Pryor v. Hoskins

Decision Date11 September 2002
Docket NumberNo. 18A02-0109-CV-608.,18A02-0109-CV-608.
PartiesRonald L. PRYOR, Sharon R. Pryor, and Gaylon Ward, Appellants-Defendants, v. Berdie HOSKINS, Appellee-Plaintiff.
CourtIndiana Appellate Court

Lynne D. Lidke, Michael B. Langford, A. Jack Finklea, Scopelitis, Garvin, Light & Hanson, P.C., Indianapolis, IN, Attorneys for Appellants.

Karl L. Mulvaney, Patrick A. Elward, Nana Quay-Smith, Candace L. Sage, Bingham McHale, LLP, Indianapolis, IN, Attorneys for Appellee.

OPINION

DARDEN, Judge.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Ronald L. Pryor, Sharon R. Pryor, and Gaylon Ward (collectively, "the truckers") appeal the jury verdict for Berdie Hoskins in her personal injury action against them.

We reverse and remand for a new trial.

ISSUES
1. Whether the trial court erred in denying the truckers' peremptory challenge of a juror.
2. Whether the trial court erred in instructing the jury about comparative fault and giving the jury only two verdict forms (rather than three).
3. Whether the trial court erred in its instruction to the jury about the statutory requirement for equipment on a trailer having a gross weight greater than 3,000 pounds.
4. Whether the trial court erroneously denied the truckers' motion for judgment on the evidence made at the close of trial.
FACTS

In the early morning hours of February 25, 1998, Berdie Hoskins—a 46-year-old African-American woman—traveled from her home in Indianapolis to meet her sister in Muncie. When she reached Muncie, the night had become particularly foggy. Hoskins collided with the back of a tractor-trailer that was parked along a residential street, which is also known as State Road 32. Hoskins brought this action against the driver, Ward, who she alleged had negligently parked the tractor-trailer, and his employers and owners of the trailer, the Pryors for allowing Ward to park so as to create a hazardous condition. Hoskins also alleged that Ward and the Pryors had been negligent in not maintaining the appropriate visible reflectors on the trailer.

At trial, Hoskins testified that when she began to enter Muncie, the fog was very bad; she slowed her speed to about 27 m.p.h. and tried to follow the center line of the road; she did not see the trailer and had no memory of striking it. There was no evidence of skid marks or that Hoskins tried to stop or avoid the trailer before striking it. The collision occurred around 3:00 a.m.

Janet Easterly and David Stover lived two doors south of Ward's house, in front of which he had parked his tractor-trailer. They heard the collision and testified about what they saw that night. Easterly testified that the streetlight next to the trailer created a shadow at the back of the trailer, the back of the trailer was "very dirty," and the taillights were "so dirty" they could not be seen. (Tr. 158). Easterly also testified that she drove toward the truck later that morning, while it was still dark, and she observed that her "own headlights did not reflect on the back of the truck" and the taillights were "not . . . readily visible." (Tr. 163, 165). Stover had gone into the street to check on Hoskins after the collision. Stover testified that he had observed how the back of the trailer "was dirty," and how the lights on the back of the truck were "dirty also." (Tr. 201). Stover further testified that the streetlight beside the trailer failed to illuminate the back of the trailer. When shown a picture of the left side of the back of the trailer, wherein there was no reflector, Stover testified that he had seen no evidence of a broken reflector on the street that night. When asked on direct examination what he could see from a distance behind the trailer, Stover testified that the back of the trailer "was dirty," and that because of where the trailer was parked, if he was from out of town and "coming down that highway, [he] wouldn't have seen the truck. Not in time." (Tr. 209).

Ward's testimony about whether there was fog when he parked the trailer about 1:00 a.m. on February 25th was equivocal; essentially, he said that he did not believe there was much fog that night because if so, he would have remembered it. Ward admitted that there was dirt on the trailer's rear reflectors and taillights. Further, Ward acknowledged that the natural flow of traffic on the street led drivers into the lane where he parked because of the slight curve, and that drivers had to make an effort to veer leftward to avoid any parked vehicle. Finally, Ward conceded that parking was prohibited along that side of the street until two houses south of his, but he opined that because it "was legal to park" in front of his house, "no extra precautions were necessary." (Tr. 666).

Hoskins' expert witness, Willard Alroth, a consulting traffic engineer, testified that he did not believe the left rear reflector was on the trailer at the time of the collision because the adjacent taillight lenses—encased in the same "indentation in the back frame structure"—were undamaged. (Tr. 348). Alroth also noted that because the trailer was parked beside a street light, "the entire back of the truck" was "in a shadow because none of the light that would be emanating from that street lamp would be falling on the back of the truck." (Tr. 352). Further, Alroth believed that the amount of dirt on the light fixtures at the rear of the trailer made it "possible that they could not have been seen." (Tr. 346).

