Pub. Guardian of Contra Costa Cnty. v. Steven P. (In re Steven P.)
| Decision Date | 10 May 2023 |
| Docket Number | A164267 |
| Parties | Conservatorship of the Person of Steven P. v. STEVEN P., Objector and Appellant. PUBLIC GUARDIAN OF CONTRA COSTA COUNTY, Petitioner and Respondent, |
| Court | California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals |
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
(Contra Costa County Super. Ct. No. P2000147)
Steven P. appeals from an order reappointing a conservator of his person, pursuant to the Lanterman-Petris-Short Act (the Act; Welf. &Inst. Code, § 5000 et seq.).[1] Because the order has already expired and the appeal is moot, we address only one of Steven's arguments on the merits and dismiss the appeal.
In 2020, the trial court appointed the director of the Contra Costa County Health Services Department (Public Guardian) as conservator of Steven's person, found him gravely disabled, and empowered the Public Guardian to place him in a locked facility and make medical decisions on his behalf. Approximately three weeks before the conservatorship period expired, the Public Guardian petitioned to be reappointed as conservator. Steven objected to the petition and asked for a bench trial, which the court held on November 2, 2021.
Psychiatrist Michael Levin, M.D., testified as an expert in psychiatry and grave disability. Dr. Levin had met Steven three times, once in person in May of 2020, once in September of 2021 via videoconference, and then another time in November 2021 via videoconference. Dr. Levin also reviewed medical records from Steven's most recent hospitalization at Contra Costa Regional Medical Center and from his current placement Crestwood Vallejo. The trial court admitted the medical records.
Dr. Levin diagnosed Steven with schizophrenia (paranoid type) and polysubstance abuse, which are recognized as major mental illnesses in the most recent edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders. Schizophrenia is a thought disorder that has several symptoms, including delusions, hallucinations, and paranoia.
Dr. Levin testified that the primary treatment for schizophrenia is medication. At the time of trial, Steven was on two antipsychotic medications, Haldol and Zyprexa. Steven also was prescribed Depakote-a mood stabilizer. Dr. Levin identified insight-or awareness of having a mental illness-as another factor that can help people comply with treatment and avoid the problems caused by schizophrenia. However, Steven appeared to lack such awareness. In his interviews with Dr. Levin, he denied experiencing hallucinations, despite the fact that hallucinations are documented in Steven's medical records. Steven also denied having a mental illness and stated that he did not need to take (and would not take were he not in a facility) any psychiatric medication.
Based on his interviews with Steven and his review of Steven's medical records, Dr. Levin concluded that Steven remained gravely disabled. Dr. Levin stated that Steven's lack of insight into his mental disorder, as well as his resistance to taking medication, made it highly doubtful that he would take his medication if released from the conservatorship. Furthermore, Steven's mental illness undermines his ability to maintain relationships, which means that he is unable to obtain or maintain shelter with other people. In Dr. Levin's opinion, Steven had no viable plan for maintaining shelter if he were released from conservatorship.
The trial court found (1) that Steven remained gravely disabled in that, because of his schizophrenia, he is unable to provide for his personal needs for food, clothing, or shelter; (2) that several legal disabilities should be imposed, including the right to refuse or consent to psychiatric and routine medical treatment; the right to enter into contracts; the right to drive; and the right to possess a firearm or other deadly weapon; and (3) that Steven's current placement was the least restrictive and most appropriate level of care.
The court later issued written orders reappointing the Public Guardian as conservator for a one-year period commencing on August 20, 2021.[2]
Because the one-year period of Steven's conservatorship expired before appellate briefing was complete (§ 5361, subd. (a); Conservatorship of K.P. (2021) 11 Cal.5th 695, 709-710), we asked the parties to submit supplemental letter briefs addressing whether the appeal is moot.
The Public Guardian maintains that Steven's appeal is moot-not only because the challenged order has expired but also because the conservatorship has not been renewed. In fact, the petition for reappointment (filed in August 2022) was dismissed after Steven left his placement, in November 2022, and could not be located.[3]
Steven concedes his appeal is moot. (See MHC Operating Limited Partnership v. City of San Jose (2003) 106 Cal.App.4th 204, 214 [].) However, as he points out, we have discretion to address issues in an otherwise moot appeal if the controversy between the parties is likely to reoccur (Environmental Charter High School v. Centinela Valley Union High School Dist. (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 139, 144), or if the issue concerns a matter of public importance that is capable of repetition yet evades review. (Brown, Winfield &Canzoneri, Inc. v. Superior Court (2010) 47 Cal.4th 1233, 1240, fn. 1; Conservatorship of Manton (1985) 39 Cal.3d 645, 647, fn. 1; Conservatorship of J.Y. (2020) 49 Cal.App.5th 220, 225, rev. granted Aug. 19, 2020, S263044, rev. dismissed July 20, 2022.)
In exercising our discretion, we consider Steven's arguments on appeal. Steven's first argument is that the trial court erred by admitting certain portions of his psychiatric records, which he insists were inadmissible hearsay. Steven does not dispute that the trial court had an obligation to consider "the historical course of [Steven's] mental disorder," which explicitly includes his psychiatric records. (Welf. &Inst. Code, § 5008.2, subd. (a).) He also concedes that Conservatorship of S.A. (2018) 25 Cal.App.5th 438, 447-448 (S.A.) held that a conservatee's redacted psychiatric records were properly admitted under the business records exception (Evid. Code, § 1271) when accompanied by a foundational declaration, and does not argue that S.A. was incorrectly decided.
Instead, Steven argues that the trial court, despite excluding all psychiatric diagnoses within those records, exceeded the bounds of S.A., supra, 25 Cal.App.5th at pages 447-448, People v. Reyes (1974) 12 Cal.3d 486, 502-504, and People v. Terrell (1955) 138 Cal.App.2d 35, 57-58-by admitting certain select statements in the psychiatric records, which purportedly were not observations of "an act, condition, or event" (Evid. Code, § 1271). Steven contends these particular statements were instead inadmissible opinions or conclusions. We decline to address such fact-intensive questions in the context of this moot appeal. Steven fails to persuade us that this is an issue of public importance or that our review of the specific instances he complains of now will be of any utility to a reoccurring dispute between these parties.
Steven also argues that there was no substantial evidence to support the order imposing legal disabilities (§ 5357), which deprived him of the right to make routine medical decisions, to drive, to possess a firearm, and to contract. Because Steven is no longer subject to the challenged order and the issue is solely factual and not of general interest, we decline to address it.
However, we will exercise our discretion to address Steven's second argument on appeal-the trial court erred in admitting expert testimony on the ultimate issue-because it appears likely to arise again in future conservatorship proceedings.
Steven argues that the trial court erred by admitting Dr. Levin's expert opinion on the ultimate issue-grave disability. We assume (for the sake of argument) that the issue was not forfeited by Steven's failure to raise this specific objection below but conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion. (See People v. Rowland (1992) 4 Cal.4th 238, 266 [standard of review].)
In this bench trial, the trial court was tasked with deciding the ultimate factual issue-whether Steven P. was "gravely disabled" as defined by the Welfare and Institutions Code. (Conservatorship of Murphy (1982) 134 Cal.App.3d 15, 19.) A person is gravely disabled if, as a result of a mental disorder, they are unable to provide for their basic personal needs for food, clothing, or shelter. (§ 5008, subd. (h)(1)(A).) Under this standard,...
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