PTI Royston, LLC v. Eubanks

• Decision Date: 28 June 2021
• Docket Number: A21A0182
• Parties: PTI ROYSTON, LLC v. EUBANKS et al.
• Court: Georgia Court of Appeals

PTI ROYSTON, LLC
v.
EUBANKS et al.

A21A0182

Court of Appeals of Georgia

June 28, 2021

FIRST DIVISION

BARNES, P. J.,

GOBEIL and MARKLE, JJ.

NOTICE: Motions for reconsideration must be physically received in our clerk's office within ten days of the date of decision to be deemed timely filed.

DEADLINES ARE NO LONGER TOLLED IN THIS COURT. ALL FILINGS MUST BE SUBMITTED WITHIN THE TIMES SET BY OUR COURT RULES.

MARKLE, Judge.

This interlocutory appeal raises the question of whether the general tort statute of repose in OCGA § 51-1-11 (b) (2) bars strict liability claims brought under the Asbestos Claims and Silica Claims Act, OCGA § 51-14-1 et seq. ("the Act"). For the reasons that follow, we conclude that it does. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court's ruling, and remand the case to the trial court to consider whether there was any fraud that would preclude PTI from raising the statute of repose defense.

When considering a motion to dismiss, we construe the pleadings in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and resolve any doubts in the plaintiff's favor. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. System of Ga. v. Brooks, 324 Ga. App. 15, 15-16 (749 SE2d 23) (2013). "When a question of law is at issue, such as whether the statute of [repose] bars an action, we owe no deference to the trial court's ruling and apply the plain legal error standard of review." (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Smith v. Brooks, 354 Ga. App. 78, 79 (840 SE2d 156) (2020).

So viewed, the facts as set forth in the complaint are as follows: Shirley Eubanks used Johnson & Johnson baby powder containing talc daily from 1963 until 2016. In 2016, she was diagnosed with an aggressive form of ovarian cancer, which she contends is due to the asbestos found in talc powder. Three years later, Eubanks and her husband ("the Plaintiffs") sued Johnson & Johnson ("J&J") and PTI Royston, LLC ("PTI"), a company that has manufactured talc for J&J since 2005,^[1] alleging three counts of strict liability based on the failure to warn, a design defect, and a manufacturing defect.^[2]

PTI moved to dismiss the strict liability counts on the ground that the Plaintiffs' claims are barred by the ten-year tort statute of repose in OCGA § 51-1-11 (b) (2). It is undisputed that PTI's first sale of the talc was in 2005, more than ten years before Eubanks learned of her cancer diagnosis and filed suit.

Following a hearing, the trial court denied the motion to dismiss, finding that the plain language of the limitation provision in the Act, as codified in OCGA § 51-14-5, barred the application of the general tort statute of repose.^[3] The trial court granted a certificate of immediate review, and this Court granted PTI's application for interlocutory appeal.

On appeal, PTI argues that the trial court erred in reading the Act's statutory provision as displacing the general tort statute of repose because the plain language of the statute of repose establishes that it applies to all strict liability claims against manufacturers, without exception for asbestos claims. It contends that the trial court's interpretation of OCGA § 51-14-5 frustrates the General Assembly's intent as set forth in the Act itself. PTI further argues that the two statutes should not be read in pari materia under our rules of statutory interpretation, and the Act provides for a statute of limitation, not a statute of repose. PTI also asserts that the trial court erred in finding the specific provision in the Act controlled over the more general statute of repose because the provisions in these two statutes do not conflict. Finally, it argues that Plaintiffs' accusation of fraud does not bar it from raising the statute of repose as a defense.

Before we turn to construction of the relevant statutes, we begin with a history of the Act to place this dispute in context. In passing the Act, the General Assembly recognized that "[d]iseases caused by asbestos exposure often have long latency periods[]" and that there was the potential for "massive litigation expense and the crowding of trial dockets," if claimants rushed to file suit in order to avoid statute of limitation issues. OCGA § 51-14-1 (a) (4) (7)-(8). The General Assembly then enacted OCGA § 51-14-5 specifically to establish a limitation period for asbestos-related claims.^[4] Under OCGA § 51-14-5,

Notwithstanding any other provision of law, with respect to any asbestos claim or silica claim not barred as of May 1, 2007, the limitations period shall not begin to run until the exposed person . . . obtains, or through the exercise of reasonable diligence should have obtained, prima-facie evidence of physical impairment[.^[5]]

(Emphasis supplied.)

At issue here is the interplay between this limitation provision in the Act, OCGA § 51-14-5, and the general tort statute of repose in OCGA § 51-1-11 (b) (2), which provides that "[n]o action shall be commenced [related to manufacturer liability] with respect to an injury after ten years from the date of the first sale for use or consumption of the personal property causing or otherwise bringing about the injury."

1. Statutory construction.

PTI argues that the strict liability claims are barred by the general tort statute of repose in OCGA § 51-1-11 (b) (2), which applies to all strict liability claims, whereas the language in OCGA § 51-14-5 provides only a statute of limitation.^[6] Applying our rules of statutory construction, and given the ordinary meaning of the language in both statutes, and the purposes set forth in the Act itself, we agree.

The application of the statute of repose to claims raised under the Act is an issue of first impression in Georgia, and the answer turns on questions of statutory construction. Our

interpretation and application of statutory language is guided by the following principles: A statute draws its meaning, of course, from its text. Under our well-established rules of statutory construction, we presume that the General Assembly meant what it said and said what it meant. To that end, we must afford the statutory text its "plain and ordinary meaning," we must view the statutory text in the context in which it appears, and we must read the statutory text in its most natural and reasonable way, as an ordinary

...