Pryor v. State

• Decision Date: 09 February 2012
• Citation: 92 A.D.3d 1047,937 N.Y.S.2d 734,2012 N.Y. Slip Op. 00873
• Parties: Nicholas PRYOR, Appellant, v. STATE of New York, Respondent.
• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division

2012 N.Y. Slip Op. 00873

92 A.D.3d 1047

937 N.Y.S.2d 734

Nicholas PRYOR, Appellant,

v.STATE of New York, Respondent.

Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Third Department, New York.

Feb. 9, 2012.

Nicholas Pryor, Dannemora, appellant pro se.

Eric T. Schneiderman, Attorney General, Albany (Kathleen M. Arnold of counsel), for respondent.

Before: MERCURE, Acting P.J., ROSE, SPAIN, MALONE JR. and McCARTHY, JJ.

SPAIN, J.

Appeal from an order of the Court of Claims (Milano, J.), entered December 21, 2010, which, among other things, granted defendant's motion for summary judgment dismissing the claim.

Claimant, a prison inmate, was placed in involuntary protective custody (hereinafter IPC) in October 2008 based upon confidential information received by a correction sergeant that claimant was in danger of being stabbed. Claimant was released from IPC in August 2009. Thereafter, he commenced this action seeking monetary damages for his alleged wrongful confinement in IPC. Following defendant's answer, claimant moved to dismiss defenses and defendant moved to dismiss the claim pursuant to CPLR 3211(a) (2) and (7) and/or for summary judgment. The Court of Claims granted defendant's motion for summary judgment and denied claimant's motion as moot. Claimant now appeals.

We affirm. “Governmental immunity protects defendant from liability for the injurious consequences of official action ‘when [that] action involves the exercise of discretion or expert judgment in policy matters, and is not exclusively ministerial’ ” ( Metz v. State of New York, 86 A.D.3d 748, 750, 927 N.Y.S.2d 201 [2011], quoting Haddock v. City of New York, 75 N.Y.2d 478, 484, 554 N.Y.S.2d 439, 553 N.E.2d 987 [1990] ). By statute, the Department of Corrections and Community Supervision (hereinafter DOCCS) is responsible “for the safety, security and control of correctional facilities” (Correction Law § 137[2]; see Arteaga v. State of New York, 72 N.Y.2d 212, 218–219, 532 N.Y.S.2d 57, 527 N.E.2d 1194 [1988] ). To that end, an inmate who may be a potential victim, and who does not voluntarily accept admission into protective custody, may be restricted from communication with the general inmate population ( see 7 NYCRR 330.2[b] ). In our view, a decision to place an inmate in IPC is a discretionary one made by DOCCS in furtherance of its duty to protect the safety of both the inmates and the correctional facility ( see e.g. Matter of Robinson v. Fischer, 82 A.D.3d 1630, 1631, 919 N.Y.S.2d 633 [2011]; Matter of Bartley v. Fischer, 73 A.D.3d 1363, 1364, 901 N.Y.S.2d 743 [2010]; Matter of Lane v. Kirkpatrick, 68 A.D.3d 1280, 1281, 890 N.Y.S.2d 682 [2009] ). Accordingly, defendant is entitled to governmental immunity regarding such decisions.

Claimant contends, however, that immunity was negated here by the failure of DOCCS to comply with 7 NYCRR 330.3(b)(2). Even assuming that the failure of DOCCS to comply with the rules and regulations governing IPC were to negate defendant's immunity ( see generally Arteaga v. State of New York, 72 N.Y.2d at 220–221, 532 N.Y.S.2d 57, 527 N.E.2d 1194; Varela v. State of New York, 283 A.D.2d 841, 841, 724 N.Y.S.2d 917 [2001] [no immunity for actions regarding inmate disciplinary matters, which are quasi-judicial in nature, if DOCCS violates applicable rules and regulations] ), we find no such failure here. Pursuant to 7 NYCRR 330.3(b)(2), an inmate in IPC “shall have such status reviewed every 30 days by a three-member committee...