Przybyla v. Przybyla
| Citation | 2018 Ohio 3071 |
| Decision Date | 03 August 2018 |
| Docket Number | Appellate Case No. 27852 |
| Parties | JOHN M. PRZYBYLA Plaintiff-Appellee/Cross-Appellant v. MICHELLE C. PRZYBYLA Defendant-Appellant/Cross-Appellee |
| Court | United States Court of Appeals (Ohio) |
(Appeal from Domestic Relations Court)
OPINIONBRIAN A. SOMMERS, Atty. Reg. No, 0072821 and CRAIG M. SAMS, Atty. Reg. No. 0089716, 10532 Success Lane, Dayton, Ohio 45458 Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellee/Cross-Appellant
THOMAS M. DINEEN, Atty. Reg. No. 0037727, 683 Miamisburg-Centerville Road, Dayton, Ohio 45459 Attorney for Defendant-Appellant/Cross-Appellee
{¶ 1} Defendant-Appellant, Michelle Przybyla ("Michelle"), appeals from a judgment modifying her spousal support and denying her motion to show cause. Plaintiff-Appellee/Cross-Appellant, John Przybyla ("John"), has also filed a cross appeal.
{¶ 2} Michelle presents ten assignments of error, which allege various errors, including: that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to modify support, that the court abused its discretion in modifying support; that the court's decision was against the manifest weight of the evidence; that the court erred in failing to consider income of John's current wife and erred in refusing to add the wife as a party; that the court erred in computing John's alleged support arrearage and in dismissing Michelle's motion to show cause; and that the court erred in finding that John's income for spousal support purposes did not include distributions from redemption of stock. John's sole assignment of error pertains to the trial court's decision to exclude the deposition of his doctor.
{¶ 3} After considering the assignments of error and the cross-assignment of error, we conclude that they are without merit. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court will be affirmed.
{¶ 4} On June 7, 2006, John filed a complaint seeking a divorce from Michelle. According to the complaint, they were married in July 1975 and had four children, two of whom were emancipated. Of the remaining children, one was nearly 17 years old and the other was 13 years old. Michelle filed an answer and counterclaim for divorce on June 16, 2006.
{¶ 5} The case did not proceed to trial. Instead, the parties entered into a separation agreement; a divorce decree, incorporating the separation agreement, was then filed on March 9, 2007. When the decree was filed, John was employed by Woolpert, Inc., and Michelle had recently finished school to become a massage therapist. Michelle also had a degree as a registered nurse and was licensed in Ohio, but had not worked during most of the marriage.
{¶ 6} The parties had substantial assets and few debts. Under the separation agreement, Michelle received $120,891 in cash, and John received $44,024. They each later received $52,000 from the sale of the marital home.
{¶ 7} John retained $386,234 in Woolpert stock because company policy required stockholders to be full-time owners of the company and precluded division of this asset.1 To equalize the assets, Michelle was given $320,798 in retirement accounts, including $87,423 in a T. Rowe Price account; $210,000 from John's Woolpert 401(k) account; $16,523 in a Fifth Third IRA account; and $6,852 contained in another Fifth Third IRA account. John retained $5,111 from the Woolpert 401(k) account. Thus, the respective distribution of assets was $441,689 for Michelle and $435,369 for John. After the money received from the sale of the house is added, Michelle received $493,689 and John received $487,369.
{¶ 8} In addition, Michelle received one-half of the martial portion of John's defined benefit plan with Woolpert. QDROs were subsequently filed with respect to this asset and the other retirement accounts that Michelle received.
{¶ 9} The separation agreement also provided for child support and spousal support. John retained custody of the older child, and Michelle was not ordered to pay any child support. John agreed to pay $1,006 per month in child support for the other child, with support to cease in 2011, when the child turned 18 years old or graduated from high school.
{¶ 10} Regarding spousal support, the separation agreement contained a provision for payment of spousal support of $3,750 per month indefinitely, plus certain additional payments based on John's receipt of additional income over $135,000 as well as bonuses. Additionally, the separation agreement reserved the court's continuing jurisdiction as to the amount and duration of spousal support. Docket #32, Separation Agreement, pp. 3-4.
{¶ 11} Prior to cessation of child support payments, spousal support was to be paid through the Child Support Enforcement Agency ("CSEA"); after that time, the parties agreed that John would pay spousal support to Michelle by electronically transferring funds from his banking institution to Michelle's banking institution. Id. at p. 7.
