1018 (Ala.1990), judgment vacated, Southern Life & Health Ins. Co. v. Turner, 500 U.S. 901, 111 S.Ct. 1678, 114 L.Ed.2d 73 (1991), affirmed on remand, Southern Life & Health Ins. Co. v. Turner, 586 So.2d 854 (Ala.1991), this Court stated "that the relationship between agency and respondeat superior is often confused" because the "distinction between the law of agency and the law of respondeat superior is subtle." This Court, quoting 3 Am.Jur.2d Agency § 280 at 783 (1986), held:

" 'The general rule that a principal is liable for the torts of his agent is not grounded on agency principles. This is evident from the holdings that a principal may be held [liable] for his agent's tort committed in the course and scope of the agent's employment even though the principal does not authorize, ratify, participate in, or know of, such misconduct, or even if he forbade or disapproved of the act complained of. Fundamentally, there is no distinction to be drawn between the liability of a principal for the tortious act of his agent and the liability of an employer or master for the tortious act of his employee or servant. In both cases, the tort liability is based on the employer and employee, rather than any agency, principle; the liability for the tortious act of the employee is grounded upon the maxim of 'respondeat superior' and is to be determined by considering, from a factual standpoint, the question whether the tortious act was done while the employee, whether agent or servant, was acting within the scope of his employment.' "

571 So.2d at 1018.

In Autrey v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Alabama, 481 So.2d 345 (Ala.1985), this Court stated:

" ' "The liability of a corporation for the torts of its employees, whether agent or servant, is grounded upon the principle of 'respondeat superior,' not the principles of agency. The factual question to be determined is whether or not the act complained of was done, either by agent or servant, while acting within the line and scope of his employment. The corporation or principal may be liable in tort for the acts of its servants or agents done within the scope of employment, real or apparent, even though it did not authorize or ratify such acts or even expressly forbade them." ' (Citations omitted.)"

481 So.2d at 347-48, quoting National States Ins. Co. v. Jones, 393 So.2d 1361, 1367 (Ala.1980) (quoting in turn from Old Southern Life Ins. Co. v. McConnell, 52 Ala.App. 589, 594, 296 So.2d 183, 186 (1974)).

In the instant case, the trial court properly held that the principle of respondeat superior was applicable. This Court has held: "To recover for damages for injuries sustained in an automobile accident against the driver's employer upon a theory of respondeat superior, it is incumbent upon plaintiff to prove that the collision occurred while the driver was within the scope of his employment, and happened while he was in the accomplishment of objectives within the line of his duties." Perdue v. Mitchell, 373 So.2d 650, 653 (Ala.1979), citing Cook v. Fullbright, 349 So.2d 23 (Ala.1977).

Because Pryor's claims against Brown & Root are based on the doctrine of respondeat superior, the burden is on Pryor to present substantial evidence that the collision occurred while Dealy was acting within the line and scope of his employment. Williams v. Hughes Moving & Storage Co., 578 So.2d 1281, 1283 (Ala.1991). In this case, Dealy left work and went out of his way home to go sailing with friends. At the time of the accident, he was returning home. Even Pryor concedes that "the evidence without question seems to indicate that Mr. Dealy was on his own personal business" at the time of the wreck. However, Pryor contends that, because Dealy was driving a Brown & Root vehicle, the fact that Dealy was on personal business is not sufficient to sever Brown & Root's liability.

Use of a vehicle owned by an employer creates an "administrative presumption" of agency and a presumption that the employee was acting within the scope of his employment, as that concept is used in the law of respondeat superior liability, but this "administrative presumption" is not in itself evidence. Durbin v. B.W. Capps & Son, Inc., 522 So.2d 766, 766 (Ala.1988); Rogers v. Hughes, 252 Ala. 72, 75, 39 So.2d 578, 579 (1949); Tullis v. Blue, 216 Ala. 577, 114 So. 185 (1927). In Durbin, the Court stated:

" 'It is well settled that those presumptions do arise from proof of the defendant's ownership of the vehicle; but it is well settled also that they are prima facie presumptions merely, or, as they are sometimes called, administrative presumptions, based upon considerations of fairness and convenience in placing the burden of proof. They are not in themselves evidence, and in practice their effect is merely to impose upon the defendant the burden of showing that the driver was not his agent, or that if he was, he was not acting within the scope of his authority or in the course of his employment. ...