Pryor v. Pryor
Decision Date | 19 January 2016 |
Docket Number | Nos. 36454,37425,37424.,36874,s. 36454 |
Citation | 162 Conn.App. 451,133 A.3d 463 |
Parties | Lynda PRYOR v. Edmond PRYOR. |
Court | Connecticut Court of Appeals |
Edmond J. Pryor, self-represented, with whom, on the brief, was Jeanmarie A. Riccio, Bridgeport, for the appellant (defendant).
Yakov Pyetranker, with whom, on the brief, were Annmarie P. Briones and Gary I. Cohen, Bridgeport, for the appellee (plaintiff).
GRUENDEL, ALVORD and WEST, Js.
These four appeals, consolidated by order of this court into two appeals, arise from postdissolution rulings by the trial court. In appeal AC 36454 and AC 36874, the defendant, Edmond Pryor, claims that the court improperly ordered him to list marital property located at Williamsbridge Road in Bronx, New York at $499,000, when the dissolution judgment required the court to use the average of two appraisals if the parties could not agree on a listing price.1 In appeal AC 37424 and AC 37425, the defendant claims that the court improperly (1) denied his motion to modify his alimony and child support obligations, (2) denied his motion to disqualify the presiding judge on the ground of judicial bias, and (3) granted the motion for counsel fees filed by the plaintiff, Lynda Pryor.2 We dismiss as moot the appeal in AC 36454 and AC 36874, because the property at issue was sold to a third party in August, 2015. We decline to review the defendant's claims in AC 37424 and AC 37425 because they are inadequately briefed. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment in AC 37424 and AC 37425.
The parties were married in the state of New York on August 12, 1989. Three children were born of the marriage. The plaintiff commenced a dissolution of marriage action in 2008, and a judgment of dissolution was rendered by the court, Calmar, J., on July 14, 2010, after a contested trial.3 The judgment contained orders relating to, inter alia, alimony, child support and the disposition of the parties' marital property.
On June 12, 2013, the plaintiff filed a postdissolution motion for order regarding the listing, marketing and sale of the Williamsbridge Road property in New York. Following a hearing, the court issued a ruling on May 6, 2014, in which it ordered the subject property to be listed at $499,000 for ninety days. The court further ordered: The defendant appealed from the court's order on May 23, 2014.
On October 22, 2015, the defendant's attorney informed the appellate clerk's office that the subject property had been sold.4 By letter dated November 3, 2015, the appellate clerk's office advised counsel of record to be prepared to address at oral argument "whether the defendant's appeals from the trial court's order regarding a listing price for certain real property should be dismissed as moot because the subject property has now been sold. See Champagne v. Champagne, 85 Conn.App. 872, 876–78 (2004)
." At the time of oral argument the parties acknowledged that the property had been sold to a third party and that the closing had taken place in August, 2015. The plaintiff argued that the appeal relating to the listing price was moot and should be dismissed. The defendant claimed that Champagne was distinguishable from this case and that the appeal was not moot. We conclude that Champagne is dispositive of the defendant's claims and, accordingly, dismiss the appeal in AC 36454 and AC 36874 as moot.
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Kennedy v. Putman, 97 Conn.App. 815, 818, 905 A.2d 1280 (2006)
.
, the defendant filed two appeals from the trial court's judgment of dissolution and various postdissolution rulings, claiming that the court improperly issued certain orders pertaining to the method by which the parties' marital home would be sold. One of the claims that the defendant raised was that the trial court improperly awarded the plaintiff the sole authority to set the listing price for the marital home. Id., at 874, 859 A.2d 942. During the pendency of the appeals, the marital home was sold to a third party. Id., at 877, 859 A.2d 942. In light of this fact, this court held that the defendant's claims that concerned the sale of the marital home were moot. Id., at 878, 859 A.2d 942. It reasoned that because the marital home had been sold to a third party, it could not afford the defendant any practical relief regarding any orders that related to the method by which the marital home was to be sold. Id., at 877, 859 A.2d 942
; see also Morgan v. Morgan, 139 Conn.App. 808, 811–12, 57 A.3d 790 (2012)
( ); Fiddelman v. Redmon, 59 Conn.App. 481, 483–84, 757 A.2d 671 (2000) ( ).
Here, the defendant challenges the trial court's order regarding the method by which the subject property was to be sold. Because the subject property has now been sold and conveyed to a third party, this court will not be able to afford the defendant any practical relief regarding the method by which the property was to be sold. Accordingly, the appeal in AC 36454 and AC 36874 is dismissed as moot.
In the defendant's second consolidated appeal, he claims that the court improperly (1) denied his motion to decrease the amount of his alimony and child support obligations, (2) denied his motion to disqualify the presiding judge on the ground of judicial bias, and (3) granted the plaintiff's motion for counsel fees. The defendant's brief is inadequate, and, thus, we decline to review his claims. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court in AC 37424 and AC 37425.
On May 2, 2014, the defendant filed a postdissolution motion to modify his alimony and child support obligations. He requested a "downward modification" on the ground that his "income ha[d] drastically decreased." The court held a hearing on this motion, together with other pending motions, on November 5 and 12, 2014. Exhibits were admitted into evidence at that time. On December 3, 2014, the court issued its ruling denying the motion.5
At the time of the hearing held on November 5, 2014, the defendant filed a written motion to disqualify the presiding judge with an accompanying affidavit signed by the defendant.6 The court acknowledged its receipt, stated that it had reviewed the motion, represented that it had no bias or prejudice toward the defendant and denied the defendant's motion to disqualify from the bench.
In the court's December 3, 2014 order, it additionally ruled on the plaintiff's February 24, 2014 motion for counsel fees to defend the defendant's appeal from a prior ruling of the court on a postdissolution motion. The court granted the plaintiff's motion and ordered the defendant to pay $8886.07 to the plaintiff on or before December 22, 2014.
The defendant has challenged the court's rulings on these three postdissolution motions. The plaintiff argues that this court should not consider the defendant's claims because they are inadequately briefed for appellate review. We agree with the plaintiff.
dictates the content and organization of an appellant's brief. The brief shall contain Practice Book § 67–4(c)
. Further, Practice Book § 67–4(d).
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