{¶ 12} Neither party appealed from the filing of the divorce decree, and no post-decree motions were filed until November 8, 2016, when John filed a motion to terminate his spousal support obligation. John stated in the motion that he anticipated retiring on March 1, 2017, due to recently discovered health issues.
{¶ 13} On December 9, 2016, Michelle filed a motion to dismiss John's motion, based on alleged lack of jurisdiction. The same day, Michelle also filed a motion seeking to have John held in contempt. She claimed in the motion that John had failed to pay spousal support and had failed to provide her with verification of any change in his annual income and bonuses received.
{¶ 14} Subsequently, on April 7, 2017, John filed an amended motion to terminate spousal support or, alternatively, to modify spousal support. A magistrate then held an evidentiary hearing on May 30, 2017, at which time the magistrate heard testimony from John's accountant, John, and Michelle. After the hearing, the magistrate found a substantial change in circumstances and reduced John's spousal support obligation to $2,500 per month, indefinitely. The magistrate also overruled Michelle's motion to show cause, but did order John to pay $500 towards attorney fees in connection with a motion to compel discovery that Michelle had filed.
{¶ 15} Both sides filed objections to the magistrate's decision, and on December 12, 2017, the trial court filed a decision and judgment, sustaining both parties' objections in part and overruling both parties' objections in part. The trial court agreed that John had shown a substantial change in circumstances, but concluded that the magistrate had erred in including the present-day value of John's Woolpert stock in his income. The court further concluded that the magistrate erred in failing to include several sources of income as part of Michelle's annual income. These sources included: Michelle's income from miscellaneous investments; Michelle's portion of the Woolpert 401(k); Michelle's Woolpert pension; and Michelle's election to take against John's Social Security income. The court also overruled both parties' objections to the attorney fee award. Based on the court's calculation of the parties' incomes, the court reduced John's spousal support obligation to $750 per month.2
{¶ 16} Michelle filed a notice of appeal on January 5, 2018, and John filed a cross-appeal on January 12, 2018.
{¶ 17} A number of Michelle's assignments of error are interrelated or overlapping, and will be considered together, where appropriate. Michelle's First Assignment of Error states that:
The Trial Court Erred and Abused Its Discretion by Improperly Applying the Controlling Statutory and Case Law in Its Determination that "A Substantial Change of Circumstances" Had Occurred Since the Time of the Divorce or the Previous Order as It Applies to Spousal Support.
{¶ 18} Under this assignment of error, Michelle initially contends that a party must establish a substantial change of circumstances before a trial court can exercise jurisdiction over a motion to modify spousal support. According to Michelle, this means that trial courts are required to hold bifurcated hearings; in the first hearing, the court must decide if a substantial change exists. If that is the case, the court then holds a second hearing to consider whether support should be modified. Both the trial court and magistrate rejected this argument.
{¶ 19} R.C. 3105.18(E) states, in pertinent part, that a court lacks jurisdiction to modify spousal support awards unless it "determines that the circumstances of either party have changed and unless * * * [i]n the case of a divorce, the decree or a separation agreement of the parties to the divorce that is incorporated into the decree contains a provision specifically authorizing the court to modify the amount or terms of alimony or spousal support."
{¶ 20} There is no dispute here that the parties' separation agreement, as incorporated into the decree, reserved jurisdiction to modify spousal support. Thus, the only "jurisdictional" issue was whether John demonstrated a change of circumstances. Notably, R.C. 3105.18 does not require bifurcated hearings in situations where a party asks to modify support; in fact the statute does not even mention hearings or the form of any hearings.
{¶ 21} Michelle has also not submitted any relevant case law indicating that a bifurcated approach is mandated. Instead, Michelle relies on Morris v. Morris, 148 Ohio St.3d 138, 2016-Ohio-5002, 69 N.E.3d 664, in which the Supreme Court of Ohio observed that its own procedural rules cannot enlarge substantive rights conferred by R.C. 3105.18(E). Id. at ¶ 32.
{¶ 22} Morris has nothing to do with the situation before us, as it only involved whether Civ.R. 60(B) could be used to allow relief from spousal support judgments based on fraud and mistake. In rejecting the application of the rule, the court noted that Civ.R. 60(B) and R.C....
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