At the conclusion of all evidence, the truckers moved for judgment on the evidence. The trial court denied the motion. Subsequently, the trial court gave the jury two verdict forms—one to indicate a verdict for Hoskins and one to indicate a verdict for the truckers. The jury returned a verdict for Hoskins, finding she was 35% at fault, the truckers were 65% at fault, and her damages totaled $435,869.46.

1. Peremptory Challenge

When the first six potential jurors were questioned during voir dire, Hoskins' counsel asked whether "[a]nyone ever had any bad experience with a truck driver." (Tr. 32). Deborah Ivy responded, "We had one (1) who almost run [sic] us off the road when we were going to take our daughter to college in North Carolina in the Virginia area, and another one (1) (inaudible) on the way to Indianapolis that almost ran the car literally off the road. (inaudible) we had to go around." (Tr. 33). Hoskins' counsel then asked Ivy whether she had "any general good feeling, bad feeling, about truck drivers," to which Ivy responded, "They're not my favorite." Four questions later, Hoskins' counsel asked whether any of the six had a "problem with sitting as a juror for [Hoskins]?" Tr. 34. Ivy answered, "She looks familiar to me. I'm not sure—does she have children? I think her children attend my church," and she elaborated that she might have seen Hoskins at her church "maybe three (3) or four (4) years ago." Id. Hoskins' counsel then asked Ivy whether Ivy had talked to Hoskins' daughters, and Ivy answered, "Not recently. Just passed them and said hi." (Tr. 35). When Ivy was asked for more information about the daughters, she said, "They're in their thirties... I believe" and that she did not "know them that well because they didn't stay very long and they sang in the choir." Id. Finally, Hoskins' counsel asked Ivy whether "even though you mentioned earlier that truck drivers aren't your favorite people, do you still think you could sit and hear this case with an open mind today?" (Tr. 35). Ivy answered, "Sure." Id.

Subsequently, the truckers' counsel asked whether Ivy was "pretty sure" that she knew two of Hoskins' daughters, to which Ivy responded, "Yes." (Tr. 56). Ivy also affirmed that she recognized the name Hoskins. When asked further about Hoskins' daughters, Ivy said, "They were real quiet. They sang." (Tr. 56). The truckers' counsel asked whether Ivy sang "in the choir as well," but the transcript shows that the answer was inaudible. (Tr. 57). Then Ivy agreed that she would call herself a "social acquaintance[ ]" of Hoskins' daughters. (Tr. 57). Finally, the truckers' counsel asked Ivy whether her familiarity and social acquaintance with Hoskins' two daughters would affect her "ability to fairly listen to the evidence and rule with regard to [the truckers.]" (Tr. 72). Ivy answered, "No."

In a conference with the trial court, out of the presence of the jury, the truckers' counsel sought to exercise two peremptory strikes, for Diane Bumpus and Deborah Ivy. Hoskins' counsel objected to the striking of "both of the black members of this panel." (Tr. 75). The truckers' counsel asserted the strikes "had nothing to do with race whatsoever," id., and proceeded to explain why he sought to strike Ms. Bumpus.1 Thereafter, the truckers' counsel explained his reasoning for wanting to strike Ivy:

With regard to Ms. Ivy, you will recall that she stated in response to [Hoskins' counsel]'s questions that she had had situations where truck drivers had ran [sic] her off the road. We believe that that might be an experience that she's had with truck drivers that could be used against our clients. She also said truck drivers are not my favorite, and I think that's nearly a quote from what she said. Again, with our, the Defendant being in the trucking industry, we think that could be held against her. Of course, and perhaps the most obviously, she is acquainted, in fact, sang in the same church choir with Ms. Hoskins' daughters. We believe that that sort of social relationship could be used against us. Finally, Ms. Ivy, by way of her juror questionnaire, states that she is very involved in a lot of church activities, as is Ms. Hoskins, and we're concerned that she might quickly identify with Ms. Hoskins, develop a relationship with her by virtue of this trial, and therefore use that potentially to sway her view in favor of Ms. Hoskins and against the Defendants. For these reasons, we again take the position that the striking was not due upon race, but for other very legitimate
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2 cases
  • Williams v. State, 45A03-0404-CR-164.
    • United States
    • Indiana Supreme Court
    • 6 July 2005
    ...Affiliation, 63 A.L.R. 5th 375, 1998 WL 1032133 (1998). Indiana courts have yet to squarely address the issue. See Pryor v. Hoskins, 774 N.E.2d 943, 955-56 (Ind.Ct.App.2002) (J. Sullivan, 2. This case was fully briefed prior to our supreme court's decision in Smylie v. State, 823 N.E.2d 679......
  • Villaruel v. State
    • United States
    • Indiana Appellate Court
    • 24 March 2016
    ...jurors, and the Supreme Court analyzed the discriminatory aspects of the case in terms of a race-based challenge.” Pryor v. Hoskins, 774 N.E.2d 943, 954 n. 5 (Ind.Ct.App.2002) (citing Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 111 S.Ct. 1859, 114 L.Ed.2d 395 (1991) ).2 [12] This case is similar t......

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